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Chapter 1
General Introduction
The study of comparative financial systems remains one of the most challenging issues in
Finance, crystallizing many puzzles and sources of controversy within the scientific com-
munity. The role of politics, defined as political preferences and executive constraints,
proved to be crucial for our understanding of the evolution and shape of financial sys-
tems. Starting from this literature on comparative development, this dissertation aims
at studying the level, structure, and functioning of financial markets and intermediaries
in a political economy perspective. In this general introduction, I first review this lit-
erature; I then offer a theoretical framework borrowed from Acemoglu, Johnson, and
Robinson (2005) to position the essays of this dissertation; and, I close this chapter by
outlining each essay.
1.1 Contracts, Property Rights, and Financial Systems
Financial systems are entrusted with the crucial task of allocating capital to its more
productive uses and maintaining the right balance between risk and reward. The de-
velopment of financial systems leads economic growth and development through capital
accumulation and technological innovation (Levine, 1997).1 However, capital accumula-
tion and innovation are only endogenous mechanisms (or proximate causes) of growth,
1The finance-growth literature demonstrates a positive (causal) link between financial development
and economic growth regardless of whether it looks at variance in outcomes across countries, across
regions within countries, within countries over time, and across industries or firms (King and Levine,
1993; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998, 2000; Rajan
and Zingales, 1998; Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic, 1998; Beck, Levine, and Loayza, 2000; Wurgler,
2000; Cetorelli and Gamberra, 2002; Fisman and Love, 2004; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004b;
Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2005; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Van Nieuwerburgh, Buelens,
and Cuyvers, 2006; Krishnan, Nandy, and Puri, 2014). These studies built on theoretical and narrative
insights of Goldsmith (1969), Shaw (1973), McKinnon (1973), among others. Importantly, the current
research effort focuses on the analysis of the mechanisms through which finance affects the real economic
activity.
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rather than fundamental causes. The fundamental explanation of the development of
financial systems, and hence economic growth is institutions. North (1990: 3) defines in-
stitutions as follows: “Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally,
are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they
structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic.”
The finance literature consistently shows that contracting institutions and their per-
manence drive the development of financial systems. Contracting institutions refer to
laws and regulations that govern contracts and contract enforcement between borrowers,
investors, and other corporate stakeholders, but also to other policy variables such as
taxes, labor laws, and competition, prudential and macroeconomic policies. In particu-
lar, the extent to which outside investors, both minority shareholders and creditors, are
protected by law from expropriation by managers and controlling shareholders of firms
is of primary importance for the development of financial systems (see La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000b). Indeed, legal protection of outside investors
eases financial contracting by reducing agency costs and asymmetries of information
and therefore improves governance and contract enforceability.2,3
Contracting institutions vary greatly across countries and time, and, as a result, do fi-
nancial systems. The degree to which outside investors are protected by law is contrasted
around the world. In the late 1990s, English Common law countries afforded the best
legal protections to shareholders, whereas French Civil law countries had on average the
package of laws the least protective of shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1998). The German and Scandinavian Civil law countries lie in between.
The exception of this rule is that secured creditors are, comparatively speaking, best pro-
tected in German and Scandinavian Civil law countries (see also Davydenko and Franks,
2008). Striking variations are also evident across time. Between 1990 and 2005, Civil
law countries such as France, Germany, and Italy embraced significant reforms aimed
at empowering minority shareholders and enhancing disclosure requirements, which are
effective tools for countering abuses by dominant shareholders (Enriques and Volpin,
2Legal protections of shareholder rights include one-share-one-vote, proxy voting by mail allowed,
judicial venue for minority shareholders to challenge managerial decisions, preemptive rights for new
issues of stocks, ability to call extraordinary shareholders’ meetings, etc. These rights are also disclosure
and accounting rules, which provide investors with the information they need to exercise other rights.
Legal protections of creditor rights largely deal with bankruptcy and reorganization procedures, and
include measures that enable creditors to repossess collateral, to respect priority rules in bankruptcy,
and to make it harder for firms to seek court protection in reorganization.
3This view is thus mainly concerned with the ways the “agent” (manager, entrepreneur) can credibly
commit to return funds to the “principal” (outside investor) and thus attract external financing. The
content of this dissertation mostly reflects this dominant view in economics as articulated, e.g., in
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2003). An interesting and fruitful research
area is concerned to move from this dominant, narrow, view—i.e., simply put as being solely preoccupied
by investor returns—to a broader “stakeholders” view (see Tirole, 2001, for a discussion).
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2007). The United Kingdom has one of the highest levels of legal protections for mi-
nority shareholders today, while it was devoid of such protections until the end of the
Second World War (Franks, Mayer, and Rossi, 2009). Contrasting with the current con-
text, in the nineteenth century the French incorporation laws and legal practices offered
more sophisticated and flexible solutions to organize business than the U.S. Common
law (Lamoreaux and Rosenthal, 2005). Brazil had strong protection of creditor rights
on paper over the period 1850-1945, and these rights were strictly enforced by the com-
mercial courts (Musacchio, 2008). Indeed, following independence (1821-1824), Brazil
adopted the Brazilian Commerce Code of 1850, which continued the Napoleonic tra-
dition by establishing a bankruptcy procedure that was highly protective of creditors;
for example, when debtors were accused of fraud against creditors, bankruptcy could
be considered a crime and punishment included jail sentences. This is in sharp con-
trast with the country’s current profile of inadequate creditor protection and contract
enforcement.
How can we explain the variations in the data? An active line of research, initiated
by Shleifer and his co-authors (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997,
1998; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2002), relates the legal environment and, more particularly,
investor protection to financial development. The causal effect of the legal environ-
ment, however, is not easy to establish since legal institutions arise endogenously. As
an example, a country may choose democratically to strengthen minority investor and
disclosure rights and then adopts the laws accordingly; the resulting correlation between
the protection of minority investors and legal environment simply reflects a democratic
choice. To circumvent the causality problem, Shleifer and his co-authors argue that
investor protection is rooted in the structure of the legal system, which is historical in
origin and to some extent not “chosen”. The authors employ the four origins of the
legal system as instruments to isolate the exogenous component of investor protection:
English Common law, French Civil law, German Civil law, and Scandinavian Civil law.
They derive interesting correlations between legal origins and investor protection. In
a series of papers they go on to show across a large cross-section of countries that the
legal origin correlates with various measures of financial outcomes such as the size and
breadth of both equity and debt markets, ownership concentration, dividend payouts,
and corporate valuation (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997, 1998,
2000a, 2002; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 1999).4 Recent work takes one
step further to identify the channel through which legal origin really operates. La Porta,
4Other authors have applied the legal origin view to issues such as cross-listing decisions (Reese and
Weisbach, 2002), takeover activity (Rossi and Volpin, 2004), development of the syndicated loan mar-
ket (Cumming, Lopez-de-Silanes, McCahery, and Schwienbacher, 2013), corporate social responsibility
(Liang and Renneboog, 2014).
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Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006) focus on English Common law countries’ securities
laws that facilitate private lawsuits.5
However, the merits of the view that the origin of the legal system is a fundamental cause
of financial development, and hence economic growth, have been questioned by a more
recent strand of literature which emphasizes the all-important role of the political envi-
ronment (Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005; Roe, 2006; Haber, North, and Weingast, 2007;
Malmendier, 2009; see Perotti, 2014, for a review).6 The underpinning of the debate
“legal versus political” institutions is the link between finance and growth presented at
the outset. This debate is particularly relevant has legal institutions have been found
to predict various financial outcomes, but less consistently economic growth and devel-
opment. The political economy approach criticizes the legal origin view along two main
arguments: The first argument posits that legal institutions and financial outcomes are
jointly determined, political power (as defined below) being the link between them. The
second argument posits that political power directly impacts on financial and economic
outcomes, with or without legal institutions.
First, one part of this literature does not refute per se that legal institutions—including
investor protection—have a causal effect on finance, but demonstrates that legal origin
is not their foundations. Central to the political economy approach is that institutions
are endogenous; they are, at least in part, determined by society, or a segment of it. This
approach is in the spirit of North (1990: 3), who goes on to emphasize: “Institutional
change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understand-
ing historical change.” The evolution of contracting institutions and, as a consequence,
the phases of financial development coincide with changes in government, the relative
power of interest groups, or the composition of dominant political alliances. Roe (1994)
and Bebchuk and Roe (1999) point out that the composition of corporate stakeholders
and their relative political power vary across countries and time and may explain the
divergence in corporate governance between the United States and Continental Europe.7
The political economy approach proved thus to be crucial to explain another important
criticism of the legal origin view: Its generalization to the past. Since a country’s legal
system is the outcome of choices made centuries ago, this view implies countries with
the “wrong” legal origin are doomed to have bad investor protection and, accordingly, to
remain financially underdeveloped. Some authors indeed question the existence of corre-
lations if one uses historical data (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Lamoreaux and Rosenthal,
5As La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006: 22) put it: “[. . . ] we have found the “true”
channel through which legal origin matters: it is correlated with the development of stock markets
because it is a proxy for the effectiveness of private contracting as supported by securities laws.”
6Stulz and Williamson (2003) add religion and language as possible fundamental determinants.
7Specific evidence on the control of European corporations can be found in Barca and Becht (2002),
whose findings confirm the sharp contrast between Continental Europe and Anglo-Saxon countries.
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2005; Malmendier, 2009). Impressively, Rajan and Zingales (2003) assemble data on
several indicators of financial development for a broad panel of countries. The authors
observe that many Civil law countries, such as Austria, Belgium, and France, had a very
high level of capital market development in the early twentieth century, even higher than
the United States. They also identify structural breaks and, in particular, “Great Re-
versals” in many countries’ financial structure. Rajan and Zingales (2003) show that
the reliance on capital markets of many Civil law countries shrank dramatically in the
interwar period, while, at the same time, their governance mode shifted towards banks
and other institutions at the expense of capital markets. Figure 1.1 illustrates well
these Great Reversals. This figure presents yearly stock market capitalization data over
the entire history of Belgium. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that these empirical
patterns correlate with the role of dominant economic elites holding back financial de-
velopment. In particular, the Great Reversals reflected a change, resulting from the
Great Depression, in the ability of dominant elites to capture financial and product
market regulations. However, the political explanation provided by Rajan and Zingales
(2003) does not lend to fully account for the reasons why some Civil law countries, such
as the Netherlands and Switzerland, maintained a market-oriented financial system. In-
deed, the authors support the idea that the governance system in Civil law countries is
more centralized and, thereby, easier for small elites to capture it.
Figure 1.1: The Historical Evolution of Belgian Stock Markets
This graph shows the evolution of stock market capitalization ratio, which is the ratio of the
market value of equity of domestic companies to GDP, in Belgium (1835-2009). Source: SCOB
Database.
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Perotti and von Thadden (2006) argue in turn that major shocks hit asymmetrically
countries in Continental Europe. In particular, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France,
and Italy experienced large inflationary shocks after the World War One, while other
countries do not. The authors offer a median voter model to predict that these price
shocks impoverished the middle class, shaping its political preferences over the role of
capital markets in society, and contributed to the Great Reversals. Perotti and von
Thadden’s (2006) model is a key contribution as it allows to explain why some Civil law
countries have not experienced further market development in the postwar period (see
the case of Belgium in Figure 1.1), contrasting with other Civil law countries such as the
Netherlands and Switzerland. Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) propose an empirical
test of this view, but they do not look directly at financial development. They show
that large shocks in wealth distribution through hyperinflation in the interwar period
explain the emergence of different structures of pension system in democratic countries.
To explain differing contracting institutions and financial systems, related papers em-
phasize that not all institutions are equally difficult to change. One view also holds
that political institutions are more difficult to change than legal institutions, and more
broadly contracting institutions, and that for this reason political institutions have a
substantial impact on contracting institutions and hence on the development of finan-
cial systems. Pagano and Volpin (2005) argue that some constitutional features affect
contracting institutions. The authors predict that the electoral rule, by determining
the formation of party coalitions representing specific groups of corporate stakeholders,
influences the level of both shareholder and employment protection. They consistently
show cross-country evidence that strong shareholder protection is more likely in coun-
tries with majoritarian electoral rule, while strong employment protection is more likely
in countries with proportional electoral rule. Sˇevcˇ´ık (2012) proposes a political economic
theory of the level of investor protection in a dynamic framework and endogenizes, in
contrast, the proportion of each group of corporate stakeholders in the economy.8
In an early survey, Pagano and Volpin (2001) report that similar dynamics are at play for
various financial policy measures, including bankruptcy, takeover, privatization, bailouts,
branching restrictions, deposit insurance, and securities market. For example, Berglo¨f
and Rosenthal (2000) explore the degree to which the populist and other debtor move-
ments in the United States influenced the variation in bankruptcy laws over time. Biais
and Perotti (2002) show how a conservative policy maker seeking reelection may design
8In a subsequent paper, Pagano and Volpin (2006) study investor protection and stock market
development in a political economy model and show that reinforcing feedback loops are at play generating
multiple equilibria: Strong investor protection induces companies to issue more equity, increasing stock
market size, which in turn may expand the investor base and increases support for investor protection.
They show, consistently with their model, that international convergence in legal protection of outside
investors is positively associated with cross-border mergers and acquisitions activity.
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privatization policies in such a way as to promote diffused financial shareholdings and
align the preferences of the voters against redistributive policies. Caselli and Gennaioli
(2008) analyze the different political feasibility of economic and financial reforms.
Second, another strand of the political economy literature demonstrates that political
institutions directly influence financial and economic development—with or without law.
In their work, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997) shed light on the type of institutions aris-
ing during the colonial era in the New World and persisting over time. The emergence
of differing institutions is due to initial conditions faced by New World colonial soci-
eties established by the Europeans—their respective factor endowments—that fostered
equality or inequality. The authors provide detailed evidence that factor endowments
such as climate, geography, natural resources, or soil conditions help explain long-run
economic success of some countries through their impacts on institutions. Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) exploit empirically this argument and propose an analysis
complementary to this story by arguing that the effect on institutions was the result of
the mode of Western European settlement around the world. The mode of settlement
can be divided into two broad categories that are related to factor endowments: those
where Western Europeans had little interest in settling due to harsher and unfavorable
conditions. In these colonies, mostly in Central America, the Caribbean, South Asia,
or Africa, Western European settlers conquered and exploited natural resources without
the concern to leave behind them favorable political institutions, which turned out to
be harmful for subsequent economic growth and prosperity; and those, like in Australia
or the United States, where Western Europeans settled in larger numbers and there-
fore developed political institutions more defensive of private property and of system of
checks and balances in government. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2002) show, in
a companion paper, a similar effect of indigenous population density. They document
that the regions of the world that were relatively rich around 1500 underwent a “reversal
of fortune” subsequently. They argue that this militates against a geographic determin-
ist view of development but the natural explanation for the reversal comes from the
political institutions hypothesis.
Another example of the direct role played by politics has to be found in the differing
degrees of wartime destruction. One such argument is offered by Roe (2003, 2006), who
argues that war damage shaped ownership structures and reliance on stock markets in
richer countries, as a result of private choices. Countries that suffered from military
invasion and occupation in the twentieth century overwhelmingly had Civil law legal
systems, while no core English Common law countries collapsed or suffered similarly
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from both wars. The wars destroyed institutions, wrecked societal foundations, and ul-
timately shifted voters’ risk aversion and ideology.9 In Civil law countries that had nicely
developed financial markets in 1913, war devastation made these countries indifferent or
even antagonistic towards stock markets in the subsequent decades. Moreover, in an ide-
ologically polarized context, the concentration of control in Continental Europe resulted
from the need for corporate owners to counter the influence of organized labor. Summing
up, Roe (2006: 498—499) writes: “I suspect it’s no accident that Switzerland—a civil
law nation—has securities markets and ownership separation numbers that more closely
resemble those in America and Britain than those in France or Germany: Switzerland
is one of the few core civil law nations not destroyed during the twentieth century.”
Even more directly, Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) evaluate the importance of legal ver-
sus political institutions in explaining cross-country differences in financial and economic
development. They use well-known indicators in the political economy literature sourced
from Polity IV and Political Risk Services to measure the political institutions of a soci-
ety, that is, those constraining the expropriation by government and powerful elite (the
authors coined instead the term “property rights institutions”). Employing instrumen-
tal variables strategies, their study reveals that political institutions have a first-order
impact on long-run economic growth, investment, and the overall level of financial de-
velopment (stock markets and the banking sector), while legal institutions—enabling
private contracts between individuals—only appear to matter for stock market devel-
opment. Their interpretation for these findings is as follows. Private agreements or
reputation-based mechanisms can compensate for legal institutions, but alternative ar-
rangements cannot compensate political institutions against the risk of expropriation.
For example, banks can increase interest rates, provide closer monitoring, or develop
reputation-based credit relationships, when it is more difficult for them to collect on
their loans. Modigliani and Perotti (2000) show in this respect that bank-based financial
system emerges in weak legal environment as banks are bound by some form of private
enforcement. The effect of legal institutions is therefore limited given these possible
alternative private arrangements. In contrast, when there is little protection for private
property or few checks and balances against government expropriation, individuals do
not have the conditions necessary for investment and trade. In this case, individuals are
also unable to write credible contracts with the state to prevent future expropriation as
the state is the ultimate arbiter of contracts. Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine (2003)
undertake similar horse races between legal institutions and political institutions. They
report that factor endowments (proxying political institutions) predict stock market and
9Consistently, Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) document that countries experienced sudden price
shocks due to war damage show higher uncertainty aversion.
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banking development, whereas legal origins (proxying legal institutions) have little (or
any) explanatory power, in line with the findings of Acemoglu and his co-authors.10
The literature on the political economy of finance is still fairly novel, but this brief
introduction through the lens of the literature on comparative financial systems—of
which this dissertation mostly belongs—demonstrates its impact and importance.
1.2 Political Economy in Finance: A Roadmap
As illustrated, the political economy approach, by pooling contributions from historians,
political scientists, and economists, illuminates many important themes in finance. This
dissertation has accordingly the following basic question as an overarching theme: What
are the consequences of countries’ political system on their financial markets and inter-
mediaries? It proceeds in answering this question along with the following theoretical
framework derived from Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005). This framework,
though abstract and rather simple, serves as a guide for the three essays of this dis-
sertation and, ultimately, enables to provide some answers to this basic question. A
schematic representation of the framework is shown in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Causal Schema
As discussed in the previous section, differences in contracting and economic institutions,
by shaping economic incentives, are a major source of cross-country differences in finan-
cial and economic development (the boxes on the right-hand side of Figure 1.2).11 These
institutions determine the size of the aggregate pie, but also how the pie is divided among
10Another closely related literature in political science and economics investigates the link between
democracy and economic development (see, e.g., Papaioannou and Siourounis, 2008; Acemoglu, Naidu,
Restrepo, and Robinson, 2014). Quintyn and Verdier (2010) show in a large sample of countries that
sustained financial deepening is most likely to occur in stable democracies.
11Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005: 395) define good economic institutions as: “those that
provide security of property rights and relatively equal access to economic resources to a broad cross-
section of society.”
Chapter 1. General Introduction 10
different groups and individuals in society—i.e., the distribution of resources (physical
capital, financial capital, and human capital). Contracting and economic institutions are
however endogenous and determined by the distribution of political power. As differing
contracting and economic institutions lead to variations in the distributions of resources,
there is no guarantee that all individuals and groups have the same preferences regard-
ing these institutions. Conflict of interests thus emerges among these individuals and
groups. The prevailing equilibrium set of contracting and economic institutions is de-
termined by their relative political power; that is, the institutions securing the best
the interests of the groups or individuals that succeeded in asserting (politically) their
wishes. In many cases this equilibrium can be costly for the society at large.
In the finance literature, a bunch of theoretical papers shows that elites use their political
power to pursue weak legal protection of outside investors as an indirect way to increase
entry costs and thus avoid competition (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Perotti and Volpin,
2007; Fulghieri and Suominen, 2012; Buck and Hildebrand, 2014). On the empirical
side, much recent evidence shows that elites can restrict financial development in order
to limit access to finance: Braun and Raddatz (2008) find that change in the strength
of incumbent industries resulting from trade liberalization in 41 countries is a good
predictor of subsequent financial development. Fogel, Morck, and Yeung (2008) show
evidence that countries where the same companies maintain a dominant position over
time have lower economic growth, weak investor protections, and less developed capital
markets. Rajan and Ramcharan (2011) find that, in the 1920s, U.S. counties in which
the agricultural elites have disproportionately large land holdings tend to have fewer
banks per capita, costlier credit, and limited access to credit. Other empirical evidence
shows how political connections create distortions in the allocation of capital and access
to finance in developing and developed economies (see, e.g., Sapienza, 2004; Dinc, 2005;
Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Claessens, Feijen, and Laeven, 2006; Duchin and Sosuyra, 2012;
Behn, Haselmann, Kick, and Vig, 2014).12
Moreover, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) offer a useful distinction between
de jure and de facto political power. On one hand, de jure political power refers to
power that originates from the political institutions (e.g., which segments of the popula-
tion are enfranchised, how power is contested, how constrained the power of politicians
12Another strand of this literature measures the value of political connections in countries with
weak institutions such as Indonesia and Malaysia (Fisman, 2001; Johnson and Mitton, 2003) as well
as in countries endowed with good institutions such as the United States (e.g., Cooper, Gulen, and
Ovtchinnikov, 2009; Goldman, Rocholl, and So, 2009; Akey, 2013; Acemoglu, Johnson, Kermani, Kwak,
and Mitton, 2013).
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and elites is, etc.).13 On the other hand, de facto political power is the political power
that is not allocated by political institutions, but rather is possessed by individuals and
groups as a result of their ability to organize, to use paramilitary forces and other means
of repression, to lobby or bribe politicians, to capture and control political parties, etc.
Figure 1.2 emphasizes in turn that the distribution of political power in society is en-
dogenous: De jure political power is endogenous to political institutions, while de facto
political power is endogenous to the distribution of resources. Political institutions and
the distribution of resources are the fundamental variables in this framework because
they change relatively slowly, and they determine directly and indirectly contracting/e-
conomic institutions and financial/economic development (see the previous section).
Crucially, this theoretical framework is not static, political institutions, though highly
persistent, are endogenous to de jure and de facto political power. The distribution of
resources shapes incentives and preferences over outcomes and thus feeds back into de
facto political power (the arrow at the bottom in Figure 1.2), which may lead to insti-
tutional political change. As an example, the emergence and flourishing of democracies
across history have been characterized by the extent to which individuals were able to
organize and engage in collective action to push for regime changes such as the presence
of labor unions during the first wave of democratization in Europe prior World War One,
or more recently the events of the Arab Spring helped with the massive use of social
networks. Besides, those who hold de jure power can also influence political institutions
by exercising their de jure power, and opt to maintain political institutions favorable to
their interests.14
This theoretical framework thus emphasizes for potential changes of political institu-
tions. These institutional political changes can be simply changes in the way political
institutions function—such as Italy who abandoned its former reliance on full propor-
tional representation in the 1990s, or the Belgian parliament which approved in 1993 the
transformation of the country into a full-fledged federal state—but they can be far more
discontinuous in the face of shocks. World history is plenty of examples of such dis-
continuous institutional political changes such as episodes of democratization, diffusion
of political rights across the population, repression of different groups. A prominent
13The label “political institutions” can be understood broadly—including, for example, social
norms—but this label is here attached to formal rules, typically laid down by explicit provisions in
constitutions (e.g., electoral and legislative rules associated with the forms of government), which en-
tail different combinations of desirable attributes of a political system—namely, its accountability and
representativeness.
14Conflicts between de jure and de facto political power can be at play. For example, the transition
from nondemocracy to democracy increases de jure political power, but at the same times elites may
intensify their investments in de facto political power, for example via lobbying, in order to (partially)
offset their loss of de jure political power (see Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008, for a formalization of this
idea).
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example is the economic consequences of the evolution of the constitutional arrange-
ments in the seventeenth century England following the Glorious Revolution of 1688
described in North and Weingast’s (1989) classical work. Later the French Revolution
also produced a violent shock to the so-called Ancien Re´gime, ending the reign of the
absolutist French monarchs. On August 4, 1789, the National Constituent Assembly en-
tirely changed French laws by proposing a new constitution which abolished the feudal
system with the privileges it entailed and stated most notably equality before the law
for all, not only in daily life and business, but also in politics. Decades of instability and
war followed the French Revolution, but a slow and interrupted process ended French
absolutism and led to the emergence of inclusive political and economic institutions,
culminating in the Third Republic in 1870. Then, the French Revolutionary Armies
and later Napoleon invaded large parts of Continental Europe, destroying absolutism,
abolishing guilds, ending feudal land relations, and imposing the equality before the
law. The French Revolution set in train a slow political emancipation of poorer classes
not only in France but in much of the rest of Continental Europe. Furthermore, in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, elites in many parts of Europe, in face
of heightened social unrest (de facto power), were forced to grant suffrage to broader
segments of the population. The broadening of suffrage is identified as an important
factor in improving access to credit, reducing the power of monopolies, and promoting
more intermediated finance (see Calomiris and Haber, 2014, for several case studies and
Chapter 2 for a systematic analysis).
This theoretical framework to finance-related issues makes up a rich research agenda,
which is covered in the next three chapters of this dissertation. In particular, this
dissertation offers three essays, each opening one box on the left-hand side of Figure 1.2,
with financial markets and intermediaries as a common theme: The first essay focuses
on political institutions (namely, the ones governing suffrage), the second one looks at
de jure political power (namely, the type and composition of governments), while the
third essay deals with de facto political power (namely, bank lobbying activities).
1.3 Outline of the Dissertation
Each of the three essays is a stand-alone contribution and can be read independently
of the other essays. This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains a
co-authored study analyzing how political institutions governing the expansion of suf-
frage impact on the historical evolution of countries’ reliance on both stock market and
bank finance. By exploiting significant variation reflecting various suffrage restrictions
between and within countries over the last two centuries, this study demonstrates that
Chapter 1. General Introduction 13
a political support for stock markets was possible when voting rights were limited to
wealthy elites; consistent with the insight that narrow elites pursue economic opportu-
nities by promoting capital raised on stock markets. In contrast, a political support for
the banking sector emerges when voting rights spread across the population. Indeed,
the expansion of suffrage induces a poorer median voter which has any (lower) finan-
cial holdings and, therefore, benefits less from the riskiness and financial returns from
stock markets. A broader political participation empowers a middle class with different
preferences, where banks are favored over stock markets since banks share its aversion
to risk. This study consistently reports panel data evidence that countries with tighter
suffrage restrictions tend to rely more on stock markets, whereas countries with broader
suffrage are more conducive towards the banking sector. As a result, it finds evidence
indicating that countries with tighter restrictions on voting franchise tend to have a
more market-oriented financial system. The results presented are robust to controlling
for other institutional arrangements, alternative hypotheses, and endogeneity.
Chapter 3 presents a co-authored study examining the political outcomes driving the
pace and extent of reforms aimed at supporting financial sector development. The last
three decades of the twentieth century have been characterized by a global drive to re-
form finance, but progress has not been homogeneous. This chapter investigates the role
of government cohesiveness in explaining part of this heterogeneity across countries and
over time, finding that fragmented governments do breed stalemate. This phenomenon
has often been assumed in the literature, based on circumstantial observations, but a
formal, systematic assessment was still lacking. This study fills this gap by exploit-
ing a panel dataset covering the OECD countries for 30 years and undertaking several
robustness checks. It is worth emphasizing that this study controls for but does not con-
centrate on constitutional features—such as the electoral rule as in Pagano and Volpin
(2005). It rather looks at political outcomes (the type of de jure political power) resulting
from constitutional features, namely government fragmentation. Indeed, majoritarian
electoral rules are more likely to produce single-party government, whereas coalition gov-
ernments are more likely under proportional electoral rules. This study highlights that
these political outcomes produce, as discussed in the previous section, systematic effects
on financial policymaking, creating an indirect link between constitutional features and
financial policy outcomes of interest. Chapter 3 also outlines three non-mutually exclu-
sive theoretical mechanisms to explain the results: the first based on a war of attrition
among political parties, the second on conflict of interests between constituencies, and
the third on the possibility of lobbying individual members of a coalition.
Chapter 4 shifts attention to the examination of the incidence and drivers of lobbying
efforts made by the banking industry in the United States. This last study documents
the relationships between lobbying, regulatory oversight, and bank risk taking. Using
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a large sample of commercial and savings banks, it finds that lobbying banks are less
likely to be subject to a severe enforcement action, a key tool of banking micro-prudential
supervision. These results suggest that banks engage in lobbying to gain preferential
treatment. Among the lobbying dimensions studied, lobbyists with prior employment
in public offices are more effective at reducing the probability of an action, especially
in period of intense enforcement activity. These findings are robust to controlling for
supervisory ratings and account for endogeneity concerns by employing instrumental
variables strategies. This study also shows an increase in default and credit risk at
lobbying banks. Overall, these results appear rather inconsistent with an information-
based explanation of bank lobbying, but consistent with the capture theory of regulation
a` la Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976).
Chapter 2
Suffrage Institutions and
Financial Systems∗
2.1 Introduction
The quality of institutions is viewed as a fundamental determinant of economic growth
and development through factor accumulation (North and Thomas, 1973; see Ace-
moglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005, for a review). In North and Thomas’s view,
factor accumulation—including financial capital—is a proximate cause of growth. The
fundamental explanation of comparative financial systems is thus differences in key in-
stitutional arrangements that define rules and rights aimed at protecting investors and
∗This chapter is based on CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9621, “The Political Economy of Financial
Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two Centuries”, co-authored with Hans De-
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Alessandro Lizzeri, Humberto Llavador, Ron Masulis, Raoul Minetti, Kris Mitchener, Steven Ongena,
Kim Oosterlinck, Enrico Perotti, Thomas Piketty, Marco da Rin, Richard Roll, Henri Servaes, Elu von
Thadden, John Turner, Paolo Volpin, Harald Uhlig, Burcin Yurtoglu, and Alberto Zazzaro for many
helpful discussions. We have also benefited from the comments of seminar participants at the Univer-
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supporting private contracts.1 Three fundamental institutions are critical for financial
rules and rights, and hence for the development of financial systems: legal, cultural, and
political institutions (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998; Rajan and
Zingales, 2003; Stulz and Williamson, 2003; Acemoglu and Johnson, 2005).
Fundamental institutions, such as legal origins and persistent cultural traits, are clearly
important and there is convincing evidence confirming their roles for the development of
financial systems.2 However, they do not lend to fully account for time-series variation in
financial systems as changes in legal origin or culture are extremely rare. They therefore
ought to be complemented by other institutional views. Of primary importance to ex-
plain the rise and decline of stock markets and banking sector is the evolution in political
institutions, as acknowledged by Haber, North, and Weingast (2007); in particular, po-
litical institutions governing the expansion of suffrage,3 a key measure of the distribution
of political power. Notwithstanding that economic historians have argued that political
institutions shaped financial systems, there has been little systematic examination of the
evidence, especially from an international perspective. This paper empirically examines
how the diffusion of voting rights across the population helps to explain the historical
evolution in a country’s reliance on both stock market and bank finance.4 We focus on
the scale of external finance (hereafter, financial development) but also on the degree to
which countries have bank-based or market-based financial systems (hereafter, financial
structure) (see, e.g., Beck and Levine, 2002). Financial development and structure have
been conclusively shown in the literature to accelerate economic growth (for a review
see, e.g., ESRB, 2014).
Suffrage reforms during the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries are crucial po-
litical changes. Suffrage reforms affect the ability of elites to obtain disproportionate
political leverage, and to design legal frameworks and state policies to benefit themselves
relative to others in terms of access to finance and economic opportunities. Paying at-
tention to changes in suffrage institutions gives indeed insights into the shifts in political
equilibria affecting financial systems over time. For example, Benmelech and Moskowitz
1There is ample evidence showing that rules and rights aimed at protecting outside investors, includ-
ing minority shareholders and creditors, and supporting private contractual arrangements do matter for
the development of financial systems; see, e.g., La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997,
1998), Levine (1998), Modigliani and Perotti (2000), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2006), or
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007).
2See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) who review the theory and empirical findings
of legal origins. On the role of culture, see most notably Stulz and Williamson (2003), Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales (2004a), Licht, Goldschmidt, and Schwartz (2005), and Siegel, Licht, and Schwartz (2011).
3We use the terms “suffrage” and “franchise” interchangeably throughout the paper.
4Our study builds on the seminal work by Rajan and Zingales (2003), Roe (2003), Gourevitch and
Shinn (2005), Perotti and von Thadden (2006), Haber, North, and Weingast (2007), Malmendier (2009),
Roe and Siegel (2009), Calomiris and Haber (2014), and many others who conceive historical changes
in a country’s financial system as reflecting shifts in the distribution of political power. Perotti (2014)
provides an excellent survey on the political economy underpinnings of financial systems.
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(2010) show that financial regulation was exploited by elites with political power for
their own interests in nineteenth century America. They provide evidence that usury
laws—limiting the maximum legal interest rates—were used to hamper competition and
control entry. States that restricted suffrage to taxpaying property owners tended to
impose more strict usury laws.5 Haber (2011) documents for Brazil, Mexico, and the
United States that less inclusive suffrage institutions amplified the political power of
elites and that their power inhibited policies governing banks, which in turn shaped
the size and competitive structure of the banking sector (see also Calomiris and Haber,
2014). Using stock price data, Turner and Zhan (2012) find that investors in British
firms, foreseeing future alterations of their property rights, responded negatively to the
1867 suffrage reform.
As illustrated, the prevalence of inclusive suffrage institutions and constraints on elites’
political power facilitate access to credit and promote more intermediated (bank) fi-
nance (see also Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006).6 While broader voting rights lead to
higher level of financial development, financial structure can still differ markedly across
democracies. Rajan and Zingales (2003) actually observe significant cross-country dif-
ferences in financial structure. The authors also document rapid changes occurring in
financial structure during the twentieth century and identify in particular “Great Rever-
sals” experienced by many European countries in the interwar period and Japan after
the Second World War.
Embedded in the premise underlying interest group theory of suffrage institutions (En-
german and Sokoloff, 2005), our paper goes beyond narrative insights and country-
specific studies and investigates whether the impact of suffrage institutions on financial
development and structure is generalizable to a broad set of countries. Combining vari-
ous data sources, we construct a unique historical panel dataset allowing us to provide
external validity regarding the all-important question of the link between suffrage and
both stock market and bank finance.7 This allows us to exploit important variation
in suffrage institutions in a time series and cross-sectional dimension and draw more
general conclusions on the political economy underpinnings of financial structure. The
main analysis relies on a panel dataset of 18 today’s established democracies covering the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and for which we obtained sufficiently reliable data.
5Relatedly, Bolton and Rosenthal (2002) give a theoretical explanation for why U.S. states with less
inclusive suffrage institutions were less likely to pass debtor relief legislation.
6Focusing on the banking sector, Quintyn and Verdier (2010) relatedly show in a large sample of
countries since the early 1960 that sustained financial deepening is most likely to occur in countries
endowed with high-quality political institutions. Bordo and Rousseau (2006) find similar evidence in a
more historical perspective.
7In Haber’s (2011) conclusion, the question of external validity of the link between suffrage institu-
tions and banking development is raised as follows: “Are these results generalizable? Obviously, more
detailed case studies beyond the three presented here [i.e., Brazil, Mexico, and the United States] are
necessary before any firm conclusions should be draw [. . . ]”.
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While our sample only includes 18 countries, it represents almost the entire population
of countries with a history of democratic voting. Summary statistics depict significant
variation between and within countries reflecting various suffrage restrictions based on
wealth, social status, education, gender, and race. More specifically, summary statistics
indicate that voting franchise was low at the beginning of the twentieth century, with
on average 17.3% of the population allowed to vote in 1900. This percentage increased
to 25.5% around 1913 and crossed the 50% mark generally after the Second World War
only. Exploiting these variations using standard panel data techniques, we show evi-
dence that suffrage institutions have a strong economic and statistical effect on financial
development and structure. Countries with tighter restrictions on their voting franchise
tend to rely more on stock markets, whereas countries with broader voting franchise are
more conducive towards the banking sector, reflecting the political support of the newly
enfranchised segment of the population. Employing our most conservative estimates, a
one standard deviation greater voting franchise leads to a 24.6% lower degree of stock
market capitalization and a 16.1% greater banking sector development. As a result, we
do find evidence indicating that countries with tighter restrictions on voting franchise
tend to have a more market-oriented financial structure.
Our findings are consistent with the insight that narrow elites pursue economic oppor-
tunities by promoting capital raised on stock markets. In contrast, a broader political
participation empowers a middle class with different preferences, where banks are fa-
vored by limiting the rights of minority shareholders. Bank finance is preferred by less
financially wealthy citizens with proportionally more exposure to labor income, as it
contains corporate risk. This prediction arises as a median voter equilibrium in Perotti
and von Thadden (2006), but a similar implication arises when government formation
depends on interest group coalitions (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; see also Hellwig, 2000;
and Gourevitch and Shinn, 2005). By moving (the location of) the median voter or by
determining the ruling coalition, the scope of the voting franchise directly influences the
development and structure of a country’s financial system.
We also address the cross-sectional implications of several complementary hypotheses
related to other (observable and unobservable) factors of institutional quality affect-
ing financial development and structure. First, we control for observable factors such
as legal origins, religious composition, and electoral rules, among other institutional
arrangements. Second, the respective contribution of each of these fundamental insti-
tutions is hard to disentangle, as it is in part a matter of definitions and of indicators
construction (Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2004; Acemoglu and
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Johnson, 2005).8 We overcome, however, objections related to other unobservable fac-
tors of institutional quality in the following ways. We include country fixed effects in
our specifications in order to remove the effect on financial outcomes of fixed country
characteristics potentially correlated with suffrage. We also include year fixed effects
to remove any common global trends in suffrage that may be correlated with finan-
cial outcomes. Critically, our results hold even after controlling for GDP per capita
and wealth inequality. We further address potential concerns about omitted variable
bias by adopting a difference-in-differences (DID) approach. This allows us to exploit
exogenous inter-temporal variations from two major suffrage reforms across countries—
namely, male and female universal suffrage reforms. The DID methodology confirms
our predictions. All in all, in these efforts to unbundle institutions, the economic and
statistical significance of suffrage institutions are unaffected.
Our results also contrast with the time-series implications of the “modernization hy-
pothesis”. The central tenet of the modernization hypothesis as articulated by Lipset
(1959) is that economic development causes a country to be democratic. This would
suggest that our results do not establish causality and that they are driven by reverse
causality. Reverse causality cannot be ruled out easily, since expansion of the voting
franchise can be the result of economic growth and factor accumulation, rather than
a cause thereof. Although the most recent studies give little empirical support for the
modernization hypothesis (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared, 2008,
2009; Aidt and Jensen, 2014), we further use an instrumental variables (IV) approach to
mitigate concerns about the cause-and-effect relationships involved. We employ proper
instruments that are country-time level varying by building on the historical and theo-
retical literature on the reasons why governing elites granted suffrage to other segments
of the population. Using this IV strategy, we obtain results confirming the predictions
of a link going from suffrage institutions to financial development and structure.
Finally, we investigate whether suffrage institutions exert long-run effects. We find that
the time of adopting universal suffrage has long-lasting impacts on financial structure.
Extending the set of countries to 35, our long-run evidence reveals an impressive impact
of the delayed introduction of the universal suffrage on the form of today’s financial
systems: a 25-year delay in the introduction of universal suffrage relates to a remarkable
17.5% increase in the today’s importance of stock markets relative to the banking sector.
8Indeed, there can be big overlap between legal systems, religious composition, and national political
institutions making it hard to isolate the idiosyncratic component of these features (especially working
with small samples of countries). For example, judicial review can be equally seen as a legal or a political
institution limiting government discretion, while enforcement of contracts requires legal rules as well as
government support. Also, legal origin may proxy for institutions that are not fundamentally related to
the legal systems: Common law countries are primarily Protestant, while French civil law countries are
overwhelmingly Catholic. The legal origin view has evolved over time as argued by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). Now the authors seem to adopt a more cultural interpretation of legal
origin “as a style of social control of economic life”.
Chapter 2. Suffrage Institutions and Financial Systems 20
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, supporting evi-
dence on the political institutions view has been primarily based on panel studies across
U.S. states (Benmelech and Moskowitz, 2010; Rajan and Ramcharan, 2011), or cross-
sectional variation around significant historical discontinuities, such as the Great Re-
versals (Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Perotti and Schwienbacher, 2009). This paper goes
beyond by assembling a broad historical panel of countries and identifying evidence for
the new generation of political economy models (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Perotti and
von Thadden, 2006). We add in turn to this new generation of political economy mod-
els by stressing the role played by suffrage institutions. Second, this paper empirically
shows how broadening the electorate affects not just the scale of external finance over
time but also its structure. This result allows to distinguish their effects from comple-
mentary hypotheses such as the legal origin view (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer,
and Vishny, 1997, 1998) or the majoritarian/proportional view of government policies
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Pagano and Volpin, 2005). Indeed, Modigliani and Perotti
(2000) suggest that in weak legal environments, banks may provide closer monitoring
than dispersed shareholders. The legal origin view shows that banking is particularly
developed in the German legal tradition. Even if some civil law traditions were sys-
tematically less supportive of shareholder rights, and banks represent the alternative,
a (time-varying) political explanation was still lacking. We provide in this respect an
empirical attempt showing why over time depositors would be better protected than
shareholders. Third, our empirical setting illuminates causality, running from suffrage
institutions to financial outcomes, and thus offers evidence for a richer alternative to a
simplistic modernization hypothesis. Finally, this paper speaks to the dominant politi-
cal science literature centered on the “Varieties of Capitalism” model (Hall and Soskice,
2001), of which our evidence rationalizes the approach.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 develops the theoretical
framework and testable hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the data and proceeds with
a discussion of initial assessments of our hypotheses. Section 2.4 contains our main
empirical results, while the long-run analysis is presented in Section 2.5. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.2 The Suffrage and Finance Nexus
This section clarifies the channel through which suffrage institutions affect financial
development and structure. In this way, we lay out the main hypotheses to be tested.
We then provide some case studies to further illustrate the economic channel we capture.
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2.2.1 Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses
The premise underlying institutional quality arguments is that key institutional arrange-
ments that define rules and rights are regarded as pre-conditions of the development of
financial systems. In particular, the political institutions view considers that good po-
litical institutions should come first because they determine the distribution of political
power in society: let people vote to influence their fortune, and to constrain elites from
abusing power. In the tradition of classical political economy, we consider that financial
rules and rights affecting financial systems are the result of political decision-making,
which are in turn influenced by economic interests. As corporate stakeholders, voters
have preferences about external financing because it affects corporate decisions, which
drive the creation and distribution of national wealth. Suffrage institutions, by deter-
mining the enfranchised segments of the population, constitute therefore a corner stone
of political outcomes. By voting for their representatives, the enfranchised population
can influence the political agenda, and thus the implementation of policies protecting
their interests. As shown, broadening the electorate is consequential as it undermines
regulatory capture by elites, increases the access and provision of credit to the private
sector (Bordo and Rousseau, 2006; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006; Benmelech and
Moskowitz, 2010), and helps protect property rights as well as investor rights (North
and Weingast, 1989).
The models of democratic choice—such as Pagano and Volpin (2005) and Perotti and
von Thadden (2006)—predict that political preferences, which are determined by the
distribution of equity ownership in the economy,9 shape the national financial system.
In other words, in this view, voters’ preferences at each point in time determine the scale
of stock markets and banking sector and thereby also the relative importance of stock
markets vis-a`-vis the banking sector.
We hypothesize that countries with tighter restrictions on voting franchise tend to have
higher levels of stock market development. In contrast, countries with broader franchise
tend to have higher levels of banking sector development.
These two predictions follow Perotti and von Thadden’s (2006) median voter equilib-
rium.10 The political support for banks or stock markets is determined by the median
voter, which has a mixed identity as investor and worker. If the median voter has little
financial wealth and mainly relies on labor income, a political majority will favor high la-
bor and creditor protection. Indeed, this median voter will assign a central role to banks
9This assumption is consistent with empirical observations. For example, Kaustia, Knu¨pfer, and
Torstila (2014) empirically examine the role stock ownership plays in shaping political preferences and
find a positive and economically significant effect on right-of-center vote share.
10Biais and Mariotti (2009) take a similar theoretical setting to analyze the political process through
which bankruptcy laws can emerge.
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over stock markets since banks share its aversion to risk. Banks have a tendency to limit
risk-taking behavior of corporate managers, since, as debtholders, they do not benefit
from the upside potential of riskier investments. In contrast, if the median voter has
sufficient financial wealth, a majority will support strong minority shareholder protec-
tion and therefore a greater role for stock markets. Stock market development results in
riskier but more profitable investments at the cost of higher labor risk-bearing. Similar
predictions arise from interest group coalition as in Pagano and Volpin (2005).
In this theoretical setting, suffrage institutions play a key role since they affect the
median voter. The expansion of the voting franchise, by adding voters that were drawn
mostly from the lower end of the wealth distribution, allows switching political majorities
towards the preferences of the newly enfranchised segment of the population.11 As
an example, Morgan-Collins (2013) analyzes eleven European countries for the period
1888-1975 and shows that an increase in the size of enfranchised population resulted
in an increased support for socialist parties. Thus, limited suffrage ensures power to
a relatively wealthy median voter, favoring stock markets, whereas a broader suffrage
moves the median voter towards lower income classes, favoring the banking sector.12
As discussed in the introduction 2.1, financial structure differs across countries, cross-
sectional as well as over time (Rajan and Zingales, 2003). In an early contribution,
Modigliani and Perotti (2000) suggest that in an unreliable enforcement regime, trans-
actions tend to become intermediated through banks, which are bound by some form
of private enforcement. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998)
show evidence that banking sector development is higher in German civil law countries.
Even if the rights of minority shareholders are on average weaker in some Civil law
countries, and banks represent the alternative, political explanations of why creditors
would be better secured than minority shareholders are still necessary. In this respect,
the models of democratic choice (Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Perotti and von Thadden,
2006) are able to account for observed variation also across Civil law countries, while
changes in suffrage institutions further account for observed variation over time. This
results in our third prediction: Countries with tighter restrictions on voting franchise
tend to have a more market-oriented financial structure.
11Economic theory provides different channels leading political elites to broaden the voting franchise.
According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006), the expansion of the voting franchise can be under-
stood as a rational response by the governing elites to avoid revolution. In contrast, Lizzeri and Persico
(2004) and Llavador and Oxoby (2005) argue that the expansion of the voting franchise was the result
of the divergence of interests existing within the elites.
12In this respect, our study also complements another strand of the literature devoted to the economic
effects of suffrage. This literature, echoing earlier concerns of Alexis de Tocqueville’s Democracy in
America ([1835] 1965), largely associated the expansion of the franchise with increases in the size of
government (e.g., Husted and Kenny, 1997; Justman and Gradstein, 1999; Aidt, Dutta, and Loukoianova,
2006).
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2.2.2 Case Studies
A closer look at countries from different legal traditions—England, Belgium, and Sweden—
offers valuable insights of many of the themes in the paper. The history of British bank-
ing after the Napoleonic Wars was not seamless and key changes in the distribution of
political power are reflected in its evolution, as described in details by Calomiris and
Haber (2014, chapters 4 and 5). In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, elites
in control of the government were not particularly concerned about government policies
that target the ability of common people to get bank credit, leaving them in the cold.
However, a series of gradual expansions of suffrage in the nineteenth century made small
elites more and more powerless. The 1832, 1867, 1884 acts broke centuries of tradition
by progressively reducing property requirements for the franchise and allowing several
segments of the male population (comprising members of the working class) to vote.13
The period before 1860 signed the end of the Bank of England’s monopoly and saw the
emergence of competing chartered banks, operating on a branching basis and serving
the needs of private commerce and industry. By the end of the nineteenth century,
the English banking system consolidated, by achieving stability and broadening credit
provision. Consequently, for over a century after 1850, the English banking sector grew
dramatically in terms of both deposits relative to GDP and borrowers’ access to banks
or bank offices. About this period, Calomiris and Haber (2014: 128) add: “By 1904,
there were over 15,000 branches of the Post Office Savings Bank and roughly 400 offices
of trustee savings banks. These new institutions reflected the rise of the middle class as
both an economic reality and a political force seeking its own sources of financing.”
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Belgium passed several reforms on stock
exchanges, while its franchise was fairly narrow.14 In 1867, government gave up its right
to ban firms from trading on the stock exchange. The Company Reform Act of 1873
abolished in turn government approval to set up a limited liability firm. By embracing
these reforms, the Brussels Stock Exchange experienced its fastest development. Van
Nieuwerburgh, Buelens, and Cuyvers (2006: 26) uncover that “between 1873 and 1914,
the total number of listed shares increased from 174 to 1197.” In the years after the
First World War, Belgium witnessed a reversal of the reforms of 1867 and 1873. In
1919, plural voting is abolished and universal suffrage for men over 21 is introduced,
increasing the representation of the Workers Party. The years following these suffrage
13The 1832 “Great Reform” Act increased, for example, the political representation of the burgeoning
industrial cities (like Birmingham and Manchester) at the expense of the so-called rotten boroughs
(locations with minuscule populations).
14Belgium had a restricted manhood suffrage till 1892 with high direct tax minima differing in urban
and rural areas. Male universal suffrage, modified by plural voting, was introduced in 1893. Plural
voting allows a maximum of 3 votes per person depending on education diploma, social status, or
property ownership.
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reforms are characterized by a massive concentration in the banking sector, stimulated
by the law of July 23, 1927. Then, the regulatory reforms of the financial system in 1934-
1935 tightened to a certain extent government control over the stock exchange. Various
events of the era—such as distributional shocks and institutional political reforms—led
the Belgian stock market development to reach its peak in 1929 and to drop off sharply
afterwards.
Ho¨gfeldt (2005) describes how the expansion of voting franchise in Sweden generated
institutional settings that affected the financial structure of the country. Until universal
suffrage was introduced in 1921, the Swedish economy had a well-developed stock market,
with a large fraction of the economy held by a few very rich families. The expansion
of suffrage however secured long-lasting political power to the Social Democratic Party
from 1932 onwards, creating the ground for a more egalitarian economy based on strong
corporatism and less stock market development.
2.3 Data and Initial Assessments
We now introduce the dataset we use throughout our main analysis of the paper and
present preliminary assessments of the link between suffrage institutions and financial
development and structure. We document that countries with (1) tighter restrictions
on voting franchise are conducive to higher levels of stock market development; (2)
countries with broader voting franchise are conducive to higher levels of banking sector
development; and in turn (3) countries with tighter restrictions on voting franchise tend
to have a more market-oriented financial structure. To this end, Table 2.1 provides
definitions of our variables and their sources, Table 2.2 contains descriptive statistics,
and Table 2.3 depicts the evolution of suffrage institutions in our sample countries. Table
2.2 also provides tests of differences in suffrage institutions for low and high countries’
levels of financial development and structure as well as pairwise correlations between
our financial and suffrage indicators.
2.3.1 The Sample
Time-series variation in voting franchise is important to capture its impact on financial
development and structure. Our base sample employs an 18-country panel dataset which
covers the longest time span possible, composed of different years spaced by around ten
years. The analysis on stock market development covers the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries while the analysis on banking sector development and financial structure is
restricted to the twentieth century due to data availability. Our dataset comprises a
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set of today’s established democracies for which we have sufficient information on stock
markets, banking sector, suffrage institutions, and country-specific characteristics. The
countries included in the panel dataset are reported in Table A.1 in Appendix A (in
bold). We are dealing with an unbalanced panel (see Table 2.2). However, every country
is well covered in the time-series dimension as the average number of observations for a
country in the twentieth century is 9 (out of maximum of 10).
2.3.2 Indicators of Financial Development and Structure
We use indicators capturing the scale and the structure of external finance in a country
over time. The goal is to proxy for the degree of availability of stock market finance and
bank finance. We rely on a variety of indicators that are commonly used in the literature
on comparative financial systems (see Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine, 2000).
We employ two indicators for the size of a country’s stock market. The first is stock
market capitalization to GDP (CAPITALIZATION). We combine several data sources
to obtain the longest time series possible (1830-1999)—Goldsmith (1985), Rajan and
Zingales (2003), and Musacchio (2010). We mainly rely on data provided by Rajan
and Zingales (2003) where the stock market capitalization to GDP is covered from 1913
to 1999 and reported for 24 countries. Musacchio (2010) however proposes improved
estimates for 1913 and complements it with 1900, as Sylla (2006) and La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) had questioned the accuracy of Rajan and Zingales’s
figures in 1913: the inclusion of corporate bonds and cross-listed companies produced
poor estimates in 1913. We therefore employ the re-estimated data of Musacchio (2010)
for the years 1900 and 1913 and the data of Rajan and Zingales (2003) for the following
years. Goldsmith (1985) provides additional data on stock market capitalization to GDP
for the nineteenth century but for fewer countries. We complete our dataset by using
Goldsmith (1985) yielding us with observations going back to 1830. The second indicator
of the size of the stock market is the number of publicly listed domestic companies per
million of inhabitants (LISTED COMPANIES). This variable is less prone to fluctuation
of stock valuations and is retrieved from Rajan and Zingales (2003), but is available for
the period 1913-1999 only.15
BANK DEPOSITS is our indicator for the size of a country’s banking sector. It is
defined as the ratio of commercial and savings deposits to GDP. While this indicator
does not provide clear information about the amount of private credit granted by the
banking sector, it is one of the few that has been compiled in a standardized manner for
15We also complete the Rajan and Zingales’s series on stock market development for Belgium with
data taken from the SCOB database maintained at the University of Antwerp. We thank the SCOB for
providing these data.
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a long time-series and for a large cross-section of countries and was employed before by
Rajan and Zingales (2003).16
Finally, we also look at the orientation of the financial system by using a measure
of the importance of stock markets as compared to the banking sector. We define
STRUCTURE as the ratio of CAPITALIZATION to BANK DEPOSITS; if this indicator
is greater than one, it means that in a given country the size of the stock market is
larger than the size of the banking sector, thereby suggesting that the financial system
is market-oriented.
Some countries from the Rajan and Zingales’s (2003) dataset are not in our dataset
since our concern is primarily the period covered before the Second World War and
financial data available for this period are somewhat sparse. Our sample ends up being
18 countries over the time period of 1830-1999 for CAPITALIZATION and 1913 to 1999
for LISTED COMPANIES, BANK DEPOSITS, and STRUCTURE.17
The top part of Panel A in Table 2.2 reports the descriptive statistics for our indicators
of financial development and structure—mean, standard deviation (overall), standard
deviation (within), and standard deviation (between). The mean value of CAPITAL-
IZATION is 0.576 and the within country standard deviation is 0.411. We also note
substantial variation across countries in CAPITALIZATION with a between standard
deviation of 0.319. This substantial variation between and within countries is confirmed
using the other stock market development indicator, LISTED COMPANIES. Table 2.2
also indicates high variability between and within countries for our indicator of bank-
ing sector development, BANK DEPOSITS. Regarding financial structure, the average
value of STRUCTURE is 2.041, indicating that on average countries in our sample have
a market-based financial system. STRUCTURE varies quite a bit over time. As an
illustration, in 1913, STRUCTURE identifies Spain and Japan (Norway and Austria) as
having the most market-based (bank-based) financial systems. In contrast, the United
States and the United Kingdom (Austria and Belgium) are classified as countries with
the most market-based (bank-based) financial systems in 1999.
16The BIS has recently made a panel dataset available on domestic bank credit to the non-financial
sector (see http://www.bis.org/statistics/credtopriv/documentation.pdf). The dataset however
does not cover the period before the Second World War.
17Years under consideration are 1830, 1850, 1861, 1875, 1880, 1881, 1895, 1899, 1900, 1913, 1929,
1938, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, and 1999. Rajan and Zingales (2003) also employ the fraction of
gross fixed-capital formation raised through equity issues. We do not use this indicator as it is not
available for many countries and years under consideration before the Second World War.
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2.3.3 Indicators of Suffrage Institutions
We employ two indicators of suffrage institutions that may explain variations in finan-
cial development and structure among countries. First, we use the number of regis-
tered voters (i.e., those eligible to vote) for the lower house of the national legislature
as a percentage of total population (SUFFRAGE). Second, we employ the number of
valid votes cast for the lower house of the national legislature as a percentage of total
population (EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE). Both measures capture restrictions on voting
franchise across countries and time. EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE is used in order to cap-
ture the extent to which the enfranchised citizens effectively use their voting right, since
not everyone who is allowed to vote may do so. We combine several sources to com-
pute SUFFRAGE and EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE. Information is mostly collected from
the Arthur S. Banks’s (2011) Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (CNTS, from
Databanks International), which goes back to 1815 for some countries. When there are
missing data or when no elections are held for the year under consideration, we take
the most recent election data available. We complement our dataset before the Second
World War with data reported in Mackie and Rose (1982) and Colomer (2001), and since
1945 with the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA)
database. We further find that our data are consistent with those in Flora (1983).
Both measures are scaled by total population instead of the population over the age of 18
(i.e., the voting age nowadays in many countries). For this study looking at cross-country
comparisons over a long time period, scaling by total population is actually preferred
for several reasons. First, voting age is not the same across countries and time. While it
gradually went down to 18 in the last decades, the voting age was substantially higher
in most countries during and right after the Second World War. Moreover, in some
countries voting age has continued to decrease; for instance, the voting age in Austria
was 24 until 1919 passing gradually over the twentieth century from 20, 19, 18 to 16
since 2007. Thus, considering the fraction of population over the age of 18 is likely to be
a contemporaneous benchmark; however, the benchmark has evolved over time. Second,
historical time-series of the total population are more reliable and consistent than series
of the population of 18 and older, which are in most of the sources rough estimates.
This avoids introducing measurement issues. Third, while some of the variation in our
suffrage indicators may be due to changes in the population’s age pyramid, the effect is
likely to be small as the population structure evolves only slowly over time, and is partly
controlled for with our time-period fixed effects. Finally, in the robustness section 2.4.6,
we further show that our results are robust to using population above 18 as denominator.
Table 2.2 (Panel A) and Table 2.3 provide descriptive statistics on our voting franchise
indicators—SUFFRAGE and EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE. Panel A of Table 2.2 shows
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Figure 2.1: The Introduction of Universal Suffrage
This figure shows the number of countries that introduced universal suffrage in our 35-country
dataset. The y-axis gives the number of countries whereas the x-axis the different time periods.
that there is substantial variability in voting franchise within and between countries.
Table 2.3 presents the evolution over time as well as the variation within a specific time
period. We learn that voting franchise has evolved gradually over time. While SUF-
FRAGE was only 14.1% throughout the nineteenth century, the percentage has grown
to over 70.6% by the end of the twentieth century. This reveals a substantial increase
of the fraction of total population that was eligible to vote over time. Table 2.3 also
shows that there is substantial variation in voting franchise across countries within a
particular period even in the late twentieth century. For instance, in 1980, the voting
franchise still ranged from 9.7% to 74.9%. In terms of votes effectively cast (EFFEC-
TIVE SUFFRAGE), the expansion shows a very similar pattern, with on average 10.1%
of total population participating in the elections in the 1830-1899 window and 50.6%
in 1999. Interestingly, the standard deviation exhibits an inverted U-shaped pattern
for both indicators of suffrage institutions. We observe that the heterogeneity in voting
franchise was comparatively low in the beginning of the twentieth century, but then al-
most doubled in subsequent decades. It became lower towards the end of the twentieth
century.
Universal suffrage is another indicator of the expansion of the voting franchise. It is a
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critical milestone in any country as it leads to a substantial expansion of voting franchise
and gives the right to vote to all men and women above a certain minimum age. Figure
2.1 shows in which period countries have introduced universal suffrage for a dataset of 35
countries (a broader dataset we will exploit when looking at the long-run effect of suffrage
institutions on financial structure (section 2.5)). We observe a great variation in the
timing of the introduction of universal suffrage, with a few countries having introduced
it already before the First World War (New Zealand, Australia, and Finland) while other
countries only introduced it late in the twentieth century (Switzerland, Portugal, and
South Africa).
Panel B of Table 2.2 provides an initial assessment on whether countries with stricter
voting franchise have a greater stock market development, lower bank development, and
a structure which is more market-oriented (see also the correlation matrix provided in
Panel C of Table 2.2). We compare our voting franchise indicators for country-year
observations where financial development is below and above the sample median, re-
spectively. SUFFRAGE and EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE are 5 and 9 percentage points
lower in countries where CAPITALIZATION is above the median than those below the
median, respectively (only EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE is statistically significant, how-
ever). Similar insights apply for LISTED COMPANIES even if these data capture only
the twentieth century implying that the voting franchise indicators are somewhat higher.
In contrast, countries with an above median sized banking system (BANK DEPOSITS)
have a larger fraction of their population endowed with voting rights (SUFFRAGE and
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE are 9 and 6 percentage points higher, respectively). Finally,
countries with an above median STRUCTURE have a SUFFRAGE and EFFECTIVE
SUFFRAGE which is 10 and 11 percentage points lower than those with a below median
STRUCTURE. This suggests that country-years with a greater market orientation have
a lower voting franchise. All in all, the differences in means reported in Panel B of Table
2.2 and the correlations in Panel C of Table 2.2 suggest that the extent of the voting
franchise is associated with financial development and structure.
2.3.4 Controls
Our empirical analysis controls for other determinants of financial development and
structure beyond those related to suffrage institutions. We include the contemporaneous
GDP per capita (GDP PER CAPITA) as richer countries are more likely to have more
developed financial systems. Another control for economic development is the degree
of urbanization (URBANIZATION RATE), defined as the proportion of the population
that lives in cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. The progressive transformation
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of a rural population towards an urban population may affect patterns of financial de-
velopment. A rural population involved mainly into agriculture is more likely to finance
its investment via trade or bank credit, whereas an urban population goes hand in hand
with industrialization and the appearance of new sectors (technology, services) that rely
more on market-based finance.
Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine (2003) find that factor endowments explain cross-
country differences in financial institutions, in line with the theories of institutional
development (Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2001).
We rely on control variables measuring factor endowments, namely the number of square
kilometers of the landmass (LAND AREA) and the distance from the equator (LAT-
ITUDE). LAND AREA captures the natural resource endowments, while LATITUDE
captures the geographic endowments. Other fundamental institutions also play a role
next to political institutions. The law and finance literature stresses the role that legal
traditions play in explaining cross-country variations in investor protection, contract-
ing environment, and hence financial development and structure. La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) find that countries with English Common law
legal tradition tend to have broader stock markets than Civil law countries. We control
for this by adding COMMON LAW ORIGIN dummy variable, which equals one if the
country adopted legal institutions from the English Common law and zero otherwise.
An argument dating back to Max Weber places greater emphasis on the crucial role of
religion to explain the development of capitalism and its institutions. Starting from We-
ber’s work, Stulz and Williamson (2003) shed light on the importance of religion in our
understanding of the degree of investor protection across countries. To control for the
impact religion may have on financial outcomes, we add a dummy variable CATHOLIC
which is equal to one if the Catholic religion is the primary religion in the country.
We include two other political economy determinants of financial development and struc-
ture to further identify the channel that voting franchise has on development. First,
the quality of democratic institutions may exert an influence on financial development
(Bordo and Rousseau, 2006; Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 2006; Quintyn and Verdier,
2010). Indeed, the accountability of the government to legislative bodies (i.e., the lower
house) or the electorate’s real political influence may have direct impact on financial
outcomes.18 Countries vary greatly from each other in terms of the degree of restraints
18By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Germany demonstrated a fairly wide voting
franchise but the lower house (Bundestag) had little control on her executive. To contain the political
consequences of her large electorate, the executive was not chosen by the lower house but by the upper
house (Bundesrat), which was not directly elected. Contrasting with neighboring countries such as
Belgium, the executive in Germany was indeed largely unaccountable to the lower house and therefore
to their electorate (Colomer, 2001). When the so-called Weimar Republic was established in 1918,
democratic institutions have been improved and notably the executive was made responsible to the
lower house.
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on the powers of the executive, the competitiveness of political participation, or the ex-
tent to which electorate can effectively express their preferences about ruling coalitions
and policies via elections. We include a dummy variable POLITY 2, which is based on
the “polity2” variable from the Polity IV database to control for the impact associated
with political openness and competitiveness (i.e., the quality of democratic institutions).
It equals one when Polity2 is positive (i.e., when the quality of democratic institutions
is sufficiently high) and zero otherwise. Second, the passage from a majoritarian (pre-
dominant throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) to a proportional
electoral rule is another institutional political reform that may affect financial develop-
ment and structure. Accordingly, the type of the electoral rule induces politicians to
shape their platforms to cater towards different segments of the electorate. This in turn
affects financial regulations and thus financial development and structure (Pagano and
Volpin, 2005). We include the dummy variable MAJORITARIAN RULE which equals
one when the lower house was elected by the plurality rule and zero otherwise.
Lastly, all models include time fixed effects. Some models also contain country fixed
effects implying we then exploit within country variation.
2.4 Regression Results
This section presents the main results and it is outlined as follows. We first discuss our
econometric specification and identification strategy. Then, we present successively our
panel data evidence on the stock market development (section 2.4.2), banking sector
development (section 2.4.3), and financial structure (section 2.4.4). Next, we discuss
endogeneity pitfalls of suffrage institutions (section 2.4.5). We close this section by
discussing robustness checks and potential alternative channels (section 2.4.6).
2.4.1 Econometric Methodology
The econometric model we employ to identify the relationship between voting franchise
and financial development and structure can be written as:
Yct = α ⋅ Sct + β ⋅Xct + uct, (2.1)
where Yct is the outcome variable of interest for country c at time t, i.e., our indica-
tors of stock market development (ln(CAPITALIZATION) and ln(LISTED COMPA-
NIES)), banking sector development (ln(BANK DEPOSITS)), or the financial structure
(ln(STRUCTURE)). Sct is one of the two indicators of suffrage institutions (SUFFRAGE
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and EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE), and Xct is the set of other controls (based upon the
economic and institutional theories explaining financial development and structure dis-
cussed in section 2.3). The parameter of interest is α, whereas β is a vector capturing
effects of the control variables in Xct, and uct is an error term. We add time and country
fixed effects:
uct = γt + λc + ct,
where ct is the remaining stochastic disturbance term. For some specifications, we es-
timate equation (2.1) without country fixed effects as these wipe out any time-invariant
country characteristics. We base inference on panel corrected standard errors (PCSE)
as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995). This procedure allows controlling for dis-
turbances that are both heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across coun-
tries.19
2.4.2 Suffrage Institutions and Stock Market Development
Our findings on the impact of suffrage institutions on our two indicators of stock mar-
ket development (ln(CAPITALIZATION) and ln(LISTED COMPANIES)) are shown
in Tables 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. We focus on the results for SUFFRAGE (Models
(1) to (3)) as the results for EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE (Models (4) to (6)) are qualita-
tively similar. Models (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) each time include different controls. We
first discuss the impact of SUFFRAGE on our two stock market development indicators
before turning to our discussion of the control variables. Model (3) includes country
fixed effects implying that the time-invariant controls become encompassed; hence, we
focus on the impact of within country variation of voting franchise on stock market
development.
First, Table 2.4 provides strong evidence in support of the prediction that a more re-
strictive voting franchise leads to a higher stock market capitalization (over the period
1830-1999). A one percentage point higher SUFFRAGE leads to a drop of 1.798%***
(Model (1)) to 1.852%*** (Model (2)) in the size of stock markets relative to GDP. Our
results are economically meaningful. For example, a one standard deviation increase in
SUFFRAGE (i.e., an increase of 0.241 in Model (2)) implies a 44.6% lower CAPITAL-
IZATION. The inclusion of country fixed effects in Model (3) induces the coefficient
of SUFFRAGE to drop a bit but within country variation remains important: a one
standard deviation (within the same country) increase of SUFFRAGE leads to a 24.6%
lower CAPITALIZATION (i.e., 0.222*1.108).
19We investigated the stationarity of our data by plotting them against time but did not detect trends.
Conventional panel unit root tests are not feasible due to the unbalanced nature of our dataset and the
presence of gaps in the data.
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Table 2.4: The Effect of Suffrage on Stock Market Capitalization, 1830-1999: Panel Data
This table reports results relating the stock market capitalization over GDP to suffrage institutions.
The dependent variable is the logarithm of CAPITALIZATION. Depending on the specifications,
the regressions control for economic development, urbanization rate, factor endowments, legal origin,
religion, degree of democracy, electoral rule, year effects, and country fixed effects. The panel spans the
1830-1999 interval and includes 18 countries. Table 2.1 summarizes variables definitions and sources.
Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suffrage Institutions
SUFFRAGE -1.798*** -1.852*** -1.108**
(0.679) (0.668) (0.557)
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE -1.759** -1.992** -0.744
(0.764) (0.861) (0.568)
Controls
ln(GDP PER CAPITA) 0.561*** 0.555*** 0.459* 0.518*** 0.549*** 0.663*
(0.179) (0.191) (0.249) (0.164) (0.187) (0.361)
URBANIZATION RATE 0.456 0.476 2.417*** 0.795** 1.088* 2.620**
(0.429) (0.519) (0.902) (0.389) (0.607) (1.054)
ln(LAND AREA) -0.149*** -0.153*** -0.317 -0.160*** -0.140** -0.309
(0.048) (0.051) (0.404) (0.047) (0.056) (0.427)
LATITUDE 0.544* 0.583** 0.628* 0.724*
(0.287) (0.274) (0.343) (0.380)
COMMON LAW ORIGIN 1.221*** 1.198*** 1.189*** 1.162***
(0.206) (0.213) (0.238) (0.255)
CATHOLIC 0.014 0.016 0.052 0.078
(0.077) (0.081) (0.078) (0.077)
POLITY 2 0.124 0.090
(0.259) (0.191)
MAJORITARIAN RULE 0.039 0.151
(0.201) (0.201)
Fixed Effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.511 0.512 0.648 0.521 0.523 0.661
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Number of Observations 172 172 172 158 158 158
Second, Table 2.5 shows clear evidence that increasing the voting franchise to a broader
fraction of the population leads to a reduction in the number of companies listed on
stock markets. These results are independent of the inclusion of country fixed effects or
not. An increase of SUFFRAGE by one percentage point corresponds with a 0.989%**
(Model (3)) to 2.553%*** (Model (2)) drop in LISTED COMPANIES. Based on Model
(2), a one standard deviation increase in SUFFRAGE (i.e., 0.241) leads to a 61.5% lower
LISTED COMPANIES.
We now turn to a discussion of the results of the control variables. Our findings are in ac-
cordance with previous literature. Richer countries (measured by GDP PER CAPITA)
have more developed stock markets both in terms of stock market capitalization (Ta-
ble 2.4) and number of listed companies (Table 2.5). We find that a higher degree of
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Table 2.5: The Effect of Suffrage on the Number of Listed Companies, 1913-1999: Panel Data
This table reports results relating the number of listed companies per million of inhabitants to suffrage
institutions. The dependent variable is the logarithm of LISTED COMPANIES. Depending on the
specifications, the regressions control for economic development, urbanization rate, factor endowments,
legal origin, religion, degree of democracy, electoral rule, year effects, and country fixed effects. The
panel spans the 1913-1999 interval and includes 18 countries. Table 2.1 summarizes variables definitions
and sources. Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). *, **,
and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suffrage Institutions
SUFFRAGE -2.450** -2.553*** -0.989**
(0.976) (0.951) (0.474)
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE -1.832** -1.803** -2.344***
(0.804) (0.784) (0.652)
Controls
ln(GDP PER CAPITA) 0.656** 0.606** 0.711*** 0.288 0.155 0.622***
(0.323) (0.309) (0.262) (0.208) (0.202) (0.191)
URBANIZATION RATE 1.312*** 1.341*** 0.525 1.416*** 1.296*** 1.086
(0.324) (0.285) (0.400) (0.366) (0.346) (0.730)
ln(LAND AREA) -0.182*** -0.193*** 0.471** -0.250*** -0.273*** 0.566***
(0.046) (0.036) (0.191) (0.045) (0.048) (0.164)
LATITUDE 1.772*** 1.857*** 2.042*** 2.046***
(0.342) (0.300) (0.532) (0.538)
COMMON LAW ORIGIN 0.918*** 0.831*** 1.069*** 0.985***
(0.179) (0.131) (0.182) (0.169)
CATHOLIC -0.121 -0.084 -0.109 -0.093
(0.080) (0.078) (0.081) (0.079)
POLITY 2 0.651 0.557
(0.649) (0.579)
MAJORITARIAN RULE 0.159 0.240*
(0.141) (0.126)
Fixed Effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country No No Yes No No Yes
R2 0.338 0.363 0.820 0.310 0.332 0.837
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Number of Observations 135 135 135 126 126 126
urbanization (URBANIZATION RATE) has positive effects on stock market develop-
ment although it is not always statistically significant. In general, LAND AREA has a
negative and significant coefficient, meaning that greater natural resource endowments
produce adverse effects on stock market development. This is consistent with predic-
tions from Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine (2003). In a same vein, LATITUDE is
positive and statistically significant suggesting that the further away a country is from
the equator the higher its reliance on stock markets. In line with the legal origin view,
countries with English Common law legal tradition (COMMON LAW ORIGIN) tend
to have more developed stock markets. Catholic religion does not seem to affect stock
market development.
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 further include two important control variables underpinned by the
literature on political institutions and the development of financial systems. Models (2)
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and (5) control for the quality of democratic institutions (POLITY 2) and for the elec-
toral rule (MAJORITARIAN RULE). Except for Model (5) in Table 2.5, those measures
of political institutions are insignificant. More importantly, our results remain robust to
the inclusion of those variables showing that our suffrage variables do not capture other
institutional political design of the era.20
Overall, these results suggest that broader suffrage institutions have a first-order negative
effect on stock market development. The next section investigates whether this pattern
is similar when considering banking sector development.
2.4.3 Suffrage Institutions and Banking Sector Development
Table 2.6 displays the results linking suffrage institutions and banking sector develop-
ment over the twentieth century. As previously, Models (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) show the
results for SUFFRAGE and EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE, each time including different
controls or country fixed effects, respectively. We again focus on SUFFRAGE as results
for EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE are very similar.
Table 2.6 indicates that a broader voting franchise has a considerable positive impact
on banking development. In particular, a one percentage point increase in SUFFRAGE
implies a 0.724%*** (Model (3)) to 0.957%*** (Model (1)) higher BANK DEPOSITS.
Taking Model (3) with country fixed effects, a one standard deviation higher SUF-
FRAGE goes together with a 16.1% larger BANK DEPOSITS (i.e., 0.222*0.724).
We now discuss our control variables. We include the same set of control variables as
in explaining stock market development. Furthermore, and specific to banking devel-
opment, all models in Table 2.6 include a dummy variable for Switzerland (except for
Models (3) and (6) where country fixed effects make the Switzerland dummy redun-
dant). Switzerland has long been a safe haven for international bank deposits and its
high banking development may capture this characteristic. Income per capita positively
20In unreported regressions we further include POLITY 2 and MAJORITARIAN RULE together
with country fixed effects; in general, the results on our suffrage indicators of interest remain unaffected.
It is also worth emphasizing that the “original” Polity2 index (coded on a scale from -10 to 10 as provided
in the POLITY IV database) correlates over time with our suffrage indicators. This is expected since
several subcomponents of the Polity2 index are related to elections and thus voting franchise. We adopt
a twofold strategy to disentangle their respective effects and avoid misleading conclusions about the
role played by our suffrage indicators of interest. First, the use of a simple dummy variable, taking
the value of one if the Polity2 index is positive and zero if negative, reduces the potential problem
of collinearity between these variables in our models. Considering the “original” Polity2 index makes
however little difference for our results in the reported models. Second, we include in our models only
the subcomponent of the Polity2 index which is not capturing elections (i.e., the constraints on chief
executive which reflects the real political impact of parliament as measured by the variable Xtconst in
the POLITY IV database). Our results on the suffrage indicators when including this Xtconst variable
become somewhat stronger, but are not reported to save space. A similar footnote applies for our other
indicators of financial development and structure.
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Table 2.6: The Effect of Suffrage on Bank Deposits, 1913-1999: Panel Data
This table reports results relating bank deposits over GDP to suffrage institutions. The dependent
variable is the logarithm of BANK DEPOSITS. Depending on the specifications, the regressions
control for economic development, urbanization rate, factor endowments, legal origin, religion, degree
of democracy, electoral rule, year effects, country fixed effects, and Switzerland effect. The panel
spans the 1913-1999 interval and includes 18 countries. Table 2.1 summarizes variables definitions
and sources. Numbers in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suffrage Institutions
SUFFRAGE 0.957*** 0.870** 0.724***
(0.366) (0.351) (0.227)
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE 1.460*** 1.226*** 0.975***
(0.267) (0.226) (0.340)
Controls
ln(GDP PER CAPITA) 0.500*** 0.503*** 0.816*** 0.404*** 0.405*** 0.901***
(0.156) (0.139) (0.207) (0.112) (0.112) (0.306)
URBANIZATION RATE 0.038 0.300 0.871 -0.341 -0.086 -0.077
(0.256) (0.298) (0.582) (0.328) (0.287) (0.600)
ln(LAND AREA) -0.074** -0.040 -0.372* -0.045 -0.032 -0.077
(0.031) (0.040) (0.212) (0.039) (0.048) (0.600)
LATITUDE 0.257 0.242 -0.413 -0.397
(0.317) (0.312) (0.414) (0.396)
COMMON LAW ORIGIN -0.011 -0.013 -0.035 -0.099
(0.123) (0.125) (0.116) (0.115)
CATHOLIC -0.011 -0.062 -0.122 -0.079
(0.123) (0.134) (0.155) (0.166)
POLITY 2 0.091 0.410*
(0.191) (0.212)
MAJORITARIAN RULE -0.217** -0.074
(0.094) (0.105)
Fixed Effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country No No Yes No No Yes
Switzerland Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
R2 0.431 0.444 0.604 0.405 0.424 0.572
Wald χ2 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Number of Observations 153 153 153 138 138 138
influences banking development. URBANIZATION RATE however is not statistically
significant in all models. LAND AREA is statistically significant only in two specifi-
cations but overall negative, showing that countries with a greater surface have lower
banking development. There is no significant effect of LATITUDE on the levels of bank-
ing sector development, whereas it positively influenced stock market development. The
measures of legal origin (COMMON LAW ORIGIN) and religion (CATHOLIC) are not
significant determinants of bank finance.
The quality of democracy indicator, POLITY 2, enters with the expected sign in regres-
sions but its impact is only significant in Model (5). MAJORITARIAN RULE is negative
and statistically significant in Model (2), consistent with the predictions from the politi-
cal economy literature. This significance does not persist when we consider EFFECTIVE
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SUFFRAGE as variable of interest. In sum, our results on banking development sug-
gest that a greater enfranchised population has on average stronger preferences for bank
finance.
2.4.4 Suffrage Institutions and Financial Structure
Sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3 provided robust and contrasted effects of suffrage institutions
on financial development, with a negative effect on stock markets and a positive effect
on the banking sector. In this section, we ask ourselves whether suffrage institutions
impact the financial structure, that is, the relative importance of stock markets vis-a`-vis
banks. Table 2.7 examines this aspect for the period 1913-1999. Models (1) to (3) study
the impact of SUFFRAGE including different sets of controls. We discuss the results
for SUFFRAGE but results for EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE (tabulated in Models (4) to
(6) are qualitatively similar).
Table 2.7 shows that the proportion of the population eligible to vote negatively impacts
on the market-orientation of the financial structure. Models (1) to (3) show that a one
percentage point greater SUFFRAGE goes together with a 1.994%*** (Model (3)) to
2.265%*** (Model (1)) lower STRUCTURE. The economic significance is considerable
as a one standard deviation increase in SUFFRAGE within the same country (based on
Model (3)) leads to a 44.3% (i.e., 0.222*1.994) lower STRUCTURE.
Our results in this section show that impacts of suffrage institutions on countries’ levels
of financial development are big enough to influence their financial structure. In other
words, increasing the size of the voting population augments the size of the banking
sector but also reduces the size of stock markets. This is reflected in a drastic decrease
in the market orientation. As being exogenous shocks affecting the median voter, suffrage
institutions play thus a key role in our understanding of the divergent orientation that
financial systems may take across space and time. We now turn to further examining
the exogeneity of suffrage institutions.
2.4.5 On the Exogeneity of Suffrage Institutions
Our evidence presented so far may encounter pitfalls in separating correlation from
causality. Our inference becomes indeed biased if the variation in our suffrage institutions
variables employed to explain financial outcomes is related to the random unexplained
component of financial outcomes. In particular, the potential role played by unobservable
factors of institutional quality raises some concerns about omitted variables, while the
modernization hypothesis points further concerns about reverse causality. In this section,
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Table 2.7: The Effect of Suffrage on Financial Structure, 1913-1999: Panel Data
This table reports results relating financial structure to suffrage institutions. The dependent variable
is the logarithm of STRUCTURE. Depending on the specifications, the regressions control for eco-
nomic development, urbanization rate, factor endowments, legal origin, religion, degree of democracy,
electoral rule, year effects, country fixed effects, and Switzerland effect. The panel spans the 1913-1999
interval and includes 18 countries. Table 2.1 summarizes variables definitions and sources. Numbers
in parentheses are panel corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Suffrage Institutions
SUFFRAGE -2.265*** -2.070*** -1.994***
(0.695) (0.638) (0.740)
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE -2.993*** -2.828*** -1.913*
(0.818) (0.786) (1.020)
Controls
ln(GDP PER CAPITA) -0.335* -0.375* -0.334 -0.223 -0.202 -0.348
(0.196) (0.202) (0.369) (0.162) (0.212) (0.585)
URBANIZATION RATE 0.649 0.188 0.445 1.217** 1.019 1.431
(0.483) (0.491) (0.897) (0.577) (0.684) (1.063)
ln(LAND AREA) 0.002 -0.042 0.067 -0.049 -0.059 0.283
(0.032) (0.031) (0.390) (0.028) (0.037) (0.347)
LATITUDE 0.758* 0.754** 1.230** 1.228**
(0.413) (0.376) (0.523) (0.508)
COMMON LAW ORIGIN 1.161*** 1.178*** 1.114*** 1.178***
(0.275) (0.271) (0.300) (0.286)
CATHOLIC 0.040 -0.024 0.104 0.064
(0.180) (0.212) (0.202) (0.220)
POLITY 2 -0.281 -0.406
(0.297) (0.267)
MAJORITARIAN RULE 0.307 0.028
(0.207) (0.270)
Fixed Effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country No No Yes No No Yes
Switzerland Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
R2 0.547 0.558 0.669 0.591 0.597 0.688
Wald χ2 (p−value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18
Number of Observations 138 138 138 129 129 129
we first argue on the plausibility of the exogeneity of suffrage institutions through the
lens of the extant literature. Second, we go one step further and use a DID research
design. Third, we use an IV technique to further pin down the exogeneity of our suffrage
institutions variables.
2.4.5.1 Alternative View: The Modernization Hypothesis
The modernization hypothesis raises some doubts that the causality goes in the direction
outlined (i.e., from suffrage to financial outcomes) rather than the other way around.
Lipset (1959) asked why the creation and the consolidation of democracy seem to require
economic development. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (2000) examine the
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correlations quantitatively and find that the consolidation of democracy is primarily a
feature of high-income countries, whereas episodes (creations) of democracy have oc-
curred at all income levels. Barro (1996, 1999) gives an economic analysis supporting
the modernization hypothesis. Since economic development is also related to financial
development, the modernization hypothesis raises some issues of causality in our context.
The latest empirical results, however, reject this alternative (modernization) hypothe-
sis. By using extensive panel data and providing careful attention at reverse causality
and omitted variable bias, Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2008) do not find
any impact of income on the level of democracy. In a subsequent study, Acemoglu,
Johnson, Robinson, and Yared (2009) identify no causal effect of economic development
on the transitions into and away from democracy. Aidt and Jensen (2014) look di-
rectly at the effect of economic development on suffrage institutions and refute in turn
empirically the modernization hypothesis. These works are rather consistent with the
idea that institutional changes during certain critical historical junctures (such as factor
endowments affecting the mode of settlement) led to divergent economic and political
development (see, e.g., Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997; Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robin-
son, 2001). These latest results suggest that endogeneity does not seem to constitute a
major concern in our context. We nevertheless make two additional steps to rule out
this possibility. We first adopt a DID approach to account for omitted variables. Then,
we employ an IV approach to deal with reverse causality.
2.4.5.2 DID Approach
To mitigate some of the concerns about omitted variables, we exploit plausibly exogenous
inter-temporal variations from two major suffrage reforms (namely, for male and female
universal suffrage) across countries. We examine the financial development and structure
of countries having undertaken suffrage reforms relative to countries that did not during
different years. Formally, we estimate the effect of the two major suffrage reforms with
a DID methodology, using the following specification:
Yct = δ ⋅Rct + β ⋅Xct + γt + λc + ct, (2.2)
where the indices, parameters, and variables are defined as in equation (2.1), except
Rct, the assignment treatment variable, which is either a dummy equal to one if a
country c introduced male universal suffrage (meaning that all males of voting ages were
allowed to vote in parliamentary elections) at time t, and zero otherwise; or a dummy
equal to one if a country c introduced female universal suffrage (in practice meaning
universal suffrage as then all males and females of voting ages were allowed to vote in
Chapter 2. Suffrage Institutions and Financial Systems 44
parliamentary elections) at time t, and zero otherwise. The treatment effect is given by
δ. We do not include both assignment variables at the same time to avoid confounding
effects.21
In this DID approach, multiple treatment and control groups take care of many threats
concerning validity, such as a reduction of any biases and noise associated with just one
comparison. This is well illustrated with the following example. Suppose that we wish to
estimate the effect of the 1913 universal suffrage law in Norway on financial development.
Because the United Kingdom introduced universal suffrage in 1928 and both countries
had more restricted suffrage in 1900, until 1928, the United Kingdom initially serves as
a control country for suffrage change; and after that it serves as a treatment country
for subsequent years. Therefore, most countries belong to both treatment and control
groups at different points in time. This specification is robust to the fact that some
countries received the treatment prior to our sample beginning year.
Models (1) to (4) in Table A.2 estimate the effect for each dependent variable of interest.
In Panel A, the assignment variable is MALE SUFFRAGE REFORM, while, in Panel
B, the assignment variable is FEMALE SUFFRAGE REFORM. The effect is highly
significant and the coefficients on both assignment variables exhibit the expected signs.22
The results in Panels A and B show that the effect of suffrage is present for both male
and female universal suffrage. We interpret these results by the fact that the effect for
male suffrage is mostly determined by wealth considerations, while the effect for female
suffrage is mostly determined by risk aversion considerations. Indeed, when women are
allowed to vote, we do not expect a decrease in the median voter’s wealth, however
we expect that females are more risk averse than their male counterparts (see Eckel
and Grossman, 2008; Sapienza, Zingales, and Maestripieri, 2009); both considerations
(wealth and risk) move the median voter preferences leftwards (see Perotti and von
Thadden, 2006).23
21Indeed, both assignment variables are highly correlated. The difference in years between male and
female suffrage reforms is less than two periods for 14 countries out of 18.
22We also provide a tighter test of equation (2.2), by limiting the DID analysis to sub-samples
of countries belonging to the same legal tradition. Intuitively, the treatment and control countries are
more likely to be comparable if they are from the same legal origin. This is important because treatment
and control countries can exhibit differential trends leading to inconclusive or erroneous inferences. In
addition, we reproduce the DID analysis with subsamples containing shorter time spans. All these results
are qualitatively similar to the results presented in Table A.2 and can be obtained upon request.
23However, part of the significant results for female suffrage reform may be driven by confounding
effects with male suffrage reform (see footnote 21). Indeed, since the time period between the two
reforms is generally short, the variable FEMALE SUFFRAGE REFORM may capture some effects of
MALE SUFFRAGE REFORM, especially if the impact on financial development is not immediate.
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2.4.5.3 IV Approach
We also examine the exogeneity of our voting franchise indicators, SUFFRAGE and EF-
FECTIVE SUFFRAGE, in the following way: We use the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test,
with the null hypothesis that the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator is consistent
with the IV estimator. A rejection of the null indicates that the endogeneity of the
regressors has a significant influence on the estimates, and that equation (2.1) should
be estimated using IV methods. We employ two instruments. The first instrument is
the threat of revolution. The argument for this instrument is that political elites opt for
male universal suffrage in order to make a credible commitment for future redistribution
and to avoid social unrest and revolution (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2000, 2006). Follow-
ing Aidt and Jensen (2014), our instrument captures revolutionary events happening in
other neighboring countries, excluding events within a country itself. This instrument is
therefore unlikely to be correlated with (observed and unobserved) contemporaneous de-
terminants of financial development originating within a country. This instrument varies
in the cross-section and over time. The second instrument is a proxy for the interna-
tional norms concerning voting rights. The diffusion of these norms has been amplified
by the proclamation by the United Nations in 1948 of the Universal Declarations of
Human Rights, aiming at banning all kinds of discrimination and at asserting equality
of rights between men and women. While this diffusion effect is relatively weaker for
the introduction of male suffrage, it is overwhelming for expansions involving women.
Detailed information on the definition and construction of the instruments is provided
in Table 2.1.24
Then, we estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions for the main specifica-
tions of Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7; detailed results are available upon request. It
must be noted that our instruments satisfy the relevance and exclusion conditions. The
relevance condition requires a sufficient correlation between the instruments and the
potential endogenous variable after netting out the effects of all the covariates. The
relevance condition is satisfied because F -statistics from the first-stage regressions ex-
ceed the threshold value for two instruments. The exclusion condition requires that the
instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the equation of interest (2.1), which
is not testable directly because the error term is unobservable. I test for overidentifying
restrictions and p-values of the Hansen J-statistics are higher than 10% in most of the
cases.
24Another instrument used was fragmentation within the elite. Some authors argue that fragmented
elites grant male universal suffrage voluntary, in their own interest, either because they prefer public
goods over transfers (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004) or because they want to obtain an electorate for particular
economic policies (Llavador and Oxoby, 2005). We prefer not to take fragmentation within the elites
into account because this argument is rather confined in the nineteenth century context, a period not
covered by Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7.
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Under both theoretical and statistical grounds that our two instruments are valid, the
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test results indicate that the exogeneity assumption is not rejected,
except for ln(CAPITALIZATION). Therefore, the method of estimation used through-
out the paper does not lead to inconsistent and biased estimates and are preferred to
2SLS estimation methods. However, our results remain qualitatively similar with 2SLS
regressions, which alleviate the concerns of reverse causality.
2.4.6 Robustness and Alternative Channels
In this section, we investigate whether our findings are robust to measurement issues re-
garding our suffrage indicators, further control variables (wealth distribution and trade
openness), and potential alternative channels through which voting franchise may op-
erate. All the new variables discussed below are defined in Table 2.1. For brevity, the
results are either untabulated or relegated to the Appendix A. Although we focus, in
this section, on the results for financial structure (see Table A.3), the corresponding re-
sults for stock market development and banking sector development are similar to those
shown in sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, respectively.
As discussed in section 2.3, our suffrage indicators are scaled by total population and
not the population over the age of 18 (i.e., the voting age population nowadays in
many countries). Significant variations in our suffrage indicators arise in jumps due to
changes in voting legislations (as previously analyzed in our DID approach). Using as
denominator population above 18 years old would not change the timing and magnitude
of these jumps.25 Still, we investigate further whether some changes in our suffrage
indicators may be due to changes in the population’s age pyramid rather than changes
in suffrage legislations. We use the following two-step approach. First, we regress
the suffrage measure on POPULATION GROWTH, which is a reasonable proxy for
the population’s age pyramid. Second, we use the residuals as measure for suffrage
institutions in our analysis. This corrected measure then proxies for any changes in
suffrage not driven by changes in the population pyramid. Our results are robust to
using this “corrected” measure.
25To be reassured that the discrepancy caused by the choice of the denominator is minimized, we
provide correlations of our suffrage variables and variables from other data sources employing the voting
age population as denominator. The IDEA dataset reports the number of registered voters (similarly, the
number of valid votes cast) divided by the population over 18 and variables from Flora (1983) employ as
denominator the population over 20. The former includes the 18 countries from 1950 onwards, while the
latter only includes 11 Western European countries before 1970. The correlation between SUFFRAGE
(similarly, EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE) and the corresponding IDEA variable is 0.721 for 93 observations
(0.857 for 88 observations). Using data available from Flora (1983), the correlations are respectively 0.989
(91 observations) and 0.991 (85 observations). Although the number of observations drops dramatically,
employing suffrage variables from these other sources do not change qualitatively the results presented
so far.
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So far, we have considered that the median voter political preferences for bank- over
stock market-oriented system are mainly determined by the expansion of the voting
franchise, assuming the distribution of wealth constant over time. However, the median
voter political preferences can move over time to favor stock markets if the financial
wealth spreads across the population—thanks to the economic success of the middle
class or the emergence of capitalized pension systems. Conversely, adverse shocks to
the population’s wealth during the wars and depression shocks shaped the median voter
political preferences over the role of stock market finance in society. As suggested by
Perotti and von Thadden (2006), we relax the assumption that the wealth distribution
is fixed over time by including information on the wealth distribution in our regression
specifications. We use the top 1% income share as a proxy for the concentration of fi-
nancial wealth over the population (see Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2011); this control
variable is labeled TOP INCOME SHARE and is taken from “The World Top Incomes
Database”.26 Even though this is the most comprehensive panel dataset on income and
wealth distribution, data on the early twentieth century are typically not well covered
and it leaves us with 15 countries only (data for Austria, Belgium, and Chile are not
available). Models (1) and (2) in Table A.3 show that TOP INCOME SHARE is not
significant but does also not change the magnitude of the coefficient on suffrage. In
particular, employing the same sample but leaving out TOP INCOME SHARE yields
coefficients on SUFFRAGE and EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE of -1.507 and -2.353**, re-
spectively. These are very similar to the ones reported in Models (1) and (2) in Table
A.3.
Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that the degree of trade openness impacts on financial
development by reducing barriers to entry. Therefore, Table A.3 reports the results
including TRADE OPENNESS as an additional explanatory variable. Trade openness
is significant and positive in Model (3) but not in (4). More importantly, the results for
SUFFRAGE and EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE are unaffected.
An expansion of the voting franchise may influence the magnitude of government expen-
ditures, which may in turn affect financial development and structure. For example, a
broader franchise may lead to more redistributive measures (see Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2000) funded by higher taxes, also on corporations. Such a tax change may favor
other creditors at the expense of shareholders and therefore impact on financial devel-
opment and structure. We rule out such alternative channels by including the logarithm
of government expenditures per capita (ln(GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE)) as an
26See Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, The World Top Incomes Database, http://topincomes.
g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu, 12/02/2013.
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additional control variable. Models (5) and (6) in Table A.3 reveal that GOVERN-
MENT EXPENDITURE is not significant and that our results on SUFFRAGE and
EFFECTIVE SUFFRAGE are hardly altered.
2.5 A Long-Run Perspective
Section 2.4 showed that the scope of voting franchise impacts national financial systems
contemporaneously. But is the impact of voting franchise only immediate or does it
also generate slower adjustment effects and generate a longer-run effect? We observe
today convergence paths of both countries’ suffrage institutions and countries’ reliance
on stock markets. Indeed, in our sample countries, the fraction of the voting population
converged in the post-World War Two era and most stock markets recovered in the last
decades. This is largely due to the fact that all the countries considered nowadays have
introduced universal suffrage for all men and women. Given that all the countries exhibit
high levels of voting participation, one might expect that suffrage has no explanatory
power anymore if it only generates immediate effects. If suffrage has explanatory power,
one might expect that the adjustment process affecting financial systems is slow or that
suffrage has long-lasting effects. Our empirical analysis below shows that the scope
of voting franchise produces longer-run effects, that is, suffrage institutions still exert
influence on market-orientation of the financial structure at the end of the twentieth
century.27 It seems important to note that we do not argue that this convergence path
of suffrage institutions cannot reverse in the future,28 but rather that this convergence
path, in a period where stock markets have mostly recovered, still produce effects on
countries’ financial system.
To shed light on this long-run effect, we investigate whether the orientation of a country’s
financial system—averaged over the period 1980-1995—is related to the time of intro-
duction of universal suffrage in that country. We focus on two indicators of the market
orientation of the financial system as constructed and previously employed by Beck,
Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine (2000). The first is the ratio of stock market capitalization
to private credit (FINANCIAL STRUCTURE29). The second indicator is the average
of the deviations from the mean of three measures capturing the relative importance
of stock markets vis-a`-vis the banking sector in terms of size, activity, and efficiency
27Perotti and Schwienbacher (2009) use similar empirical tests to study the long-lasting effect of
wealth distribution shocks on countries’ private pension funding.
28Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) present theoretical arguments, historically well-grounded, on the
reasons why some democracies once created collapsed, whereas in others the democratic process endures
and consolidates.
29We scale stock market capitalization by private credit in our long-run analysis and by bank deposits
in section 2.4. To distinguish them clearly, we label the scaling by private credit as FINANCIAL
STRUCTURE.
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(FINANCIAL STRUCTURE INDEX). To measure the impact of voting franchise, we
employ the year of introduction of the universal suffrage (UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE),
that is, the year of the first parliamentary election in which all males and females of vot-
ing ages are allowed to vote in a given country (constructed from Flora, 1983; Ramirez,
Soysal, and Shanahan, 1997). We enlarge our sample to 35 countries listed in Table A.1.
We did not consider those additional 17 countries before due to a lack of data on the early
twentieth century. Figure 2.1 illustrates when universal suffrage was introduced in our
35-country dataset and clearly shows a clustering around both World Wars. Similarly
to previous sections, we include the same set of control variables in which we replace
the GDP per capita by the initial GDP per capita (INITIAL GDP PER CAPITA).30
Table 2.8 reports the results of estimating the impact of UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE
on FINANCIAL STRUCTURE and FINANCIAL STRUCTURE INDEX. Econometric
specifications consider the whole sample of 35 countries, but also restrict the sample to
the 18 countries employed in section 2.4. We discuss OLS and 2SLS regression results
only for FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (tabulated in Models (1) to (4)) as the ones for
FINANCIAL STRUCTURE INDEX (tabulated in Models (5) to (8)) are qualitatively
similar. The date of introduction of universal suffrage (UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE)
has an impressive positive (statistically and economically) effect on the orientation of
the financial system over the period 1980-1995. Model (1) of Table 2.8 shows that a
25-year delay in the introduction of universal suffrage implies a 17.5 percentage point
increase in the relative importance of stock markets as compared to banks and other
financial intermediaries (i.e., 0.007*25). This result is stable to restricting our analysis
to the 18 countries (see Model (2)). To deal with potential endogeneity, we instrument
UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE with the number of countries already having introduced up
to that point universal suffrage (i.e., INTERNATIONAL NORMS).31 We obtain similar
coefficients from 2SLS estimations (see Models (3) and (4)). These cross-section findings,
suggesting an increased dominance of stock markets over banks when universal suffrage
arose later, provide further support for our predictions.
30The construction of the proxy for economic development, called INITIAL GDP PER CAPITA, is
slightly different since it is the real GDP per capita in 1980 using data from Summers-Heston. URBAN-
IZATION RATE, LAND AREA, LATITUDE, COMMON LAW ORIGIN, and CATHOLIC are defined
in Table 2.1 and are related to the year 1980.
31These international norms should not influence the financial structure of a specific country directly
but be correlated with UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE, making it a good instrument. This is the only
instrument used in Table 2.8 since it is specifically related to universal suffrage, whereas the other
instrument, proxing the threat of revolution, rather relates to male universal suffrage.
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2.6 Conclusions
This paper investigates whether fundamental political institutions such as the ones de-
termining the scope of the voting franchise impact on the development and structure of
a country’s financial system. As an exogenous structural political shock, an expansion
of the voting franchise shifts the location of the median voter. A restricted voting fran-
chise ensures a wealthy median voter and is more conducive to support strong minority
shareholder protection and thereby the development of stock markets. In contrast, a
broader voting franchise induces a poorer median voter and is more conducive to pro-
vide support to the banking sector. We assemble a broad panel of countries covering the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries and provide evidence supporting these predictions.
Corroborating theoretical advances in a novel area of research in political economy and
finance, our results suggest that national financial systems reflect voters’ political pref-
erences, which are in turn influenced by their financial stake and risk aversion profile
(Pagano and Volpin, 2005; Perotti and von Thadden, 2006; Biais and Mariotti, 2009).
We further document that the voting franchise has contemporaneous effects but also
long-lasting effects on national financial systems. We do find evidence that countries
which introduced later universal suffrage exhibit a more market-oriented financial sys-
tem at the end of the twentieth century. Overall, our findings emphasize the critical role
played by suffrage institutions in shaping a country’s financial system and the persistent
effects that these institutions produce.
This study raises follow-up research questions. The expansion of voting rights may
have impact on many other dimensions of financial and economic development. One
interesting area to explore is deposit insurance, which has been introduced in most of
the democratic countries from 1960 onwards (Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Kane, and Laeven, 2008).
Deposit insurance represents a financial safety net to primarily protect the middle class
and its introduction did not take place at the same time; while some introduced it in
1960s, many other countries did so in 1990s or even later. Understanding the motivation
for quick introduction requires exploring the effect of suffrage.
In addition, this study finds parallels in many other fields in finance, most importantly
in debates on internal corporate governance mechanisms. For example, our analysis can
provide insights on the impacts of low participation of retail investors in shareholder
meetings of publicly listed companies. While retail investors also hold voting rights
just like institutional investors, they often do not participate in shareholder meetings
(Hewitt, 2011). This is a worldwide phenomenon which leads to weak “effective” mi-
nority shareholder rights due to corporate governance structures that discourage small
investors to attend shareholder meetings. Recently, the SEC started investigations on
the poor participation of retail investors and initiated rule-making proposals that would
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provide incentives for retail investors to participate more in shareholder meetings.32
These include ways to reduce costs for retail investors to cast votes and obtain relevant
information. Similarly, the European Union voted in 2007 the European Shareholder’s
Rights Directive that enhances rights of small shareholders, as well as facilitates partici-
pation in shareholder meetings of firms located outside their national boundaries. Both
initiatives may lead to an increase in the “effective” suffrage of retail investors, who
most likely have different economic preferences than large institutional shareholders.
Another application is shareholder-based versus stakeholder-based corporate governance
systems. A good example of the latter is Germany, where employee representatives have
codetermination rights in board meetings (Fauvera and Fuerst, 2006). The suffrage base
is then broader than in a shareholder-based system in which only legal owners (i.e., the
shareholders) have a say. Fauvera and Fuerst (2006) show that enlarging the voting rights
in boards to employee representatives leads to different corporate governance structures
and thus firm value, notably when cooperation between management and employees is
most needed. One reason is that employees have different economic preferences than
shareholders, since their claims are less sensitive to the upside potential of firms. In
contrast, shareholders have incentives favoring riskier corporate activities.
32See, for example, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125734615206828065.html, 4/07/2012; and
www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/votingrules2010.htm, 4/07/2012.
Chapter 3
Reforming Finance under
Fragmented Governments∗
3.1 Introduction
Why do some governments refrain from undertaking structural financial reforms and
forgo the expected improvements in economic development associated with them? Eco-
nomists have traditionally devoted a significant amount of attention to the analysis
of the political economy of reforms in times of hardship, with a particular focus on
stabilizations as opposed to structural changes (Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi, 2006).1
For example, it has been recently documented that political fragmentation hinders gov-
ernment response to financial crises (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2014), consistently with
robust previous results on the government ability to rein in hyperinflation (Veiga, 2000;
Hamann and Prati, 2002) or tackle unsustainable debt trajectories (Roubini and Sachs,
1989; Alesina and Drazen, 1991). Yet, less attention has been paid to the impact of
∗This chapter is based on LSM Working Paper No. 2013/28, “Reforming Finance under Fragmented
Governments”, co-authored with Francesco Di Comite (Universite´ catholique de Louvain and European
Commission). We would like to thank Joa˜o Amaro de Matos, Marco Becht, Paul Belleflamme, Sophie
Be´reau, Andreas Bernecker, Andrea Conte, Gianmarco Daniele, Eric de Bodt, Valerie De Bruyckere,
Marc Deloof, Brandon Julio, Elias Papaioannou, Armin Schwienbacher, Paolo Volpin, and Teng Wang,
along with audiences at the University of Antwerp, Louvain School of Management, SKEMA Business
School, the Tor Vergata Conference on Money, Banking and Finance in Rome, the Australasian Finance
and Banking Conference in Sydney, the 3L Finance Workshop held at the National Bank of Belgium, the
MFA Meetings in New Orleans, the RES Meetings in Cambridge, the RIEF Conference on International
Trade and International Finance in Milan, the Belgian Financial Research Forum in Antwerp, the EEA
Congress in Malaga, the Corporate Finance Day in Lie`ge, the ALEA Meetings in Chicago, and the
French Finance Association in Aix-en-Provence for helpful comments and suggestions.
1Structural financial reforms refer to reforms that increase the role of market forces and compe-
tition in the financial sector (i.e., financial liberalizations), while maintaining appropriate regulatory
frameworks to deal with market failures.
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political fragmentation on governments’ ability to undertake structural reforms in nor-
mal times, especially in finance, notwithstanding their welfare benefits. Disperse ruling
coalitions are often blamed for delays in the legislative process, but no systematic test
of this common assumption has been performed yet.
In this paper we fill this gap by analyzing systematically the impact of political frag-
mentation within governments on the pace and extent of reform activity in the financial
sector. Government fragmentation refers to the notion that each party in a coalition
government is an elementary decision-making unit, whose multiplication affects the co-
hesion of the government and, thereby, its ability to reach an agreement to deviate from
the status quo.2 Circumstantial analyses on the pursuit of reforms in specific countries
suggest that weak governments may not be able to finalize financial reforms and thus
postpone them indefinitely. For instance, Ben-Bassat (2011) carefully reviews all the
attempts to reform the financial system in Israel starting from the mid-1980s, finding
that it took 32 attempts to pass 10 reforms, each one being discussed in the Knesset
for 10.2 years on average. Ben-Bassat (2011) supports the idea that the composition
of the ruling coalitions, among other variables, plays a significant role in explaining the
differences in speed of completion of the proposed reforms over time. This finding is
consistent with the observations on delays in fiscal stabilization reported by Alesina and
Drazen (1991) based on historical accounts of politically polarized belligerent countries
after World War One and with the inability to respond quickly to financial crises due to
political gridlock recommended by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014).
One question thus naturally arises: are these observations the result of specific external
conditions or are they part of a more general pattern holding true across countries and
over time? We address this issue by focusing on structural financial reforms in a panel
of yearly observations for 30 OECD countries from 1975 to 2005. The period under
investigation has been characterized by a big wave of structural reforms in the financial
sector involving almost every country of the world, even though not at a uniform pace
(e.g., Abiad and Mody, 2005; Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2008). In our dataset we
indeed observe remarkable within-country variation in the extent of reforming activity,
which makes financial regulation an ideal domain to study the impact of government
fragmentation on the capacity to reform. Specifically, the index of financial reforms we
use is a composite index covering several aspects of financial policy borrowed from Abiad,
Detragiache, and Tressel (2010). In order to capture the multifaceted nature of financial
reforms, the index aggregates information on seven different dimensions of government
2Government fragmentation is usually measured in the literature either by the number of parties in
a coalition or by their relative size (as approximated by a Herfindahl index). In this paper we use both
proxies to ensure the robustness of our results. Notice that in the paper the terms cohesiveness (or lack
thereof) and strength (weakness) are used in the discussion, but they are attributed only a more general
connotation and not a precise definition.
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intervention. In each dimension, countries are classified on a continuum that ranges
from full repression to full liberalization. We exploit the variation in the timing of these
changes in financial policy across countries by using panel fixed-effects models. Our
results confirm the generality of the claim that fragmented governments do represent
an obstacle to financial policy change. The economic effect is noticeable. Our preferred
estimate suggests that a one standard deviation increase in the Herfindahl index for
government leads to a change in financial policy equivalent to the full liberalization of
one dimension of the index of financial reforms in slightly less than six years.
We test the robustness of our results in several ways. We first test whether they are
driven by characteristics of countries’ constitutional design and population, which may
influence the indices of government fragmentation that we use. To assuage this concern,
we examine the impact of several factors, including the proportionality of the electoral
system, the federal structure of the nation, income inequality, and the underlying na-
tional fractionalization of ethnicities, languages, and religions, which are shown not to
affect our results. Second, using an instrumental variables (IV) technique we find that
our results are robust to reverse causality. Third, we obtain similar results if we fur-
ther control for different types of financial crises, if we use ordered logit estimations,
and if we run “horse races” between our indices of government fragmentation and other
dimensions of political fragmentation.
As an external validation of our hypothesis, we also extend the analysis to a key ele-
ment of financial policy promoting financial sector development: corporate governance.
Reforms aimed at protecting the rights of outside investors, including minority share-
holders and creditors, have been shown in the literature to be beneficial to an economy’s
performance (see surveys by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000b;
and Beck and Levine, 2005), but fragmented governments may find it difficult to enact
such reforms because they are likely to imply loss of rents for corporate insiders. We
therefore investigate whether government fragmentation may be associated with poorer
investor protection by employing the adjusted “anti-director rights” index constructed
by Pagano and Volpin (2005) and the “creditor rights” index of Djankov, McLiesh, and
Shleifer (2007). We do find evidence that fragmented governments are associated with
little incentive to enact reforms to bring a country with poor investor protection up to
the best practices.
Summing up, our empirical results point decisively in the direction of a significant im-
pact of government fragmentation on the capacity to reform finance, but how to justify
this result theoretically? Based on different strands of the political economy literature,
we adapt to the context of financial reforms three possible, non-mutually exclusive ex-
planations: one interpreting the delay in reforms as an inefficient supply of a public good
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(the reform proposal) and the other two as the result of a conflict of interests between
constituencies.
The first possible explanation of the results follows models of “war of attrition”, but
instead of the conflict between different agents, typical of the stabilization literature a`
la Alesina and Drazen (1991), it frames the issue as the result of a coordination problem
a` la Bliss and Nalebuff (1984).3 Uncontroversial reform proposals are interpreted as
public goods which must be provided by individual agents incurring a private cost, thus
parties in larger coalitions have an incentive to wait for the others to make the proposal
slowing down the reform process.
Turning to the possible explanations based on conflicts of interests, after having outlined
a very simple model to show a potential source of conflict between holders of different
factors of production, two political economy mechanisms are analyzed: the first, inspired
by the veto player literature (Tsebelis, 2002), assumes that different parties in the ruling
coalition represent a different constituency-related interest and can veto reforms unfa-
vorable to their constituency; the second, adapting to the financial reform context the
strand of literature that focuses on lobbying activities on semi-benevolent politicians
(Grossman and Helpman, 1994), does not require parties to be associated to particular
constituencies, but just attributes the differences in reforming activity to the presence
of small parties in the governing coalitions, which may internalize voters’ welfare less
completely and be easier for lobbyists to capture.4
The latter approach has the advantage of being able to provide an explanation for the
role played by the relative size of parties in a coalition, so it could be considered as our
favorite theoretical model. Unfortunately, we are not aware of any source of reliable and
comparable data on lobbying activities outside the United States, which happens to be
the only country in our sample which has never been ruled by a coalition of parties.
So we cannot test it directly against the other two alternatives, which explains why
the three models are simply presented as possible, non-exclusive ways of rationalizing
our empirical results. They are all based on well-known political economy models used
mostly in the context of stabilization. The theoretical contribution of the paper lies
in adapting these models to the context of structural reforms in the financial sector,
3Notice that it would be extremely difficult to use the same war of attrition framework used in
the literature on stabilization efforts in the context of the analysis of financial reforms. The reason
is that one of the main ingredients of the stabilization war of attrition game is that waiting is costly
for all the agents and time just unveils the most impatient by raising costs. When studying delays in
financial reforms, though, it may be claimed that the agents resisting reform are not paying any costs
for waiting, but their being infinitely patient would imply an instantaneous solution of the game with
the counterparts paying immediately the costs of reform.
4See also Perotti and Volpin (2007) and Bebchuck and Neeman (2010), who use the Grossman and
Helpman’s (1994) framework to the context of investor protection.
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covering both uncontroversial decisions and regulations which may cause conflicts among
coalition members.
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it builds on the empirical
literature linking political fragmentation and legislative impasse. The typical field of
application is fiscal stabilization, which has been extensively tested since the seminal
work by Roubini and Sachs (1989). Works by Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998),
Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002), Woo (2003), and many others show that higher political
fragmentation leads to higher public deficits or public debt. Veiga (2000) and Hamann
and Prati (2002) make a similar point concerning inflation stabilization.
However, the papers closest to ours are the ones dealing with structural reforms in fi-
nance. Besides the above-mentioned analysis of the Israel’s financial reform history by
Ben-Bassat (2011), Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014) focus on the regulatory differences
between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods. They argue that political and ideological
polarization between government and opposition parties resulting from financial crises
period actually translate into weak reforms and legislative stalemate. Using data on
Indian state-owned firms, Dinc and Gupta (2011) find that privatization policies are sig-
nificantly delayed in regions where the national government party faces more competition
from opposition parties. Bortolotti and Pinotti (2008) find that political fragmentation
hampers the implementation of privatization policies in 21 OECD countries.5 We com-
plement these papers here in two ways. First, we focus on fragmentation arising within
governing coalitions, showing that this is indeed the most critical concept of political
fragmentation breeding stalemate. Second, we directly test the impact of government
fragmentation on several types of structural financial reforms for a large panel of demo-
cratic countries over many years.
Finally, we contribute to a long-standing body of research in political economy portraying
regulatory decisions as the outcome of private interest motives as opposed to the public
interest.6 For example, Kroszner and Strahan (1999) investigate whether interest groups
in the United States may have influenced the decisions by state politicians to deregulate
bank branching. They show evidence that deregulation occurred earlier when banks
were relatively larger and firms more bank dependent. Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue
that the level of financial development (a proxy for financial reform) results from the
political influence of incumbent firms which try to shield their rents from competition by
5On the literature connecting the nature of political institutions and financial policies, see also
Bortolotti and Faccio (2009), whose work shows that privatization programs tend to be incomplete in
countries with proportional electoral systems and centralized political authority. Pagano and Volpin
(2005) show that strong shareholder protection is more likely in countries with majoritarian electoral
systems. We add to this literature by stressing that government fragmentation is another relevant driving
force behind a broader set of financial reforms.
6The private interest approach build most notably on the classic works of Olson (1965), Stigler
(1971), and Krueger (1974).
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outsiders. By instrumenting elites’ political power with local suffrage laws in nineteenth
century America, Benmelech and Moskowitz (2010) conclusively show how financial
regulation was shaped by elites to control entry (for an international perspective, see
Degryse, Lambert, and Schwienbacher, 2013).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data
and empirical methodology. Section 3.3 shows our empirical results and discusses robust-
ness issues. It also provides corroborating evidence on corporate governance reforms.
Section 3.4 proposes three tentative explanations for the empirical findings. Section 3.5
concludes.
3.2 Data and Empirical Methodology
This section introduces the set of variables and the empirical methodology. Section 3.2.1
describes the sample. Section 3.2.2 defines and summarizes the variables. Section 3.2.3
outlines our empirical methodology.
3.2.1 Sample Selection
Our empirical investigation relies on a panel of 30 democratic OECD countries, spanning
from 1975 to 2005.7 Reforms in the financial sector occurred worldwide and gradually
since the 1970s with the formation of convergence clusters of countries. Countries which
have similar economic development levels (such as OECD countries) have been shown
to display much stronger convergence levels than the countries in the world at large (see
Figure 1 in Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel, 2010). However, we observe significant
variation within our sample, both across countries and over time.
Given that we focus on political economy variables such as the composition of the ruling
coalitions to explain differences in financial reforms, we need to restrict our sample to
countries endowed with stable and high-quality democratic institutions.8 To identify
countries endowed with democratic institutions in the years considered, we employ the
“Polity2” index, which sums a democracy score (ranging from 0 to 10) for each country
with an autocracy score (ranging from 0 to -10).9 Our threshold value for Polity2 is
7The countries included in the analysis are reported in Table B.1. The following OECD member
countries are not included due to data availability: Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, and Slovenia.
8Democratic institutions have to ensure, among others, political competition and openness—i.e., the
existence of institutions and procedures through which citizens can effectively express their preferences
about alternative leaders and policies, the presence of institutionalized constraints on the exercise of
power by the executive, and other aspects of the political environment, such as the rule of law, freedom
of the press, systems of checks and balances (see Polity IV project for further developments).
9More details can be found in the Polity IV handbook.
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5 out of 10, which is a reasonable boundary for a stable democracy in the Polity IV
dataset.10 Since there are no standard thresholds in the literature to identify a fully
democratic country using the Polity2 index, sensitivity analyses have been performed
with weaker and stricter definitions of democracy. They do not affect our results.
3.2.2 Definition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 reports the definition of the variables and their sources, while Tables 3.2 and
3.3 contain descriptive statistics.
3.2.2.1 Index of Financial Reforms
The index of financial reforms used comes from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010),
whose work extends Abiad and Mody’s (2005) index. They create a time-varying index
of reform that measures the reduction of government control over the financial sector.
The index aggregates seven dimensions of financial sector policy: credit controls and ex-
cessively high reserve requirements; interest rate controls; entry barriers and/or lack of
pro-competition policies; state ownership in the banking sector; capital account restric-
tions; prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector;11 securities market
policy. Countries are given a score normalized between 0 and 3 in each dimension, with
zero corresponding to the highest degree of repression and three indicating full liber-
alization. Their overall measure ranges between 0 and 21, but we normalize between
0 and 1 to provide a more intuitive interpretation of regression outputs. Since we are
interested in the short-run dynamics of financial sector policy (i.e., the reform process),
we mostly consider in the empirical analysis the first differences of this index (called
∆FR in the tables).
The index encompasses a broad range of financial sector policies occurring during the
thirty years analyzed. It has also the advantage of putting more weight on reforms in
the domestic financial sector rather than on liberalization of capital flows, which are
often negotiated and decided at a supranational level. This is an ideal feature for our
purposes because we are more interested in domestic political dynamics than in global
trends.
From Table 3.2, we note that the mean value of the normalized index in level, FR, is
0.707, meaning that OECD countries display fairly liberalized financial sectors. Also, we
10This restriction implies that some countries are not considered since 1975. As an example, Chile
and Turkey are not included before 1989 and 1983, respectively. We treat the censored observations as
randomly missing, and we do not attempt to model this aspect of sample selection.
11Of the seven dimensions, this dimension is the only one where a greater degree of government
intervention is coded as a reform (see Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel, 2010).
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can clearly see that the index of financial reforms varies substantially through much of
the sample, with a standard deviation equal to 0.253. More importantly, the mean value
of the first differences of the index of financial reforms, ∆FR, is 0.020 and the standard
deviation is 0.046. A closer look at our sample (see Table B.1 for the evolution of ∆FR
per country) also reveals that all the OECD countries have experienced an average
increase of financial liberalizations (i.e., a positive ∆FR) over the sample period, with
very few cases of reversals.12 This is in line with previous studies on the subject.
Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
This table presents descriptive statistics for our 30-country panel dataset spanning from 1975 to
2005. Table 3.1 summarizes the variables definitions and sources.
Variable Mean Median Std Dev Nb of Obs
Index of Financial Reforms
FR 0.707 0.810 0.253 813
∆FR 0.020 0.000 0.046 788
Indices of Government Fragmentation
HERFGOV 0.712 0.733 0.272 796
NUMBER OF PARTIES 2.340 2.000 1.452 796
LARGEST SEAT SHARE 0.777 0.842 0.233 796
Control Variables
ln(GDP PER CAPITA) 9.589 9.739 0.634 777
RECESSION 0.143 0.000 0.350 813
INFLATION 0.106 0.043 0.295 808
GFCF 0.224 0.219 0.041 804
TRADE OPENNESS 0.659 0.595 0.317 804
EU MEMBERSHIP 0.435 0.000 0.496 813
Political Economy Control Variables
IDEOLOGY 1.861 2.000 0.968 811
FIRST YEAR 0.245 0.000 0.430 813
HERFOPP 0.534 0.506 0.237 792
MAJORITY GOVERNMENT 0.554 0.536 0.114 796
Additional Control Variables
PROPORTIONALITY 1.945 2.000 1.182 813
FEDERAL 0.312 0.000 0.464 811
INCOME INEQUALITY 0.336 0.332 0.066 807
ETHNIC 0.228 0.132 0.192 813
LANGUAGE 0.224 0.164 0.190 813
RELIGION 0.435 0.403 0.241 813
3.2.2.2 Indices of Government Fragmentation
In order to capture the fragmentation of power within a governing coalition, we use
proxies borrowed from the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (WBDPI).13
Specifically, following the political economy literature, we use two indicators of fragmen-
tation: the Herfindahl index and the number of parties. As for the first, the Herfindahl
index for government (denoted HERFGOV) is the sum of the squares of the seats’ share
12Out of the 788 observations of ∆FR reported in Table 3.2, we identify 18 cases of reversals, that is
a negative ∆FR.
13See Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh (2001) for further information.
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of all parties in the government. Formally,
HERFGOVjt = Nj∑
i=1 s2ijt,
where sijt is the share of seats of party i in the coalition government j in year t. Shares are
computed based on the total number of seats in the parliament held by the government.
The index ranges from 0 to 1 and can be thought of as a measure of fragmentation of
power in the ruling coalition, many smaller parties being associated with lower values
than fewer bigger parties. Our second indicator is the number of parties within the
ruling coalition. This variable, labeled NUMBER OF PARTIES, is a simple count of
the political parties present in the government.
Table 3.2 shows that the average value of HERFGOV is 0.712, meaning that countries
have on average few big parties in their governing coalitions. This variable HERFGOV
also greatly varies between and within countries (see variations for each country reported
in Table B.1). NUMBER OF PARTIES follows a similar pattern.
Table 3.3 (Panel A) deepens this picture and reports, for each index of government
fragmentation, descriptive statistics by the number of parties present in the government.
In Table 3.3, we show that the high mean value for HERFGOV in Table 3.2 is not
purely driven by single-party governments (for which HERFGOV equals 1), but the
Herfindahl index can be also high for coalition governments. Table 3.3 stresses how
the fragmentation of power within coalition government is still highly present in two-
party governments (the median number for HERFGOV is 0.677 and the maximum is
0.987) and how it increases smoothly, on average, with the number of parties. Multi-
party governments represent more than 60% of our sample, with 35% composed by four
parties or more. Additional information is provided on Panel B of Table 3.3, which
indicates the correlations between the indices of government fragmentation.
In addition, we consider the share of seats held by the largest government party (LARGEST
SEAT SHARE, see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 for descriptive statistics). This ensures that the
variability of the Herfindahl index is not completely driven by changes in the size of the
largest party alone (which is the main component of the Herfindahl index). This also
controls for the fact that the index may in principle not increase monotonically in the
number of very small parties.14
14Indeed, a few relatively big parties can have the same Herfindahl as one big and many small parties.
However, after having checked by hand each coalition government in our dataset, we did not detect cases
where a same Herfindahl value is reported for different compositions of government.
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3.2.2.3 Control Variables
We use standard control variables present in the literature. In particular, we control for
macroeconomic and institutional environment as well as for shocks and learning process
altering the pace at which reforms occur.
The decision to go on with reforms may be influenced by the informative content of
previous financial reforms, in terms of costs and benefits. We capture this informative
content by lagging the index of financial reforms (FR) and its first difference (∆FR),
that is, controlling for past levels of financial liberalization and for previous financial
reforms.
As the demand for financial services increases with the level of economic development,
we include the first lag of the variable GDP PER CAPITA. We then account for dif-
ferences in the macroeconomic environment by the following variables: RECESSION,
INFLATION, and GFCF. Movements in these variables capture the size of internal and
external macroeconomic shocks experienced by a country. The dummy variable RE-
CESSION is defined as a year where annual real GDP growth is negative. INFLATION
is defined as the annual rate of inflation. GFCF is the gross fixed capital formation as a
share of GDP. We also control for the role played by trade openness in fostering financial
reforms as argued by Rajan and Zingales (2003). The variable TRADE OPENNESS is
computed as total international trade (imports plus exports) as a share of GDP.
In some cases, OECD countries embrace reforms in their financial system due to their
membership to supranational organizations such as the European Union. EU MEM-
BERSHIP is a dummy with value one given to members states, starting from their date
of entry into the European Union.
3.2.2.4 Political Economy Control Variables
To control for the impact of other political economy factors, we use IDEOLOGY, FIRST
YEAR, HERFOPP, and MAJORITY GOVERNMENT. A push for financial reforms
may stem from the ideological bias of the parties in the government. IDEOLOGY is
an index of government orientation with respect to economic policy ranging from 0 to
3 and is coded to have lower value associated with right-wing governments and higher
value with left-wing governments. Then, FIRST YEAR is a dummy variable indicating
the executive’s first year in office. This is a control for the “honeymoon hypothesis”,
suggesting that new governments have incentives to pass reforms at early stage of their
mandate in order to realize the benefits of reform before the next election. We also
consider the opposition fragmentation, as in principle it can play a role in preventing the
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government from altering the status quo. This is motivated by the fact that a few bigger
opposition parties may find it easier to coordinate against government proposals, whereas
a fragmented opposition may have divergent interests and its cohesion may break down
on specific government initiatives. Thus, the Herfindahl index (called HERFOPP) is used
to express the fragmentation of the opposition as well. Finally, minority governments
behave differently from governments holding a majority of seats in the parliament and
political fragmentation within a coalition may be more relevant when the coalition has
enough political power to legislate alone, without external support. For this reason, we
use the control variable MAJORITY GOVERNMENT, which measures the proportion
of seats held by the government in the parliament.
The last part of Table 3.1 also considers control variables that will be presented and
discussed in section 3.3.2.
3.2.3 Empirical Methodology
We are interested in examining the effect of government fragmentation on financial
reforms. As a first step, we check the stationarity of ∆FR. To this end, we implement
the Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) panel unit
root tests proposed by Maddala and Wu (1999). Unreported test results conclude that
∆FR is integrated of order zero (I(0)), which means that we should not incur spurious
results. We then estimate the following dynamic model, in which the dependent variable
(∆FR) is lagged:
∆FRc,t = αc + αt + β1∆FRc,t−1 + β2FRc,t−1 + β3GFc,t + γ′Xc,t + c,t. (3.1)
In model (3.1), c and t index the country and time, ∆FRc,t is the difference in the index
of financial reforms, αc and αt are country and year fixed effects, ∆FRc,t−1 and FRc,t−1
are the lags of the dependent variable (in first differences and levels), GFc,t is one of our
indices of government fragmentation, Xc,t is a vector of control variables, and c,t is the
error term.15 We report estimates with robust standard errors adjusted for clustering
by country.
There are two major challenges in identifying the effect of government fragmentation
on financial reforms. First, it is hard to control for all factors that may have an effect
15The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side implies that the fixed effects
estimator is biased, albeit the bias is likely to disappear for a fixed number of countries as the number
of time periods increases. In practice, however, Judson and Owen (1999) have shown that the bias is
negligible for panels that cover more than 20 years. We have an average number of year per country
equal to 24.
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on financial policy change. For instance, hard-to-measure factors such as initial endow-
ments (Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine, 2003), religious norms (Stulz and Williamson,
2003), social capital (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales, 2004a), and trust (Guiso, Sapienza,
and Zingales, 2009) may affect both government fragmentation and financial policy
change. To account for omitted variable bias and unobserved country heterogeneity,
we exploit time-series variation employing fixed-effects estimates. Besides time-varying
control variables (Xc,t), we indeed include country fixed effects (αc) that control for all
time-invariant country characteristics and year fixed effects (αt) that control for global
trends that affect all countries equally. Second, since a correlation between govern-
ment fragmentation and financial reforms can be driven by reverse causality, in section
3.3.3 we estimate equation (3.1) using an IV technique that directly tackles endogeneity
concerns.
3.3 Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results and robustness checks. In particular, section
3.3.1 shows our main results. Section 3.3.2 further explores whether deeper country-
specific factors drive our results, while section 3.3.3 discusses the possibility of reverse
causality. Section 3.3.4 proposes additional robustness checks.
3.3.1 Main Results
Table 3.4 contains our main results. Columns (1) to (4) show the results using the
Herfindahl index for government (HERFGOV) as a proxy for government fragmenta-
tion, while columns (5) and (6) consider instead the number of parties in the ruling
coalition (NUMBER OF PARTIES). Each column estimates the impact of government
fragmentation on financial reform (∆FR) with a different set of control variables. As
the results are robust across specifications, we first discuss the impact of the indices of
fragmentation, our variables of interest, and then turn to the discussion of the control
variables.
Table 3.4 provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that less fragmented govern-
ments have a positive and significant effect on the pace and extent of financial reform.
The effect is statistically and economically significant. In almost all specifications the
coefficient on HERFGOV is positive and significantly different from zero at the 1% level,
the only exception being column (3) in which it is significantly different from zero at
the 5% level. The coefficients on HERFGOV range from 0.022 to 0.091. Column (4),
which includes the full set of controls, is our preferred specification. A one standard
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deviation increase of HERFGOV implies a 0.025 increase in the change of the index
of financial reforms (i.e., 0.272*0.091), which is a sizable effect recalling that the mean
value of ∆FR is 0.020. The latter effect is equivalent to move from no liberalization to
full liberalization in one of the seven dimensions of FR in slightly less than six years.
Another way of interpreting this finding is that going from a ruling coalition for which
the HERFGOV is on average 0.300 (like Belgium, see Table B.1) to a ruling coalition for
which the HERFGOV is 0.655 (like France), ∆FR should increase by 3.2% (in absolute
terms) or 10.8% (in relative terms, with respect to the initial level of Belgian ∆FR).
Hence, holding everything else constant, differences in government fragmentation have
a significant economic effect on financial policy change.
Taking the remaining specifications, a one standard deviation increase in HERFGOV
leads to an increase in ∆FR of 0.006 points, in column (3), to 0.024 points, in column
(2). Notice that in columns (2) and (4), where the control variable LARGEST SEAT
SHARE is introduced, the coefficient on HERFGOV becomes stronger. This means that
keeping the share of the largest party in the coalition constant, the marginal effect of
fragmentation is even stronger. But it should be noticed that the inverse is also true.
Since the coefficient on LARGEST SEAT SHARE is negative and significant, an increase
in the size of the largest party, holding the overall Herfindahl index fixed, would imply
a higher degree of government fragmentation of the smaller coalition members and our
estimates suggest that this would hinder reforms. One way of rationalizing this result
is presented in section 3.4.3, where a model of lobbying is presented in which smaller
coalition members may be less expensive for lobbyists to capture in order to delay
reforms.
Turning to the effect of the number of government parties in a coalition, columns (5)
and (6) show that it negatively impacts financial policy change. Although, the results
for NUMBER OF PARTIES are somewhat weaker, the coefficient remains significantly
different from zero at conventional levels. The coefficients on NUMBER OF PARTIES
are equal to -0.003. The economic impact of NUMBER OF PARTIES is largely relevant.
Let us consider the effect of adding one party to the government.16 One more party
joining the governing coalition (using the coefficient of column (6)) is estimated to map
into a decrease of 0.003 points in the pace of financial reforms (∆FR). This result suggests
that the bias towards the status quo increases with the number of parties in the ruling
coalition, even without taking into account the relative size of each member.
As for the control variables included in Table 3.4, past financial reforms (measured by
the lagged dependent variable, ∆FRc,t−1) enter the regressions positively but just fail
16We focus on such unit increase in NUMBER OF PARTIES because it relates to some concrete
feature of the political equilibrium and it is quite close to the standard deviation of NUMBER OF
PARTIES (1.449).
Chapter 3. Reforming Finance under Fragmented Governments 68
T
a
b
l
e
3
.4
:
G
overn
m
en
t
F
ra
g
m
en
ta
tio
n
a
n
d
F
in
a
n
cial
R
eform
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
rep
o
rts
resu
lts
rela
tin
g
fi
n
a
n
cia
l
refo
rm
s
to
g
ov
ern
m
en
t
fra
g
m
en
ta
tio
n
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ria
b
le
is
∆
F
R
.
D
ep
en
d
in
g
o
n
th
e
sp
ecifi
ca
tio
n
s,
th
e
reg
ressio
n
s
co
n
tro
l
fo
r
la
g
g
ed
fi
n
a
n
cia
l
refo
rm
s
(in
fi
rst
d
iff
eren
ces
a
n
d
lev
els),
la
rg
est
sea
t
sh
a
re,
eco
n
o
m
ic
d
ev
elo
p
m
en
t,
recessio
n
,
in
fl
a
tio
n
,
g
ro
ss
fi
x
ed
ca
p
ita
l
fo
rm
a
tio
n
,
tra
d
e
o
p
en
n
ess,
E
U
m
em
b
ersh
ip
,
g
ov
ern
m
en
t’s
id
eo
lo
g
y,
ex
ecu
tiv
e’s
fi
rst
y
ea
r
in
o
ffi
ce,
o
p
p
o
sitio
n
fra
g
m
en
ta
tio
n
,
m
a
jo
rity
g
ov
ern
m
en
t,
y
ea
r
a
n
d
co
u
n
try
fi
x
ed
eff
ects.
T
h
e
p
a
n
el
sp
a
n
s
th
e
1
9
7
5
-2
0
0
5
in
terva
l
a
n
d
in
clu
d
es
th
e
O
E
C
D
co
u
n
tries
rep
o
rted
in
T
a
b
le
B
.1
.
T
a
b
le
3
.1
su
m
m
a
rizes
va
ria
b
les
d
efi
n
itio
n
s
a
n
d
so
u
rces.
A
ll
sp
ecifi
ca
tio
n
s
a
re
estim
a
ted
w
ith
ro
b
u
st
sta
n
d
a
rd
erro
rs
(in
p
a
ren
th
eses)
clu
stered
b
y
co
u
n
try.
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
in
d
ica
te
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
lev
els,
resp
ectiv
ely.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
In
d
ic
e
s
o
f
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t
F
ra
g
m
e
n
ta
tio
n
H
E
R
F
G
O
V
0
.0
2
3
*
*
*
0
.0
9
0
*
*
*
0
.0
2
2
*
*
0
.0
9
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
L
A
R
G
E
S
T
S
E
A
T
S
H
A
R
E
-0
.0
8
3
*
*
-0
.0
8
7
*
*
(0
.0
3
4
)
(0
.0
3
3
)
N
U
M
B
E
R
O
F
P
A
R
T
IE
S
-0
.0
0
3
*
*
-0
.0
0
3
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
C
o
n
tro
l
V
a
ria
b
le
s
∆
F
R
(la
g
g
ed
)
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
9
3
0
.0
9
4
0
.0
9
0
0
.0
9
7
0
.0
9
4
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.0
5
9
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
(0
.0
5
8
)
F
R
(la
g
g
ed
)
-0
.1
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
1
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
2
*
*
*
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
6
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
ln
(G
D
P
P
E
R
C
A
P
IT
A
)
(la
g
g
ed
)
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
8
)
(0
.0
2
7
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
(0
.0
2
6
)
R
E
C
E
S
S
IO
N
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
0
.0
1
8
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
(0
.0
0
5
)
IN
F
L
A
T
IO
N
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
G
F
C
F
0
.1
9
6
*
*
*
0
.2
1
0
*
*
*
0
.1
9
1
*
*
*
0
.2
1
0
*
*
*
0
.1
8
9
*
*
0
.1
8
9
*
*
(0
.0
7
0
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.0
7
4
)
(0
.0
6
9
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
T
R
A
D
E
O
P
E
N
N
E
S
S
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
7
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
1
1
0
.0
0
6
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
1
)
(0
.0
2
0
)
E
U
M
E
M
B
E
R
S
H
IP
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
0
9
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
1
0
0
.0
1
0
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
8
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(co
n
tin
u
ed
)
Chapter 3. Reforming Finance under Fragmented Governments 69
T
a
b
l
e
3
.4
—
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
P
o
li
ti
c
a
l
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
C
o
n
tr
o
l
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
ID
E
O
L
O
G
Y
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
2
0
.0
0
3
*
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
(0
.0
0
2
)
F
IR
S
T
Y
E
A
R
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
-0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
(0
.0
0
4
)
H
E
R
F
O
P
P
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
0
4
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
(0
.0
0
9
)
M
A
J
O
R
IT
Y
G
O
V
E
R
N
M
E
N
T
0
.0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
0
.0
0
0
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
(0
.0
1
7
)
Y
e
a
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
C
o
u
n
tr
y
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
O
v
er
a
ll
R
2
0
.1
5
6
0
.1
5
3
0
.1
5
6
0
.1
4
9
0
.1
5
2
0
.1
5
0
W
it
h
in
R
2
0
.2
1
4
0
.2
1
8
0
.2
1
5
0
.2
1
8
0
.2
1
1
0
.2
1
3
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
C
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
3
0
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
7
2
7
7
2
7
7
2
7
7
2
7
7
2
7
7
2
7
Chapter 3. Reforming Finance under Fragmented Governments 70
to be significantly different from zero at the 10% level. The lagged level of financial
liberalization, FRc,t−1, exerts a large, negative, and strongly significant effect on actual
financial policy change. This may be determined by the fact that countries with highly
repressed financial sector have more potential to embrace reforms, whereas in countries
with highly liberalized financial sector there is less space for further reforms.17 The
lagged level of economic development does not seem to have an influence on financial
reforms. The effect of the recession dummy variable is positive and significant, stressing
that recessions give impetus to reform. INFLATION is negative and significantly dif-
ferent from zero at the 1% level in all specifications. GFCF has also some explanatory
power, probably because of the important role played by financial markets in foster-
ing investments. TRADE OPENNESS and EU MEMBERSHIP are positive but not
statistically significant.
Last, in columns (3), (4), and (6), we examine the effects of government’s ideological
orientation, the fact of being for the first year in office and the total share of seats of the
ruling coalition in the parliament. We also include opposition fragmentation as a control.
However, none of these variables appear statistically significant, with the only excep-
tion of IDEOLOGY in column (6). The coefficient on IDEOLOGY is positive, small,
and significant, meaning that left-wing governments tend to reform more the financial
sector than their centrist and rightist counterparts. Importantly, we also consider ide-
ological polarization as an alternative concept related to the ideological dispersion in
the legislature. Qualitatively similar effects are observed when we control for ideological
polarization, understood as the distance between the median government party and the
median opposition party.18 We do not report them for brevity.
As depicted in section 3.2.2, financial reforms in our sample go in most cases in the
direction of higher degree of liberalization, but of course financial reforms can also go
in the opposite direction. According to our hypothesis, stronger governments should
also achieve quicker reversals from liberalization. We examine it by considering reform
events, irrespective of the directionality towards liberalizations. We thus repeat the
analysis by taking as dependent variable ∣∆FR∣, the absolute value of change in our
index of financial reforms. Unreported regression results are similar to those of Table
3.4, regardless of which indices of government fragmentation we consider.19
17Huang (2009) and Campos and Coricelli (2012) report similar findings.
18More exactly, we include in our base specification the variable POLARIZ defined as the maximum
ideological polarization between the executive party and the four principle parties of the legislature
(sourced from WBDPI database).
19HERFGOV is positive and significant, with a coefficient of 0.022 (p-value of 0.012), while NUMBER
OF PARTIES is negative and significant, with a coefficient of -0.002 (p-value of 0.083), if we take a
specification similar to colmuns (1) and (5) of Table 3.4, respectively.
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In sum, the findings in this section point decisively in the direction of our hypothesis,
indicating that fragmented governments underprovide financial reforms. While our in-
dices of government fragmentation perform well in regressions, an important concern
is whether government fragmentation is simply a proxy for other characteristics of a
country’s constitutional arrangements and population. We address this concern in the
next section.
3.3.2 Characteristics of Countries’ Constitution and Population
In this section, we examine whether the effect of government fragmentation identified in
Table 3.4 is driven by deeper country-specific factors. We further explore the role played
by proportional electoral system, federalism, income inequality, and ethnic, linguistic,
and religious fractionalization (see Table 3.1 for definitions). Table 3.5 shows the results
and only reports, for brevity, the variables of interest.
The political science literature has long stressed the implications of proportionality of
the electoral system on government characteristics (see, for example, Lijphart, 1994).
Indeed, proportional electoral systems are much more likely to produce multi-party
governments, whereas single-party governments are more likely in majoritarian electoral
systems. The political economy literature has in turn stressed the implications for policy
outcomes of different electoral systems (see, for example, Persson and Tabellini, 2004;
Pagano and Volpin, 2005). To address both issues we add PROPORTIONALITY in our
base specifications. The indicator of the degree of proportionality of the electoral system
is constructed as in Pagano and Volpin (2005). It ranges between 0 and 3 and is coded
to have lower value associated with pure majoritarianism and higher value with pure
proportionality. The variable PROPORTIONALITY enters significantly and negatively
in columns (1) and (2), suggesting that proportional electoral systems are less prone to
pursuing reforms in the financial sector than majoritarian systems, consistently with the
findings of Pagano and Volpin (2005). More importantly, the results for our indices of
government fragmentation are unaffected.
A country’s federal structure may also favor government fragmentation and affect policy
outcome. We therefore include a dummy variable for federal structures (called FED-
ERAL) in columns (3) and (4). From these specifications, federalism does not appear
to be a significant determinant of financial reforms, whereas government fragmentation
remains a significant one.
Also income inequality may drive our results. Inequality affects financial reforms because
unequal distribution of resources affects de facto political power. Hence, government
fragmentation can reflect the underlying income inequality. In unequal countries, fears
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that liberalized financial systems will only help the rich may undermine the political
support for financial reforms—and inversely with more equal countries.20 In columns
(5) and (6), we include the Gini index of income inequality, as reported by the World
Bank. Income inequality does not appear statistically significant, but our indices of
government fragmentation remain critical determinants of financial policy change.
An important body of empirical research also supports the claim that the degree of
heterogeneity within a country’s population affects governments and policy outcomes.
Columns (7) and (8) control for the underlying group structure of ethnicities, languages,
and religions in OECD countries. We rely on the (time-invariant) fractionalization
variables computed by Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003),
which reflect the probability that two randomly selected individuals from a population
belong, respectively, to different ethnicities, languages, and religions. From columns (7)
and (8), none of the fractionalization variables appear significantly different from zero,
with the only exception of RELIGION. Again, both statistical and economic significance
of our indices of government fragmentation are unaffected.
Overall, these results confirm that government fragmentation plays a significant and
distinct role on financial policy change and does not capture other deep features of a
country’s political institutions and population.
3.3.3 Reverse Causality
While the panel techniques account for time-invariant country characteristics and time
trends, the results may still be driven by reverse causality. In theory, cases could be
imagined in which the need for financial reforms in a country changes its institutions so
deeply as to affect government fragmentation through the voting behavior of citizens.
Although the generality of this claim is disputable, it is a possibility that we want to
rule out by properly instrumenting variations in government fragmentation.
In order to address concerns about reverse causality, we use an IV technique, and specif-
ically two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimations. We identify instruments that provide
additional variability to the country and year fixed effects. We instrument the Herfind-
ahl index for government and the number of parties in a coalition using two variables
which are not related to structural characteristics—such as the constitutional design or
population characteristics which may affect financial reforms as well—but rather reflect
the occasional electoral outcomes which always involve a component of randomness.
20Claessens and Perotti (2007) review the experience with financial reform in the context of inequality.
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The first instrument is called RELATIVE STRENGTH and is defined as the difference
between the Herfindahl index for government and the Herfindahl index for opposition.
This instrument captures the relative cohesiveness of the ruling coalition vis-a`-vis the re-
maining parties in the parliament. The level of relative strength affects the composition
of the governing coalition, but it is not perfectly correlated with it because the latter
also depends on country characteristics affecting the average size of parties (such as the
indices of fractionalization discussed above). In other words, holding everything else
fixed, a high value of this instrument (i.e., high relative strength) would be associated
with having one very large party leading the government coalition or having a govern-
ment coalition of few large parties. This would then result in a high level of Herfindahl
index and in a lower level of parties needed in the coalition.21
The second instrument is called CLOSE ELECTIONS and is a dummy set to one if the
coalition has just slightly more than half of the seats in the parliament. In particular,
we consider the first quartile of the sample distribution of the difference between the
coalition seat share and the 50% threshold. This variable captures the possibility that a
party receives a big share of the vote but falls short of reaching the 50% and the needs
to find smaller parties to get majority in the parliament. This combination of a large
party and one or a few small parties would result in a high Herfindahl index.
Table 3.6 displays 2SLS results. Columns (1) and (3) are the first-stage regressions,
in which HERFGOV and NUMBER OF PARTIES are respectively regressed on the
two instruments and the set of control variables and fixed effects. Columns (2) and (4)
represent the second-stage regressions, in which the exogenous variation in each index of
government fragmentation is exploited to estimate the effect on financial policy change.
Our previous results are confirmed by the 2SLS estimations: there is evidence that
fragmented governments affect negatively financial policy change.
Given the validity of our instruments,22 we further check the endogeneity of our indices of
government fragmentation by performing Durbin-Wu-Hausman test. We fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the specified endogenous regressors (i.e., our indices of government
fragmentation) can actually be treated as exogenous. Thus, we can be confident that
our estimations in previous sections do not lead to inconsistent and biased estimates.
21Alternatively, the difference in size between the largest government and opposition party could be
used. The results still hold under this slightly different specification of the RELATIVE STRENGTH
variable, but the coefficients in the second stage are somehow less significant when country fixed effects
are used in the first-stage regressions.
22Our instruments are significantly different from zero at conventional levels in first-stage regressions.
The first-stage F -statistics, reported at the bottom of Table 3.6, are above the 19.93 value required for
a 2SLS estimation with two instruments, meaning that our instruments are strong and thus satisfy the
relevance condition (Stock and Yogo, 2005). Moreover, the Hansen J-statistics as well as the difference-
in-Sargan statistics suggest that our instruments are not correlated with c,t, the error term of the
structural equation (3.1), and thus satisfy the exclusion condition.
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3.3.4 Miscellaneous Robustness Checks
This section presents additional robustness checks. For brevity, the results are either
untabulated or reported in the Appendix B.2. All of the results discussed below are
available upon request.
3.3.4.1 Financial Crises
Crises might be seen as potential mechanism for unlocking economic reforms. Our results
have shown that economic recessions give impetus to reform the financial sector (in Table
3.4 RECESSION appeared positively and significantly). Different types of financial
crises can also trigger different actions on financial sector policy. In their study, Abiad
and Mody (2005) highlight that currency crises raise the likelihood of reform, whereas
banking crises have the opposite effect. More generally, financial crises can increase
fragmentation by leading to extreme voting behaviors, reducing in turn the chances of
financial reforms as supported by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014). Since financial crises
can affect reforms, Table B.2 controls for banking, currency, domestic/external debt,
inflation, and stock market crises using the Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) comprehensive
dataset.
The coefficients obtained for our financial crises dummy variables appear indistinguish-
able from zero in most cases with the only exception of inflation crises, which negatively
affect reforms. These results does not seem to support the hypothesis that crises spur
reform, but since this is not the focus of the current paper we do not investigate fur-
ther the issue. What is relevant for our purpose is the observation that including crises
among the controls does not reduce the explanatory power of government fragmentation
on the pace and extent of financial reform.23
3.3.4.2 Ordered Logit Estimations
Our main results rely on standard fixed-effects methods instead of ordered probability
models because the updated index compiled by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010)
23For robustness purposes concerning the definition of crises variables, we also replicated these results
employing measures of currency and banking crises as used by Abiad and Mody (2005) and as constructed
by Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez-Peria (2001). The inclusion of these measures restricts
our sample to 25 countries on the 1975-1997 period. Regardless of which indices of government frag-
mentation we use, we obtain results that are similar to those in Table 3.4. HERFGOV is always positive
and significant, with a coefficient of 0.039 (p-value of 0.002) if we take a specification similar to column
(1) of Table 3.4. Similarly, NUMBER OF PARTIES shows a negative coefficient (value of -0.004) and
significantly different from zero (p-value of 0.086).
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is more continuous than the one compiled by Abiad and Mody (2005).24 To be fully
consistent with Abiad and Mody (2005) and allow comparability, we also report the
results using ordered logit method for our estimation. The results are presented in Table
B.3. They do not change our conclusions and confirm our hypothesis that the status quo
bias decreases as governments become less fragmented. However, the interpretation of
the coefficients become somewhat different since they are to be interpreted as marginal
effects.
3.3.4.3 Other Dimensions of Political Fragmentation
Although we have considered so far various political economy variables, one may won-
der whether our conclusions are altered by other dimensions of political fragmentation,
namely fragmentation among institutions and fragmentation over time. In this respect,
we discuss in turn two sets of tests.25 First, we test whether our results still hold when
the parties in the government do not enjoy an absolute majority in the chambers that
have lawmaking powers. Indeed, if the opposition has the majority in one of the cham-
bers, the government has to engage in negotiations to pass reforms or amend them to
obtain the favor of some opposition party. This may result in a lower ability to enact
needed reforms. The variable ALLHOUSE is defined as being a dummy variable taking
the value of one when the party of the executive has the absolute majority of both cham-
bers. When we include this measure of fragmentation among chambers, as a control in
our base specifications, our results are similar to those in Table 3.4.
We also include a measure of checks and balances among institutions. In fact, our in-
dices of government fragmentation do not capture the effectiveness of electoral checks
on government decision makers and the electoral rules that influence party control over
members. When the system of checks and balances among different constitutional play-
ers is weak, government control of the legislative apparatus is usually strong. Therefore,
we employ the variable CHECKS, which takes into account the number of players with
a veto in a political system, adjusted for whether they are independent of each other,
their respective party affiliation, and the electoral rules.26 The inclusion of CHECKS in
24Indeed, by assigning various subdimensions that are then normalized between 0 and 3 for each
of the seven dimensions of financial sector policy, Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2010) offer a more
continuous-like index. See Huang (2009) who proposes a critical discussion on the use of ordered logit
methods in this context.
25All variables introduced in this section are drawn from the WBDPI database and details on their
construction can be found in the WBDPI codebook (see also Beck, Clarke, Groff, Keefer, and Walsh,
2001).
26For presidential systems CHECKS is the sum of 1 (for the President), and the number of relevant
legislative chambers. However, if there are closed lists and the President’s party is the main government
party, then the relevant legislative chambers are not counted. For parliamentary systems CHECKS is
the sum of 1 (for the Prime Minister) and the number of parties in the coalition. If there are closed lists
and the Prime Minister’s party is the main government party, then this sum is reduced by one.
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our base specifications does not affect our results, neither in significance nor in sign or
order of magnitude.
Second, government entrenchment may frustrate any attempt to alter the status quo. We
use two measures capturing temporal aspects of fragmentation. We employ the variables
STABS and TENURE. The former is defined as the percentage of veto players who drop
from the government in any given year, thus indirectly measuring how much the members
of the ruling coalition can be considered as “insiders”. The latter is defined as the tenure
of the veto player in the government with the longest tenure. For both variables, veto
players are defined as follows: for presidential systems, the veto players are the President
and the largest party in the legislature. For parliamentary systems, veto players are
defined as the Prime Minister and the three biggest coalition members. STABS takes
into account changes occurring within a term, whereas TENURE takes into account
whether veto players’ identity changes from one term to another. The inclusion of
STABS and TENURE in our base specifications hardly affect our results. Interestingly,
STABS appears in regressions positively and significantly different from zero, meaning
that a drop of the number of veto players from the government increases financial policy
change. Consistently with intuition, this suggests that government alternation facilitates
the pursuit of reforms.
Together with the political economy variables employed in section 3.3.1, these robustness
tests suggest that financial policy gridlock is mostly driven by government fragmentation
than by other concepts of fragmentation of the political landscape.
3.3.5 Corporate Governance Reforms
The previous section finds support for the hypothesis that government fragmentation
results in a decrease in reforms aimed at supporting financial sector development. In this
section, as an external validation of our hypothesis, we turn to a particular component
of financial development not captured by the index of financial reforms but identified as
relevant in the literature: corporate governance.
A huge body of literature stresses the benefits of investor protection for corporate gover-
nance around the world (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000b; Beck
and Levine, 2005). The literature identifies deep causes (mostly time-invariant) of a
country’s level of investor protection such as its historical legacy, constitution, social
capital, and culture, all of which lie outside the realm of government activities. Many
countries have undertaken corporate governance reforms over time and, from a short-
run point of view, any reform designed at protecting the rights of outside investors,
including both minority shareholders and creditors, may find strong political partisans
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Table 3.7: Corporate Governance Reforms
This table reports results relating corporate governance reforms to govern-
ment fragmentation. The dependent variable is the absolute change of the
sum of two indicators of investor protection: (1) the “anti-director rights”
index as updated by Pagano and Volpin (2005) and the “creditor rights”
index as produced by Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007). In columns 1
and 2, the independent variable of interest is HERFGOV, while in columns
3 and 4 the independent variable of interest is NUMBER OF PARTIES.
All specifications use the same set of control variables of Table 3.4 and, in
columns 2 and 4, further control for proportional electoral system. This
table only reports the coefficients of variables of interest for brevity. The
panel spans the 1993-2002 interval and includes OECD countries. Table
3.1 summarizes variables definitions and sources. All specifications are esti-
mated with robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered by country. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables of Interest
HERFGOV 0.295** 0.271**
(0.124) (0.114)
NUMBER OF PARTIES -0.040** -0.037**
(0.020) (0.019)
PROPORTIONALITY -0.124*** -0.140***
(0.044) (0.042)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002
Within R2 0.090 0.090 0.090 0.092
Number of Countries 26 26 26 26
Number of Observations 248 248 248 248
and resistance from the insiders. For instance, families that control large corporations
may lobby governments to oppose change in investor protection arrangements. From the
perspective of these families, an improvement in rights of outside investors goes hand in
hand with a deterioration of the prospects of expropriation, which reduces their value
of control. The question we thus raise is: does our hypothesis hold for corporate gov-
ernance reforms? In other words, mirroring the argument made for financial reforms in
general, are less fragmented governments more efficient in unlocking investor protection
policy and disrupting the status quo?
Our empirical strategy is as follows. First, we construct an index of corporate governance
reforms. This index is the sum of anti-director rights and creditor rights as defined in
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and extended by Pagano and
Volpin (2005) and Djankov, McLiesch, and Shleifer (2007), respectively. This variable
captures the quality of investor protection. Second, we examine the effect of government
fragmentation on the absolute change of this index of investor protection in OECD
countries to the interval between 1993 and 2002.
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We report results in Table 3.7. In columns (1) and (3), we first regress corporate gov-
ernance reform on government fragmentation with the same set of control variables as
before. We find that our indices of government fragmentation have the expected sign
and they are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Moreover, Pagano and
Volpin (2005) predict that strong shareholder protection is more likely in countries with
majoritarian electoral systems. We therefore introduce (in columns (2) and (4)) the
variable measuring the proportionality of the electoral system. Our indices of govern-
ment fragmentation are unaffected, while the proportional electoral systems’ indicator
is negatively and significantly different from zero at the 1% level.
All in all, we show that government fragmentation is negatively associated with corpo-
rate governance reforms, providing additional supporting evidence for our hypothesis.
Notably, this finding confirms that investor protection at any given point in time results
partly from recent decisions made by governments, and partly by long-standing factors
such as the electoral system.
3.4 Tentative Explanations of the Results: Three Simple
Models
In the empirical section we have documented a causal relationship between government
fragmentation and financial reforms, but through which channels may it come about?
Three possible, non-mutually exclusive mechanisms are presented, which are consistent
with our findings. The first one is based on a “war of attrition” between well-intentioned
politicians trying to avoid the private costs of providing a public good: the reform
proposal (section 3.4.1). The second one relies on coalition members being able to veto
reforms which are unfavorable to their constituencies (section 3.4.2). The third one
focuses on targeted lobbying efforts aiming at individual members of a coalition to stop
or delay reforms (section 3.4.3).
3.4.1 War of Attrition in Drafting Reform Proposals
The first possible explanation of our empirical results is based on the waiting game
described by Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) for the provision of a public good, which in our
case would be the proposal of a consensual reform to the coalition partners. Imagine
that all the parties in a ruling coalition agree on the need for a particular financial
reform, but there is no agreement on who has to craft the proposal and incur the costs
of designing it and explaining to the public and the coalition partners. In this case, the
reform proposal can be interpreted as a public good associated with a private cost. The
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structure of the model is quite standard in the literature, so here are outlined just the
key mechanisms and assumptions of the associated model.
The main mechanism is quite simple and intuitive. Assume that all the parties attribute
the same unit value to the proposal and implementation of the reform (which is assumed
instantaneous for simplicity, so that only the proposal is delayed but not the implemen-
tation). Everyone is assumed to agree on the need for reform and all the parties share
the same discount value for time, which is assumed exponential. The cost of proposing
the reform, c ∈ [0,1], differs across parties and is distributed in the population with a
cumulative differentiable distribution function, F (c) (the private cost is assumed smaller
than the benefit for the parties to be interested in it). Finally, the size of the ruling
coalition, n, is exogenously given and costs are independently and identically distributed
with density f(c).
In this framework it can be shown that the optimal waiting time for each party to
propose the reform, T (., .) can be expressed in terms of its actual cost of proposing the
legislation, c, and the number of parties in the coalition, n, so that T (n, c), which is
assumed to be monotonic in c. Every party is assumed to behave in the same way and
expect the others to behave accordingly, so it sets its optimal strategy by determining its
maximum waiting time, T (n, c), which amounts to choose a c = c∗. The expected utility
for each party would then correspond to the net benefit from proposing the financial
reform (1− c) at its maximum waiting time T (n, c∗) plus the expected discounted value
if the good is supplied earlier by a party with a lower cost of advancing the proposal:
E[U(c, c∗)] = (1 − c)e−T (n,c∗)[1 − F (c∗)]n−1 + ∫ c∗
0
e−T (n,x)nf(x)[1 − F (x)]n−2dx.
In this kind of model, Bliss and Nalebuff (1984) prove that each party’s optimal waiting
time, besides increasing monotonically in its cost of proposing the reform, is directly
proportional to n − 1, where n is the number of parties in the coalition with the same
cost distributions:
T (n, c) = (n − 1)T (1, c).
This result may rationalize our empirical result as far as the regressions on the number
of parties are concerned. However, it should be noted that this explanation would apply
only to reform proposals over which there is consensus in the coalition, which is not
always the case. The next two ways of rationalize our empirical results address this
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potential drawback and provide also a justification for the relevance of the results on
the concentration of power in the coalition.
3.4.2 Conflict between Constituencies’ Interests
The second and third possible explanations of our results are based on political con-
flict of interests, where parties exploit their veto power in a ruling coalition to their
constituency’s or their own advantage, in a framework a` la Tsebelis (2002).
To provide a concrete illustration of a potential conflict of interests between factor
holders, consider an economy whose total output is determined by the combination
of i ∈ I factor inputs according to a Cobb-Douglas production function with constant
returns to scale:
Y = A∏
i∈I P ii ,
where I factors of production, Pi, are combined to produce a unit of output Y with
an exogenously given level of productivity, A, with technology i capturing the relative
importance of each factor in the production process. Constant returns to scale are
warranted by the condition ∑i∈I i = 1. The different factors can be seen as land use,
labor, energy, water and so on, but for the sake of our argument it is important to define
explicitly only one: financial capital, which we indicate with subscript f ∈ I such that
the factor is Pf and its technology parameter is f .
Financial capital is assumed to be composed of an endogenously determined share (δ)
of the exogenously given total world savings (S), so that Pf = δS. For simplicity,
we assume that returns on capital invested in the rest of the world are always lower
than in the economy considered, but the amount of capital flowing into the country
is constrained by domestic policy decisions. In particular, the share of world savings
invested in the economy of the country depends on the political choice on the extent of
financial liberalization of the market.
Before turning to the political economy aspects of the problem, notice that assuming
competitive markets and no heterogeneity across providers of the same factor, the re-
muneration of each factor provider is expected to depend on its marginal productivity.
In the case of financial capital, the remuneration pi is thus determined by:
pi = ∂Y
∂Pf
= AfP f−1f ∏
i≠f∈I P ii = Af∏i≠f∈I P
i
i(δS)1−f ,
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where Y represents total output, Pf financial capital input, Pi≠f∈I any other factor
used in the production process, f the relative importance of financial capital and i≠f∈I
captures the relative importance of all the other factors. Finally, A represents the
exogenously given level of total factor productivity. This expression highlights clearly
the source of conflict between factor holders. In the case of financial capital, for example,
it can be noticed how every additional unit of capital allowed into the country will reduce
the remuneration of the existing units, holding the other factors fixed. By symmetry,
the same holds for all the other factors.
Imagine now that each factor providers’ interests are perfectly represented by one party,
whose only objective is to maximize the remuneration of its constituency. This means,
for example, that the party representing labor would veto policies that increase the
effective size of the workforce, the party representing energy suppliers would veto energy
liberalizations, and so on. In this purely conflictual setting, the combination of vetoes
would allow reforms to be passed only on legislation affecting factors which are not
represented by the parties in the ruling coalition. If party coalitions are needed for
the government to have a majority in the parliament and if the issue at stake is not
correlated with the determinants of coalition membership, then it can be claimed that
the higher the number of parties, the higher the number of different constituencies and
factor interests represented and the slower will be the reform process because of veto
threats.
This simple “conflict of interests” mechanism could thus be identified as a second pos-
sible explanation for the empirical relation between the number of parties and the pace
and extent of reform. It complements the war-of-attrition explanation presented in the
previous subsection in explaining why a higher number of parties in a ruling coalition
may slow down reforms, but it does not rationalize yet the role played by the concen-
tration of power as measured by the Herfindahl index. To this end, a third explanation
is proposed in the following section, based on targeted lobbying.
3.4.3 Lobbying against Financial Reform
To adapt a lobbying framework a` la Grossman and Helpman (1994) to the context of
the politics of financial reform, we keep the representation of the economy as presented
in the explanation based on the “conflict of interests” in section 3.4.2, but we simplify it
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to make the point clearer and allow for a more refined political economy mechanism.27
Without loss of generality, the analysis is restricted to a conflict between labor suppliers
and capital holders. In other words, the output of the economy is assumed to be
Y = AF γW 1−γ ,
where financial capital F and labor W are combined to produce a unit of output Y with
an exogenously given level of productivity, A. The parameter γ ∈ [0; 1] represents the
financial capital intensity of the economy (i.e., the relative importance of financial capital
over labor in the production process). Again, financial capital is assumed to be composed
of an endogenously determined share (δ) of the exogenously given total world savings
(S), with F = δS. For simplicity, we keep on assuming that returns on capital invested
in the rest of the world are lower than in the economy considered, but the amount
of capital flowing into the country is constrained by domestic policy decisions, with the
share of world savings invested in the country depending on the investment opportunities
opened up through financial reforms undertaken by semi-benevolent politicians who give
the same weight to workers’ and savers’ welfare. In addition, we assume that savers have
one unit of capital and if they want to invest it in the country they are now assumed
to settle there in order to avoid that parties find optimal to target one type of factor
holder.
Parties’ preferences are expressed in terms of a stylized political economy model. We
assume that incumbent political parties, alone or as part of a ruling coalition, are as-
signed the only task of choosing δ, their desired level of financial liberalization in the
economy. In the spirit of Grossman and Helpman (1994), parties define their optimal
level of reform based on two factors: the total amount of funds received from financial
sector lobbying activities (L) and the citizens’ welfare.28 The latter is captured by wages
(w) and returns on the financial capital invested (r), as shown in the following objective
function:
27See Perotti and Volpin (2007) whose work also uses this framework to study the conflict of interests
between incumbent and new firms with respect to the level of investor protection. In their model,
incumbent firms lobby for low investor protection insofar as it discourages entry by new firms. Putting
aside entry-deterrence interests, Bebchuk and Neeman (2010) develop a model in which insiders use
corporate assets they control to lobby politicians to provide a suboptimal level of investor protection and,
thereby, protect their control rents. We follow here their approach of outlining a model in which semi-
benevolent politicians may fail to implement welfare maximizing policy because of lobbying activities.
In contrast, in our model, we look at the mechanism according to which small veto players in coalition
governments can increase the probability of deviating from the socially optimal policy.
28Despite we mainly consider compensating contributions, lobbying activities can take many other
forms—such as campaign contributions, business opportunities, charitable donations, and so forth—
which do not affect the conclusions of our model. In this respect, Grossman and Helpman (1996)
and Besley and Coate (2001) develop contrasted approaches on lobbying activities, while Harstad and
Svensson (2011) make an interesting distinction between bribing and lobbying.
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Ui = [1 − (β¯c + βi)]L + (β¯c + βi)(w + r). (3.2)
In this expression, each incumbent political party (i) trades off the financial support
obtained from lobbying activities (L) against citizens’ labor remuneration (w) and fi-
nancial capital returns (r). For simplicity, the same weight is given to the remuneration
of the two factors, which amounts to considering the economy as evenly split between
financial capital holders and labor providers, with every inflow of capital being matched
with a corresponding inflow of labor.29 The relative weight given by each party to citi-
zens’ welfare and lobbying is captured by a country-specific component β¯c, capturing the
time-invariant legislative structure of the country in which lobbyists operate (Bennedsen
and Feldmann, 2002), which is common to all the parties in the country and a party-
specific component βi, which can be seen as approximating a particular party’s relative
benevolence. Of course, benevolence cannot be directly observed, but we can expect
voters to be able to screen parties’ benevolence to a certain extent, in such a way that
the size of party i can be considered as a proxy for βi.
30
Lobbying money obtained by each party in a coalition government is modeled as a share
(l) of all the profits obtained in the financial sector, L = lΠ, whereas total profits can
be expressed as the returns (pi) on the financial capital invested (F ), that is, Π = piF .
Assuming no heterogeneity across providers of the same factor and competitive markets,
the holders of financial capital are remunerated according to the marginal productivity
of their factor, pi = ∂Y∂F , so that the amount of lobbying money (L) available for any
incumbent party is equal to
L = lΠ = lpiF = lAγW 1−γ(δS)γ .
As for the welfare of citizens, in our stylized model it depends on the remuneration of
both factors of production, to which the incumbent politician gives the same weight.
Abstracting from any heterogeneity of workers, each unit of labor will receive the same
remuneration (w) equal to
29This assumption prevents corner solutions in which politicians just target the largest group.
30From this perspective, the size of a party can signal its perceived benevolence, but an alternative
view could be that larger parties internalize the welfare impact on their choices on voters to a larger
extent and be less prone to deviate from optimal policies because of lobbying. For example, outside the
scope of this two-factor model, it can be argued that small parties may be less benevolent because they
may represent the interest of their tiny constituencies and be more disposed to propose niche policies than
policies of more general interest. An alternatively approach would be to assume the relation between
party size and benevolence as stemming from specific institutional arrangements granting, for example,
public funding proportional to size party size. In this case, in the presence of fixed costs incurred by
parties to sustain their activities, parties below a certain threshold may need lobbying financing to ensure
their survival. However, this approach would set a threshold above which all parties would not care for
lobbying money, whereas we find it more advantageous to represent the problem as more continuous in
terms of the parameter βi.
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w = ∂Y
∂W
= A(1 − γ) (δS
W
)γ .
The same holds for the remuneration of financial capital, r, with the only difference
that part of it is used for lobbying activities and does not accrue to its holders, whose
remuneration can then be written as
r = (1 − l)pi = (1 − l)∂Y
∂F
= (1 − l)Aγ (W
δS
)1−γ .
Recall that even though the international amount of savings (S) is exogenously given
in each period, the incumbent parties can indirectly set the level of financial capital
invested in the country through the choice of the degree of financial liberalization (e.g.,
they can open up domestic investment opportunities for foreign holders of savings). The
level of financial liberalization (δ) preferred by party i is then a function of the level of
lobbying contributions (L), party i benevolence (βi), production technology (γ), and the
relative level of factor endowment (W and S), in addition to an idiosyncratic ideological
party bias on the desired level of financial liberalization, ξi:
δ∗i = (1 − l)(1 − γ)(β¯c + βi)WS[1 − (β¯c + βi)]lγW + (β¯c + βi)(1 − γ) + ξi. (3.3)
Notice that when there is no lobbying (l = 0) or no importance is given to lobbying
money (βi = 1), the level of liberalization δ follows the evolution of local labor force and
world savings, which the parties take as exogenous, WS . This is the level of liberalization
that maximizes welfare by providing the highest level of returns for the holders of the
two factors and from which there would be no possible Pareto improvement. On the
other hand, if a party i cares only for lobbying money (βi = 0) or the entire remuneration
of the financial sector is absorbed by lobbying contributions (l = 1), then the desired
level of liberalization for the party i will be δ = 0. The δ function is indeed monotonically
decreasing in lobbying contributions l and monotonically increasing in the interest for
social welfare βi and in the size of the labor force W . In this model, lobbying is therefore
acting as an incentive for politicians to underprovide financial reform in order to keep
returns to financial capital higher than they would otherwise be. Politicians become
more captive as their interest in social welfare decreases, as captured by the parameter
βi.
In this setting, abstracting from the process of coalition formation (as, for example, out-
lined in Baron and Hirsch, 2012), incumbent parties can be seen as maximizing equation
(3.2), but each party in the ruling coalition can act as a veto player. Thus lobbyists
Chapter 3. Reforming Finance under Fragmented Governments 87
just need to target one party of the coalition to block reform. Assuming that parties
are heterogeneous along two dimensions (benevolence, βi, and bias vis-a`-vis financial
liberalization, ξi), then this model can be used to rationalize why the speed and extent
of financial reform can be driven by the parties at the extreme of the size distribution
in a ruling coalition. Specifically, assuming that benevolence is somehow perceived by
voters and associated with party size, following (3.3) larger parties (high βi) will deter-
mine the downward boundary to financial liberalization and smaller parties (low βi) the
upward boundary. In other words, a country will become more (less) financially liber-
alized only when the change is compatible with the preferences of the smallest (largest)
party in the ruling coalition. Therefore, the number of parties in the coalition does not
affect the amount of lobbying resources available for each party because lobbyists only
need to target one veto player at the extreme of the size distribution. However, given
that each party has also an idiosyncratic preference for financial liberalization, it is the
overall configuration of the coalition that counts. This aspect is indeed captured by
the Herfindahl index of fragmentation, which in our empirical analysis is shown to be a
significant determinant of the speed of reforms, controlling for the share of the largest
party.31
Given the constant increase in the labor force and the consistent process of incremental
financial liberalization documented in section 3.2, this third explanation can explain why
the presence of smallest parties can be so important in determining the speed of financial
reform by determining its upward boundary to financial reform. In other words, even
if the constant increase in population and labor force would call for a constant gradual
increase in financial liberalization, after every election the level of βi of each party is
expected to change and the overall preferences of the ruling coalition will be determined
by the veto power of the parties less willing to liberalize: the ones with the lowest
combination of party-size-related βi and random ξi.
As opposed to the previous two ways of rationalizing our empirical results, this would
thus not only look at the number of parties but would stress the importance of the
distribution of power in the coalition. An illustrative example is the case of a two-
party coalition where the two parties have the same size (say 26% and 25%) or very
different sizes (49% and 2%). In the “war of attrition” and the “conflict of interests”
explanations, these two two-party coalitions would have the same probability of passing
31Consistently with this lobbying channel, we repeated our regression analysis using a somehow less
precise but more immediately evident proxy for the smallest party in a coalition government, namely
a dummy variable set to one if at least one government party holds less than 20% of the government
seat shares. The results are remarkably in line to the ones obtained in section 3.3.1 and is in line with
the prediction that small parties, at the extreme of the size distribution in a coalition, are the drivers
of the reform agenda. For a specification similar to column (1) of Table 3.4, the dummy variable for
governments with a party holding less than 20% of the seats has a coefficient of -0.009 (p-value of 0.048).
Since the threshold of 20% is arbitrarily chosen, we perform sensitivity analyses using different thresholds
and we obtain qualitatively similar results.
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a financial reform. In the lobbying example, though, the latter coalition would be much
less expensive for financial lobbyists to capture than the former, and so reform would be
much less likely in one case than in the other. Notice that in equation (3.2) it cannot
be determined a priori the relative importance of idiosyncratic party preferences (ξ)
over their benevolence (β).32 If the importance of the former is such as to make the
latter insignificant, then only the number of parties would matter, as in the previous two
explanations. However, the empirical relevance of the metrics of fragmentation in our
estimations would rather suggest that relative party sizes in the ruling coalition matter.
This makes the lobbying mechanism as the most promising line of investigation for future
research, when extensive panel datasets on lobbying contributions to individual parties
will be available.
3.5 Conclusions
Reforming finance ranks high among policymakers’ priorities today. Yet, most advanced
economies are finding it hard to pass legislation promptly, which may ultimately harm
the welfare of their citizens. In this paper we have investigated one channel that may
explain this difficulty, testing whether delays in structural financial reforms may stem
from the high degree of government fragmentation currently experienced by most modern
democracies. Several studies have documented the importance of this relation for very
specific financial reforms (Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008), in particular country contexts
(Ben-Bassat, 2011), or in the aftermath of financial crises (Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi, 2014),
but the generality of the results still had to be assessed systematically.
Using a panel dataset covering 30 advanced democracies for 30 years and undertaking
several robustness checks, our results consistently point in the direction of a significantly
negative impact of government fragmentation on financial reforms, with fragmentation
approximated by the number of parties in a coalition and their relative size. Further-
more, we provide a form of external validation of our results by focusing on corporate
governance reforms and showing that they are similarly affected by government frag-
mentation.
Based on the political economy literature, we outline three possible, non-mutually ex-
clusive ways of explaining our empirical findings. We first show that if private costs
for the parties are associated with proposing reforms for the coalition, then each party
will have an incentive to wait longer for the others to take the initiative as the coalition
32On the concept that politicians shape their preferences on reform based on a combination of id-
iosyncratic ideological bias and lobbying contributions, see, for example, evidence from the United States
provided by Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010).
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becomes larger, even if there is consensus among parties over the reforms to undertake.
Second, we outline a simple model of conflict of interests between parties vetoing reform
proposals hurting their constituencies. In this case, the delay in reforming finance would
stem from disagreement over the legislation to pass and only a change in the compo-
sition of the ruling coalition would solve the standoff. Finally, we present a model of
lobbying in which it is not only the number of parties that matter, but the relative size of
coalition partners since individual parties can be targeted by lobbyists to block reform.
Of course, an interesting avenue for future research would be to adjudicate among the
different explanations, but that would require extensive information on lobbying in dif-
ferent countries. Unfortunately, to our best knowledge, no dataset is currently available
to track lobbying activity outside the United States.
A final caveat is due. Even though our results strongly support the idea that fragmented
governments are associated with a less intense reforming activity, they do not imply that
institutions leading to fragmented governments should be considered inferior to others.
As noted by Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2004), institutions are designed to address
simultaneously several issues, such as fairness, legitimacy, representation, and the need
for checks and balances. The efficiency in reforming the financial sector is just one of
these dimensions.

Chapter 4
Bank Lobbying on Regulatory
Enforcement Actions∗
4.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis demonstrated that regulatory capture and, in particular, weak-
ness in banking regulatory oversight was a key contributing factor in the buildup of risk
ahead of the crisis (Kane, 2012).1 The three decades leading to the financial crisis were
characterized by an enormous growth in the banking industry of the United States. As
banks gained importance and wealth, they became in turn more assertive and politically
influential.2
Lobbying is an important source of rising political influence for the banking industry,
affecting the ability of regulators to design proper rules and supervisors to enforce the
rules in place. In this context, the regulated industry can allegedly incentivize the reg-
ulator to provide favorable treatment, especially when it comes to issue a regulatory
enforcement action. Regulatory agencies may indeed impose actions to require that
financial institutions undertake corrective measures; this is a crucial micro-prudential
∗This chapter is based on “Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from Banking”. I
thank Paul Belleflamme, Gilles Chemla, Paolo Colla, Jean-Gabriel Cousin, Hans Degryse, Marc Deloof,
Armin Schwienbacher, Sophie Shive, and participants at seminars at ESC Rennes, Ghent University,
SKEMA Business School, and University Paris-Dauphine for useful comments. I especially thank Piotr
Danisewicz for many and helpful discussions.
1See also Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2012) and Admati and Hellwig (2013) who provide many
examples of failures and gaps in banking regulation and supervision and compelling arguments for why
it is harmful.
2The experience of financial deregulation over the past three decades in the United States has indeed
seen the emergence of an even bigger and more profitable banking industry. During this period, Jayaratne
and Strahan (1996), among others, find evidence that intrastate branch banking reforms spurred rapid
economic growth. But, as political consequences, these reforms also tended to strengthen an already
powerful constituency, the banking industry (see Johnson and Kwak, 2010).
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supervisory tool to ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system. The pref-
erential treatment, associated with political influence, may in turn magnify the moral
hazard problem—that politically active banks can take risks expecting to have favorable
treatment when things get bad. This laxity in the enforcement process, in conjunction
with the moral hazard problem, created an environment which encouraged excessive risk
taking and, ultimately, contributed to the financial meltdown. Despite the continuing
debate on this issue and numerous policy prescriptions, little systematic examination of
the evidence has been undertaken on the incidence and drivers of lobbying efforts made
by the banking industry.
In this paper I attempt to fill this gap by pursuing two goals. First, I empirically exam-
ine the relationship between bank lobbying and regulatory enforcement outcome. Two
sets of existing theories motivate the examination of this relationship. On the one hand,
the decision to lobby politicians or regulatory agencies may be driven by information-
transmission motives. Banks have better information than regulators and partly reveal
their information by endogenously choosing their lobbying effort (Grossman and Help-
man, 2001, offer an exhaustive literature review). Under this information-based view,
lobbying provides regulators with valuable information about banks’ financial condition
and future outlook. The information-based theory thus predicts that regulatory agen-
cies are less likely to issue an enforcement action against lobbying banks, which are
in turn likely to outperform their non-lobbying peers. On the other hand, regulatory
agencies might be laxer in their examinations because they may be captured by banks
they supervised, consistently with the theory of regulation put forward by Stigler (1971)
and formalized by Peltzman (1976). Under this regulatory capture view, banks lobby
to incentivize the regulator and politicians to provide favorable treatment, in exchange
of valuable contributions that are used more or less directly to sway voters.3 This view
also predicts a negative association between lobbying and the probability of an enforce-
ment action, which accordingly involves moral hazard elements. Second, as the merit of
these two views is ultimately an empirical question, my second goal is to provide insights
into these theories. To do so, I explore the implications of lobbying by banks on their
risk-taking behaviors.
I address the first goal by making use of a large (partly hand-collected) dataset of com-
mercial and savings banks from 1999 to 2012. I focus on severe enforcement actions
(against institutions) issued by federal agencies in charge of the supervision of commer-
cial and savings banks in the United States—namely, the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency (OCC), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the Federal
3An important body of research shows how politicians can exert influence over regulatory agencies
by using, among other mechanisms, budgetary control, oversight hearings, and appointment of agents to
reward or punish the agencies for decisions that affect their constituencies (see, e.g., McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast, 1999).
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Reserve System (Fed). My analysis reveals clear evidence that banks engaged in lobbying
are less likely to be subject to a severe enforcement action relative to their non-lobbying
peers. Next, I find that the effect is strongest during the banking crisis, suggesting that
in period of intense enforcement activity regulatory agencies are more likely to impose
an action against non-lobbying banks. In economic terms, an increase of one standard
deviation in the dollar amount spent on lobbying corresponds to a decrease of 1.0-2.9
percentage points in the likelihood of getting a severe action, controlling for other fac-
tors. Critically, these results are robust to controlling for variables proxying each of
the six components of the CAMELS rating (i.e., the U.S. supervisory rating), which
serves as decision criteria in the issuance of an enforcement action (see Peek, Rosengren,
and Tootell, 1999, for a comprehensive discussion on the importance of the CAMELS
ratings). These findings hold regardless whether lobbying is based on lobbying activity,
revolving door, or lobbying intensity. As I can only measure the lobbying dimensions
regulated under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 (henceforth LDA), and not the
many lobbying practices taking place without being publicly disclosed, my estimates on
lobbying can be considered a lower bound of the true effect.
I perform a number of tests to establish the robustness of the results. First, I adopt
instrumental variables (IV) strategies to mitigate some of the endogeneity concerns. The
two instruments used are the distance of the bank’s headquarters to Washington, D.C.
and the initial number of offices held by the lobbying bank. These instruments are valid
under both theoretical and statistical grounds. The first instrument proxies for a certain
cost of lobbying, while the second for the initial bank size, which is predetermined and
not correlated with a bank’s enforcement probability prevailing in the following years.
Second, although I control for bank size, CAMELS rating, and other financial and
demographic factors, it is possible that banks’ lobbying activities are correlated with
other factors unaccounted for by my control variables, such as the systemic importance
of banks. To accommodate this possibility, I conduct a set of tests: I use various
specifications including different control variables and also look at subsamples excluding
large banks, banks with the best or worst financial condition, and banks headquartered
in New York City and Washington, D.C. Third, as I recognize that lobbying decision
may not be assigned at random, I also repeat my analysis using matching methods to
account for potential selection on observables.
With regard to the second goal, I seek to understand the transmission mechanism by
examining the risk-taking behavior of lobbying banks. In this respect, I do find evidence
that lobbying banks are associated with higher risk taking. I first examine the aggregate
effect of changes in banks’ leverage and asset composition on overall bank risk. Following
the literature, I rely on the Z-score, a measure of banks’ distance to default. In economic
terms, I find that lobbying banks increase their default risk (measured by the Z-score)
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by 5% of its mean. I also find that lobbying banks tend to follow strategies designed to
increase their volatility and credit risk. Overall, this evidence appears to be consistent
with a view that moral hazard likely contributed to the increase in risk taking at lobbying
banks. In other words, it suggests that the negative link between lobbying and the
probability of being subject to an enforcement action fits better with the capture theory
of regulation, even though it is hard to firmly establish that some information-based
considerations do not drive as well the lobbying decision made by banks.
This paper is related to several strands of the political economy and banking literature.
This study belongs to the literature on regulatory design, spanning from the Chicago
theory of Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) to the rent-seeking and corruption theories
(e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1993, 1994). Despite a rich theoretical literature, there is a lim-
ited number of papers that document (in developed economies) the various mechanisms
through which financial institutions seek to affect the financial outcomes in their favor.
For example, Braun and Raddatz (2010) provide international evidence suggesting that
banks use their political influence to achieve beneficial regulatory treatment in exchange
for rewards in the form of future employment in the banking industry.4 Kroszner and
Strahan (1999) present compelling evidence that pressures from special interest groups
account for the pattern of bank branching deregulation of the 1970s and 1980s in the
United States. In the context of the recent crisis, Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2010) show
that the Congress members were more likely to support bank bailout legislation of 2008
when they received higher contributions from the financial sector. Duchin and Sosyura
(2012) show that capital allocation to banks under the Troubled Asset Relief Program
(TARP) is partly determined by their political connections. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi
(2013) find that, during credit-expansion years, mortgage-industry campaign contribu-
tions increasingly predict congressional voting behavior on legislation related to housing.
Igan and Mishra (2012) examine how spending on lobbying by the financial sector af-
fected deregulation in the run-up to the crisis, while Igan, Mishra, and Tressel (2012)
demonstrate that lenders who lobby harder on mortgage issues have higher mortgage
credit growth, securitize more aggressively, and end up with higher delinquency rates ex
post.5
This paper is also connected to studies on moral hazard and bank risk taking. Duchin
and Sosyura (2014) study the effect of TARP investments on bank risk taking and
credit origination (see also Black and Hazelwood, 2013). The authors show that bailed-
out banks initiate riskier loans and shifts assets toward riskier securities after receiving
4Related studies show that private interest can pursue weak financial regulation to enjoy favorable
access to credit (see, e.g., Perotti and Volpin, 2007).
5Outside the banking industry, Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) relatedly show how politically
connected firms are significantly more likely to be bailed out in distress, yet exhibit worse performance
afterwards, consistently with rent-seeking theories.
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government assistance, suggesting that moral hazard likely contributed to the increase in
risk taking as theoretically predicted in Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007), among others.6
This paper adds to these literatures in three key aspects. First, this paper helps reconcile
these prior findings by illuminating one channel through which lobbying affects risk-
taking behavior by banks. In particular, I show how banks engage in lobbying to gain
preferential treatment, allowing them to “safely” pursue riskier strategies. Second, I
address this question in a broad perspective by analyzing banks that represent the vast
majority of depository institutions in the United States and that account for a very large
portion of overall bank assets, instead of limiting the analysis to large or publicly traded
financial institutions. The results of this paper are in this respect directly applicable
to the part of the banking industry that is important in terms of economic size, but
also in terms of impact on financial stability. Third, to my knowledge, I bring in a
micro-prudential dimension not yet systematically explored in other studies, namely the
probability of an enforcement action.
I also complement a small number of studies that examine the relationship between
special interest politics and regulatory enforcement events. These studies demonstrate
likewise that political connections negatively impact on enforcement outcomes imposed
by other regulatory agencies such as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Gordon and
Hafer, 2005), the Internal Revenue Service (Richter, Samphantharak, Timmons, 2009),
or the Securities Exchange Commission (Correia, 2014). Yu and Yu (2012) show that
corporate lobbying delays the detection of fraud, illuminating as well the favorable treat-
ment gained by lobbying firms. In the banking literature, Agarwal, Lucca, Seru, and
Trebbi (2014) find no evidence that corruption or career prospects in the banking in-
dustry are linked to the relative leniency of state banking regulators vis-a`-vis federal
regulators in assigning CAMELS ratings. Shive and Forster (2014) examine the deter-
minants of revolving door hiring (from one of the six U.S. financial regulators) and its
effects on listed financial institutions. They find, among other effects, that new hires are
positively associated with the probability of regulatory action from their ex-employer
against the institution.7 Compared to Shive and Forster (2014) my study takes a some-
what different approach. Rather than focusing on listed financial institutions, I analyze
all other individual institutions. Moreover, I concentrate on several other dimensions of
lobbying and, importantly, revolving door takes here a somehow different meaning—i.e.,
the use of lobbyists with past employment in any public offices rather than firms’ new
hires from regulatory agencies. I capture in this respect another channel of influence
through lobbyists’ political network.
6Outside the U.S. context, see also the empirical analyses of Dam and Koetter (2012) and Gropp,
Grundl, and Guettler (2014).
7Using a large sample of publicly available curricula vitae, Lucca, Seru, and Trebbi (2014) identify
evidence of countercyclical net hiring patterns by federal and state banking regulators.
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Finally, this work speaks to the empirical literature on the real effects of banking regu-
lation and supervision. Such work encompasses studies across the globe (Barth, Caprio,
and Levine, 2004; Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Levine, 2006) as well as in a single country
(Berger and Udell, 1994; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; Kroszner and Strahan, 1996).
Interestingly, Danisewicz, McGowan, Onali, and Schaeck (2014) find that regulatory
enforcement actions, as shocks on bank business activities, adversely affect the local
economic activity.
The rest of the paper continues as follows. Section 4.2 presents the U.S. banking micro-
prudential supervision, provides a brief description of bank lobbying, and develops the
hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the data and variables. Section 4.4 contains empirical
results. Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Institutional Setting and Hypotheses
In this section I provide some background for the empirical analysis. First, I briefly
review the legal and regulatory framework for the application of enforcement actions.
Then, I present the bank lobbying activities in the political system of the United States.
I close this section by laying out the hypotheses to be tested.
4.2.1 The Enforcement Actions in the U.S. Banking Supervisory Pro-
cess
The United States evolves in a dual federal-state banking system (Blair and Kushmeider,
2006). The OCC, the FDIC, and the Fed share the regulatory and supervisory respon-
sibilities for commercial and savings banks at the federal level, and with the banking
departments of the various states. The primary agency in charge with the supervision
of a bank is a function of its charter and line of business. Federally chartered banks
(usually referred to as national banks) are primarily supervised by the OCC, while
state-chartered banks are supervised by the Fed (if members of the Fed) or the FDIC (if
not members of the Fed). The Fed has also supervisory authority for all bank holding
companies.8
The major objective of micro-prudential supervision is to ensure safe and sound banking
practices and compliance with banking laws and regulations. To achieve this objective,
the supervisory process entails both off-site monitoring and on-site examinations. Off-
site monitoring is a “data-driven” approach. This approach uses early-warning models,
8The Office of Thrift Supervision, a bureau of the Department of the Treasury, charters and super-
vises thrifts, which are however not covered by this analysis.
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combining prior examination data and information that banks provide in their Quar-
terly Report on Condition and Income (or Call Report) filings, to monitor banks be-
tween on-site examinations.9 In on-site examinations, a bank’s primary agency verifies
the content of Call Reports and gathers additional in-depth information by meeting the
management, reviewing and evaluating its loan portfolio, and reading additional docu-
ments from the bank. The regulatory agencies maintain large staffs to conduct periodical
on-site examinations (every 12 months, or 18 months if the bank meets certain criteria).
A variety of enforcement actions can be imposed if the agency identifies during its
examination any financial weaknesses, managerial problems, or violations of banking
laws or regulations.10 Agencies may impose informal or formal actions (see below). The
enforcement actions require the institution to take corrective measures and, thereby,
restore safety and soundness by stabilizing the institution, altering bank practices and
behaviors, and averting potential losses to the deposit insurer. Non-compliance with
enforcement actions often carries heavy penalties, including the termination of deposit
insurance.
Several types of enforcement actions are available to the regulatory agencies (see Curry,
O’Keefe, Coburn, and Montgomery, 1999). On the one hand, informal actions usu-
ally request an institution to adopt a board resolution or agree to the provisions of a
memorandum of understanding to address the problem. On the other hand, formal en-
forcement actions, hereafter grouped according to their seriousness, include civil money
penalties, prohibition and removal orders, formal written agreements, cease and desist
orders, prompt corrective action directives, and deposit insurance threats. Civil money
penalties and prohibition and removal orders are usually not issued against the insti-
tution itself but against individuals associated with the institution because of violation
of laws, regulations, and other written agreements.11 In the analysis, I only consider
the following formal actions that are publicly disclosed and issued against institutions.
First, formal written agreements are bilateral agreements between the bank and the
regulator which set out details on actions to be taken or proscriptions to be followed in
the written agreement. Written agreements are not followed by a federal court case ver-
dict. Second, cease and desist orders are issued after hearings. They are injunctive-type
9Call Reports provide a snapshot of the reporting institution at the end of each calendar quarter,
including a comprehensive set of financial statements and other information relevant to prudential su-
pervision, such as derivatives and off-balance-sheet items, past due and nonaccrual loans, and charge-offs
and recoveries.
10The management problems leading the initiation of enforcement actions are typically poor loan
administration, insufficient corporate planning, inadequate internal control mechanisms, while financial
problems leading actions are typically failure to file with regulators, inadequate capital and loan-loss re-
serves, poor liquidity, inadequate earnings, important volume of poor-quality assets, undue concentration
of loans, excessive asset growth, failure to recognize losses, insider payments.
11When illegal actions of individuals threaten the safety and soundness of the institution, a cease and
desist order or a formal written agreement against the institution is issued as well (see Ioannidou, 2005).
Chapter 4. Bank Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions 98
orders that may be issued when a bank has engaged or is about to engage in an unsafe
or unsound banking practice, or a violation of law. A bank subject to such an order
is required to follow the proscriptions set out in the order and can be directed to take
specified remedial actions. Unlike formal written agreements, cease and desist orders
can be enforced in court. Third, prompt corrective actions are automatically imposed on
banks with deficient capital levels. These actions impose banks to take corrective mea-
sures to restore capital, and require the submission of a capital restoration plan within
a predetermined time period. In addition, prompt corrective action framework includes
a list of discretionary action that the regulator may impose given the undercapitaliza-
tion category of the bank (e.g., ban on executive pay, dismissal of board, restrictions on
asset growth, prohibition of acquisitions, establishing new branches, issuing new lines
of credit). In the analysis, I thus do not consider mandatory prompt corrective actions
but instead the issuance of prompt corrective action directives, for which the regulator
has the discretion to impose additional actions on the bank. Fourth, deposit insurance
threats are the most severe type of enforcement action the regulators can bring before
the bank is placed in receivership, which lead to the sale or termination of the bank’s
charter.
It is also important to note that the examinations culminate in the assignment by a
team of examiners of a CAMELS rating, which reflects different degrees of bank health
and is scaled between 1 and 5. Banks with a rating of 1 or 2 are considered with no (few)
significant regulatory concerns, whereas those with 3, 4, and 5 ratings present moderate
to extreme levels of regulatory concerns. The CAMELS rating is a critical input into
numerous types of enforcement actions issued. An informal action is generally directed
to institutions receiving a 3 rating, while highly rated (4- and 5-rated) banks are in
principles subject to a formal action. The CAMELS rating is however not the only
factor conditioning the issuance of an action. The regulator may indeed decide to issue
an informal action rather than a formal action: There are instances where the current
condition of the bank reflects significant improvement resulting from earlier actions. In
other instances, individual or economic circumstances make CAMELS ratings inappro-
priate (e.g., when the management has been replaced, or in time of crisis when there is
higher probability of failure as the health of borrowers and the value of collateral secur-
ing loans deteriorate). As noted by Ioannidou (2005), bank size may also be a factor
triggering (or not) an action, especially in the presence of asymmetric information. Reg-
ulatory agencies and their staffs have thus substantial discretion along the enforcement
process—i.e., from the CAMELS grading to the enforcement action decision-making.12
12The Center for Public Integrity has published many articles on the hands-off approach of many
financial regulators during the past decade. In “FDIC Slow to Pursue Failed Bank Directors, Recover
Tax Dollars” (Center for Public Integrity, March 15, 2011 and updated on May 19, 2014), Ben Hallman
reports about the United Commercial Bank (UCB), which is based in San Francisco and got a $300
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4.2.2 Bank Lobbying Activities and the Lobbying Disclosure Act of
1995
Lobbying is the strategic transmission of information in private meetings and venues be-
tween interest groups and politicians, their staffs, and agents. In practice, information
may have many forms, such as messages, signals, threats, commitments, facts, argu-
ments, statistics, or some combination thereof.13 Interest groups have budgets for and
spend money on these lobbying activities. The influence of interest groups in the politi-
cal system of the United States is, however, under constant scrutiny. Legislative reforms
have been undertaken to respond to the perceived need for transparency and understand-
ing of the activity of special interest groups and their lobbyists. In particular, the LDA
of 1995 and its Amendments impose strict disclosure rules for every individual and firm
lobbying the Congress and federal agencies.14 According to the LDA, lobbyists have to
file registration and periodic reports indicating, among other data, the amounts received
by clients as compensation for their services, the issue areas and agencies lobbied.15
For the purpose of influencing the Congress and agencies, special interest groups also
employ a variety of other methods, including campaign contributions, media campaigns,
endorsements, and grassroots campaigns. Lobbying is, however, particularly apt to the
study of interest groups’ political influence. First, lobbying represents by far the most
important channel of political influence, especially for the banking industry (see Kerr,
Lincoln, and Mishra, 2014). In 2012, the financial sector spent $488 million on lobbying,
over six times the $81 million that they spent on Political Action Committees (PACs)
contributions during the congressional cycle 2011-2012 (see Table 4.1). Historically, no
million government bailout from the TARP: “[. . . ] examiners had bestowed on UCB a favorable “2”
rating on the FDIC scale used to classify a bank’s overall condition. That rating denotes “satisfactory
performance by management and the board and satisfactory risk management practices,” according to
FDIC guidelines. The bank received the favorable rating even while examiners identified a number of
serious problems, including a large number of exceptions to the bank’s lending policy so it could make
more loans, and a “combative culture” where management failed to downgrade non-performing loans,
according to an FDIC report. [. . . ] The FDIC hasn’t taken any public action against former bank
officers and directors, though it still has time to do so.”
13The LDA of 1995 defines a lobbying contact as “any oral or written communication (including an
electronic communication) to a covered executive branch official or a covered legislative branch official
that is made on behalf of a client with regard to (i) the formulation, modification, or adoption of
Federal legislation (including legislative proposals); (ii) the formulation, modification, or adoption of
a Federal rule, regulation, Executive order, or any other program, policy, or position of the United
States Government; (iii) the administration or execution of a Federal program or policy (including the
negotiation, award, or administration of a Federal contract, grant, loan, permit, or license); or (iv) the
nomination or confirmation of a person for a position subject to confirmation by the Senate.”
14The LDA defines a lobbyist as “any individual who is employed or retained by a client for financial
or other compensation for services that include more than one lobbying contact, other than an individual
whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided by
such individual to that client over a six month period.”
15Recently, an increasing number of papers have made use of these registration- and transaction-
related data on lobbying (see, e.g., Blanes i Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen, 2012; Bertrand, Bombardini,
and Trebbi, 2014; see de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014, for a review).
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other sector has spent as much money on lobbying and campaign contributions as the
financial sector. Table 4.1 depicts that lobbying expenditures made by the financial
sector in 2012 represent about 15 percent of overall lobbying expenditures. Figure 4.1
(A) shows that insurance companies, securities and investment firms, real estate inter-
ests, and commercial banks constitute the bulk of that money. Moreover, the financial
industry, including banks, has intensified its lobbying expenditures over the 1999-2012
period (see Figure 4.1 (B)).
Figure 4.1: Financial Sector Distribution of Lobbying Expenditures
This figure presents the evolution of lobbying expenditures. Figure A shows the total lobbying
expenditures (in $100 million) by financial institutions over time. The financial sector is
classified into: (1) Insurance companies, (2) securities and investment companies, (3) real
estate companies, (4) commercial and savings banks, and (5) other types of financial firms.
Figure B shows the total lobbying expenditures (in $100 million) for the banking industry (i.e.,
commercial and savings banks) over time. Source: CRP.
Second, contrasting with campaign contributions, the vast majority of lobbying expen-
ditures reflect a clear economic motive. Campaign contributions are dependent on con-
gressional cycles and may contain ideological and partisan motives (see Ansolabehere,
de Figueiredo, and Snyder, 2003), affecting in turn measurements.
Third, one of the most important aspects of lobbying industry is the so-called “revolving
door”, the career transitions from public services into the lobbying industry. Blanes i
Vidal, Draca, and Fons-Rosen (2012) stress the prevalence of former political employees
across the lobbying industry. From their sample covering the years 1998-2008, the
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authors report that in total former political employees represent over 60 percent of
all lobbyists—i.e., lobbyists who work for lobbying firms and “self-filing” organizations
that conduct in-house lobbying activities. These former political employees include
congressional staffers as well as former employees of government agencies, executive
bodies, or Presidential administrations. Relatedly, half of former congressmen became
lobbyists after leaving office. With their political experience, ex-politicians and ex-
political employees have developed a network of colleagues and friends that they can
later exploit on behalf of their clients. Career concerns in the lobbying industry may
in turn have significant effects on the actions taken by serving as politicians or political
employees.
4.2.3 Hypotheses Development
Because lobbying represents a pervasive channel through which banks seek political in-
fluence and confers a multitude of advantages, banks whose operations and performance
are impacted to a greater extent by banking regulation and supervision are more likely
to engage in lobbying. As a result, politically active banks may benefit from laxity in the
enforcement process for several reasons. First, the capture theory of regulation posits
that banks lobby to expect a preferential treatment when it comes to decide on the is-
suance of a severe enforcement action. Banks may affect enforcement recommendations
and priorities by directly lobbying regulatory agencies (OCC, FDIC, Fed), or even the
Department of Justice, or elected politicians who have oversight over regulatory agen-
cies.16,17 Alternatively, banks may affect indirectly enforcement outcomes by lobbying
for favorable regulatory and supervisory environment or business conditions. Indeed,
banks spend a fair amount of money to lobby for favorable regulatory conditions, allow-
ing them to start or continue to take excessive risks such as increasing reckless lending
practices.18
16The political economy literature generally assumes that politicians are concerned about their reelec-
tion prospects and hence about their level of political support. Politicians, seeking reelection, may use
a variety of mechanisms to control regulatory agencies, whose activities may affect the political support
from their constituencies (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1999). For example, the legislator can cut
the regulatory agency budget to restrain the potential zeal exerted by an agency in trying to control a
bank. See, for example, Nathan Kopel, “Consumer Protection Bureau Mired in Politics,” Wall Street
Journal, June 15, 2011. Elected politicians have also at their disposal other mechanisms to punish or
reward regulatory agencies’ decisions such as oversight hearings, appointment of agents and threat of
turnover.
17Equivalently from an empirical standpoint, banks may signal, through a well-financed lobbying
force, their willingness to fight the regulator’s decision—for example, through subsequent action in the
political arena or in the courts—, as regulators have incomplete information about banks’ objective
function. Gordon and Hafer (2005) predict that the regulator will prefer to avoid pursuing institutions
with large lobbying expenditures as it will be costlier in terms of filing and resolving the enforcement
action.
18The lobbyists’ influence on financial regulations has been the subject of a large media coverage;
see, for example, Stephen Labaton, “Ailing, Banks Still Field Strong Lobby at Capitol,” New York
Times, June 4, 2009; Jed Horowitz, “Banks Urge Congress to Extend Crisis-Era Deposit Insurance,”
Chapter 4. Bank Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions 103
Second, under another view, which resonates with the informational lobbying literature,
banks lobby to credibly signal information to politicians or regulatory agencies on their
financial condition and future outlook. Lobbying mitigates the information asymme-
tries between both parties and results in better informed enforcement action decisions.
Indeed, by lobbying banks may prevent tighter regulation and supervision that would
have restricted their profitable opportunities. This information-based view implies that
lobbying banks are likely to outperform their non-lobbying peers without specifically
taking additional risk.19
These reasons, in line with either capture theory of regulation or information-revealing
theory, imply that one would observe banks active in lobbying associated with lower
probability of receiving an enforcement action. One would also expect that lobbying is
associated with greater reduction in the probability of an action when lobbying involves
higher expenditures or the existence of revolving doors, as there are higher costs to
the politician or regulator of breaking the relationship with the bank. Moreover, once
the banking crisis hit and regulatory agencies were forced to file increasing number
of enforcement actions, several factors—including lobbying—determine who would be
subject to an action and who would not be. Agencies may avoid pursuing lobbying banks
in bad times as such banks can be perceived as being costlier to file an enforcement action
against them. This motivates the special attention devoted to enforcement outcomes
during the crisis.
If banks lobby to increase their chances of preferential treatment, the motive for lobbying
involves moral hazard elements. As discussed in the introduction, there is a higher
ex ante probability that a given lobbying bank will benefit from lax scrutiny by the
regulatory agency in case of problem. When financial or management problems occur,
the regulatory agency decides to be laxer in its decision to issue a severe action against
banks engaged in lobbying. If there is some consistency in the regulatory agencies’
treatment of lobbying banks over time, a lobbying bank has (or signals) an increase in
the probability that it will not be subject to a severe action again in case of problem.
In turn, this can reduce for example proper corporate governance mechanisms (e.g.,
less monitoring by outside investors), creating a moral hazard problem. Consequently,
banks engaged in lobbying activities are in situation allowing them to take additional
risk (hidden action). This moral hazard channel suggests that it is likely to observe
Reuters, July 30, 2012; Ben Protess, “Behind the Scenes, Some Lawmakers Lobby to Change the Volcker
Rule,” New York Times, September 20, 2012. See also Glenn Simpson, “Lender Lobbying Blitz Abetted
Mortgage Mess,” Wall Street Journal, December 31, 2007, who describes that the sought outcome of
bank lobbying was the defeat of tighter regulation of the mortgage market that could have reduced
reckless lending practices.
19A different view of informational lobbying—and equivalent from an empirical standpoint—posits
that banks lobby to obtain political intelligence to better adapt to changing regulatory environments.
More directly, banks can also hire lobbyists to acquire private information about ongoing or impending
agencies’ actions (see Gao and Huang, 2014).
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an empirical association between banks’ lobbying activities and their propensity to take
risks, consistently with the capture theory of regulation.
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
In this section I discuss the variables used in my analysis and provide details about their
construction. The choice of variables is driven by theoretical considerations and data
availability. Appendix C.1 summarizes variable definitions.
4.3.1 Regulatory Enforcement Actions
I obtain information about the timing and type of regulatory actions from SNL Fi-
nancial. I only focus on actions, labelled hereafter as “severe”, issued against troubled
institutions on the basis of “safety-and-soundness”. Severe actions include formal writ-
ten agreements, cease and desist orders, prompt corrective action directives, and deposit
insurance threats. This grouping reflects supervisory practices in the United States. Less
severe actions are not used because they are usually issued against individuals affiliated
with an institution and thus they are not issued because the financial condition of the
institution has been deteriorating. Moreover, state banking regulators may also issue
enforcement actions. But these actions are not collected by SNL Financial as they are
not provided by all state regulators for the entire sample period. Therefore, I mainly
employ a dummy variable equal to one if a severe enforcement action is issued by a
federal agency (OCC, FDIC, or Fed) against a given bank in the year the action become
effective, and zero otherwise. In unreported robustness tests, I also employ separately
dummy variables for each severe action; the results (available upon request) are quali-
tatively similar to the ones presented in the next section.
Descriptive statistics for my enforcement sample appear in Table 4.2. In total, I record
2,422 severe enforcement actions and 7,915 less severe actions. The largest number of
severe actions consists of cease and desist orders, accounting for 60 percent (1,462) of
total severe actions. Formal written agreements accounts for 848 observations, while 104
prompt corrective action directives are identified. Deposit insurance threats make up the
remainder, but are observed very marginally during my sample period (8 observations).
As expected, more than 60 percent of any actions have been issued after 2007, suggesting
that the enforcement activity intensifies in crisis period.
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4.3.2 Risk Taking
I use four balance sheet variables measuring various dimensions of bank risk taking. My
primary measure, the Z-score, focuses on overall bank risk. Defined in Appendix C.1,
the Z-score is a frequently used measure of banks’ distance to default, which aggregates
the effects of leverage and asset composition (see, e.g., Laeven and Levine, 2009; Duchin
and Sosyura, 2014). The Z-score is computed as the sum of return on assets (ROA) and
the equity-to-asset ratio scaled by the standard deviation of asset returns. Under the
assumption of normally distributed bank profits, this score approximates the inverse of
the probability of default, with lower values meaning higher chance of default (see Roy,
1952, for a first formalization of the relation). In other words, the Z-score indicates the
number of standard deviations a bank’s return on assets has to drop below its expected
value before equity is depleted and the bank is insolvent.
I complement the Z-score with three measures of bank risk that are respectively based
on profit and loan loss ratios (see, e.g., Cebenoyan and Strahan, 2004). The risk variable
based on profit ratio is the ROA volatility, which is an estimate of the standard devi-
ation of ROA computed over a three-year rolling time window. The variable based on
loan loss ratio is the share of nonperforming loans to total loans. Nonperforming loans
include loans that are 90-plus days delinquent and loans in nonaccrual status. This
latter measure is a proxy for credit risk, as it reflects the potential adverse exposure to
earnings and asset market values owing to deteriorating loan quality. Since a portion
of nonperforming loans will result in losses for the bank, a high value for this ratio is
associated with higher credit risk. As a further robustness test, I also use the share of
nonaccrual loans to total loans as an alternative credit risk measure.
4.3.3 Lobbying
I use lobbying disclosure reports to identify banks that are engaged in lobbying in a
given year. The LDA indeed requires lobbyists to register and report information on
their activities to the Senate Office of Public Records (SOPR). I use the version of the
data compiled by the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP), a non-profit organization
based in Washington, D.C. for the promotion of political transparency.20 Specifically, the
three lobbying variables used in the empirical analysis (see Appendix C.1 for definitions)
are constructed with the following information from the CRP lobbying data: the name
of the registrant (i.e., the lobbying firm) and the name of the client (in case of a “self-
filing” organization, the bank appears as registrant and client); the annual amount the
20Details on how CRP has compiled the SOPR information are displayed on their website: www.
opensecrets.org.
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client pays, which is calculated by the CRP by summing the information in semi-annual
reports (or quarterly reports after 2007); and the revolving door profile of lobbyists hired
by the client.
I merge data obtained from the CRP with the SNL Financial database manually by name
to extract information on banks’ lobbying activities. The name-matching procedure used
(i.e., an algorithm that finds common words) allows me to generate a list of potential
matches between the names in the CRP lobbying data and those in the SNL Financial
data. I then meticulously check one by one whether the pairs of name strings are actual
matches via eyeballing, web searches, and additional information provided in disclosure
reports.21
In line with prior studies, I consider all lobbying activities at the parent financial insti-
tution level rather than the individual bank (subsidiary) level. Individual banks greatly
benefit from the lobbying activity of their parent without necessary lobbying on their
own. Parents may also lobby on behalf of their subsidiaries. Therefore, for each bank,
I assign lobbying information of the parent financial institution. In cases where sub-
sidiaries lobby (and thus file disclosure reports), I attribute its lobbying information to
the parent financial institution. This means that the lobbying information for a specific
bank may not reflect its original filing with the SOPR, but rather the combined activities
of all entities of its group.
It is worth noting that I do not consider expenditures made by industry associations
who lobby on behalf of their members. However, if I had to assign a share of the asso-
ciations’ lobbying expenses to each member bank, this would not make a big difference
as the amount would appear relatively small compared to amount spent on their own.
Moreover, I am unable to include those lobbying expenditures since associations nor-
mally do not disclose membership information. This limitation of the data implies that
I underestimate some bank’s actual lobbying activities.
I identify 360 banks that are active in lobbying in any of the years from 1999 to 2012;
this corresponds to 1,355 lobbying bank-year observations. Table 4.3 reports the time
distribution of lobbying banks. The lobbying sample exhibits similar regularities than
what is presented in section 4.2.2 for the entire financial sector. Banks are increasingly
active in lobbying during the sample period. The average amount spent intensified from
about $800 thousand in 1999 to $1.4 million in 2012. While the number of lobbying
banks is relatively small compared to non-lobbying banks (1.24 percent of bank-year
21This information available on CRP website is not user-friendly (one has to click on each bank to
obtain details). Also, I often go over the individual disclosure reports (in pdf format on both SOPR and
CRP websites) to cross-check the information.
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observations), it represents a significant fraction of total amount spent on lobbying by
the financial sector.
Moreover, I manually collect from CRP the issue areas and the name of agencies lobbied.
Untabulated statistics from the lobbying sample show that banks lobbied an average of
24 agencies per year, while they only lobbied an average of one agency responsible for
supervising commercial and savings banks (i.e., FDIC, OCC, or Fed). Although this is
relatively low, in the vast majority of cases banks appear to lobby the Congress, who
oversees these agencies. In more than fifty percent of cases, bank lobbying activities are
related to finance-specific issues (i.e., accounting, banking, bankruptcy, and financial
institutions issues). Lastly, banks’ lobbying status is highly persistent over time. The
correlations between the lobbying variables and their respective lagged value range from
81.8 to 94.4 percent. This is consistent with Kerr, Lincoln, and Mishra (2014), among
other studies, who report a 92 percentage probability that a firm will lobby in a given
year conditional on lobbying in the prior year.
4.3.4 Financials and Demographics
To control for banks’ financial condition and performance, I follow the CAMELS rating
system employed by U.S. regulatory agencies in their decision to initiate actions against
institutions. The CAMELS rating derives its name from the six components that are
evaluated: Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earnings, Liquidity,
and Sensitivity to market risk. Each of the six components is rated by regulators and
the final rating is on a scale of 1 to 5. Because an announcement by a regulator that
a bank has a high CAMELS rating (meaning a high probability of failure) could be
extremely detrimental to the institution, individual banks’ CAMELS ratings are highly
classified (see Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell, 1999). I thus need to introduce proxy
variables for each of the six components. Similar to Duchin and Sosyura (2012, 2014),
my choice of proxy variables is guided by financial ratios and management information
that evaluate banks on similar components and available in Call Reports. I obtain Call
Reports data for all commercial and savings banks in the United States between 1999
and 2012 from SNL Financial. These reports are also used for the other financial data
used in my analysis. Appendix C.1 offers detailed descriptions of each CAMELS rating
proxy variable, while Table 4.4 presents descriptive statistics.
In addition to CAMELS rating proxy variables, I also control for the following set of
financial and demographic factors: Deposit-to-asset ratio (reliance on deposits), debt-
to-equity ratio (leverage), total core deposits (size of banks’ stable source of funds), total
assets (bank size), and age.
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4.3.5 Additional Descriptive Statistics
The full sample consists of 11,115 banks and covers the time period from 1999 through
2012 (108,876 bank-year observations).22 The types of banks included are the ones
supervised by the OCC, the FDIC, or the Fed; that is, mainly commercial banks, but
savings banks and bank holding companies (not consolidated data) are also included. In
Table 4.4, I present descriptive statistics on the main variables for the full sample. These
statistics provide sample moments that will be useful for interpreting the magnitude of
my regression coefficients. Figure 4.2 also shows that there is no systematic clustering
of states where regulatory enforcement actions and lobbying activities took place.
In Table 4.5, I describe the characteristics of banks subject to an enforcement action.
Compared to banks not subject to an action, those whose regulator issued an action
against are, as expected, significantly less healthy in terms of capital adequacy, as-
set quality, management quality, and earnings; this is, however, not the case for two
CAMELS components: Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. Along related dimen-
sions, banks subject to an action are more leveraged and have a lower Z-score, meaning
that they are more likely to default. The regulatory agencies also tend to issue a severe
action to banks that are bigger and younger.
Table 4.5 also provides preliminary evidence that lobbying banks are less often subject to
an enforcement action. Lobbying expenditures are 5 percentage points higher in banks
that are not subject to an action, although the difference just fails to be statistically
significant at the 10 percent level (p-value = 0.11). This suggests that lobbying intensity
is associated with lax enforcement outcome. I draw similar conclusions when I compare
the enforcement outcome based on lobbying and revolving door dummy variables. As
lobbying banks are also different on dimensions other than the enforcement outcome, I
now turn to examine this relationship in the multivariate settings to follow.
4.4 Empirical Results
This section contains the regression results. In the following I analyze the relationship
between bank lobbying and enforcement outcome in greater depth. The moral hazard
implications of bank lobbying follow with the presentation of regression results relating
lobbying and risk taking.
22I have removed observations that correspond to outlier banks.
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Figure 4.2: State Distribution of Regulatory Enforcement Actions and Lobbying
Expenditures
This figure presents the concentration of regulatory enforcement actions and total lobbying
expenditures by states. Figure A shows the state distribution of the total number of severe
enforcement actions in the sample. Figure B shows the sum of lobbying expenditures (in $100
million) by commercial and savings banks in the sample. Sources: SNL Financial and CRP.
4.4.1 Do Lobbying Banks Benefit from Laxity in the Enforcement Pro-
cess?
To study the relationship between bank lobbying and the probability of getting a severe
enforcement action, I estimate the following logit model:
Prob(Yit∣Xit) = F (α +Xitβ), (4.1)
where F (⋅) is the cumulative logistic distribution.23 Yit is equal to one if the regulatory
agency issues a severe enforcement action on bank i at time t, and is equal to zero
otherwise. α is a constant term. Xit contains a variety of factors, including time and
state dummies, time-varying control variables, and one of the three measures of lobby-
ing (Lobbying dummy, Revolving door dummy, and the natural logarithm of Lobbying
expenditures). In all specifications, the set of time-varying control variables includes the
23The estimation results are qualitatively similar if a probit model is used.
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Table 4.5: Characteristics of Banks Subject (Not Subject) to a Severe Enforcement
Action
This table reports the mean value of risk, lobbying, financial and demographic variables of
banks that are subject (not subject) to a severe enforcement action. The last column reports
the p-values of a test of difference in the means between banks subject and not subject to a
severe action. All variables are defined in Appendix C.1.
Variable
Severe Actions No Actions Difference
(Mean) (Mean) (p-value)
Risk Taking
ln(Z-score) 2.274 3.994 0.000
ln(ROA volatility) -4.773 -6.173 0.000
ln(Nonperforming loans to total loans) 0.072 0.013 0.000
ln(Nonaccrual loans to total loans) 0.059 0.011 0.000
Lobbying
Lobbying dummy 0.009 0.013 0.107
Revolving door dummy 0.007 0.011 0.044
ln(Lobbying expenditures) 0.109 0.155 0.113
Financials and Demographics
Capital adequacy (%) 13.121 17.420 0.000
Asset quality (%) -1.962 -0.977 0.000
Management quality -0.033 -0.015 0.000
Earnings (%) -1.675 0.861 0.000
Liquidity (%) 10.379 7.786 0.000
Sensitivity to market risk (%) 19.767 20.477 0.025
Deposit-to-asset ratio (%) 84.822 82.114 0.000
Leverage 11.301 9.054 0.000
ln(Total core deposits) 11.578 11.276 0.000
Size 12.060 11.755 0.000
Age 53.075 68.265 0.000
CAMELS rating proxies (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management quality, Earn-
ings, Liquidity, Sensitivity to market risk) as well as Deposit-to-asset ratio, Leverage,
the natural logarithm of Total core deposits, Size, and Age. As already shown in Table
4.4, there are few enforcement action events compared to zeros (“nonevents”); the event
of an action occurs in about 2 percent of all bank years. Logistic regression coefficients
are biased downwards in rare events data. Following King and Zeng’s (2001) recommen-
dations, I correct these biases by analyzing the data using rare events logit model. My
results are stronger following their recommendations, and are unreported for brevity.
In tables, I report standard logit models to be conservative. All standard errors are
clustered by bank.
A few comments are in order. First, I would ideally control for the unobservable bank
specific effect by estimating the logit model (4.1) including bank fixed effects. However,
the estimation of the bank fixed effects coefficients in my nonlinear panel data setting
introduces an incidental parameters problem discussed by Neyman and Scott (1948)
and reviewed by Lancaster (2000). This problem of finding consistent estimators in
nonlinear models occurs because the number of fixed effects grows without bound, but
the amount of information available for their estimation is limited, especially in settings
with short time span and many fixed effects. Both the fixed effects and coefficients on
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other variables (i.e., β) become biased in such setting. For nonlinear panel data models,
it is not possible to get rid of the fixed effects by taking differences or performing within
transformation (see Hsiao, 2003). My results are however robust to the use of a linear
probability model with bank fixed effects, and are reported in Appendix Table C.1.
Second, it is also worth emphasizing that I do not observe much variation of my lobbying
measures within banks, as discussed in section 4.3.3. The clear advantage of fixed-effect
model then comes at a certain price and the drawback results from its inefficiency in
estimating the effect of variables that have very little within variance.
Table 4.6: Impact of Lobbying on the Probability of a Severe Enforcement Action: Base Models
This table presents estimates from logit regressions explaining the likelihood of a severe enforcement action. The
dependent variable is Severe action dummy. Models (1)-(3) are estimated for the full sample (i.e., the 1999-2012
interval). Models (4)-(6) are estimated for the crisis sample (i.e., the 2007-09 period). All the regressions control
for the six components derived from the CAMELS rating system (Capital adequacy, Asset quality, Management
quality, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk), Deposit-to-asset ratio, Leverage, Total core deposits,
Size, Age, year fixed effects, and state fixed effects. All variables are defined in Appendix C.1. Average marginal
effects are reported and robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Crisis Sample
Lobbying
Lobbying dummy -0.0082** -0.0195***
(0.0033) (0.0053)
Revolving door dummy -0.0106*** -0.0217***
(0.0032) (0.0048)
ln(Lobbying expenditures) -0.0008* -0.0023**
(0.0004) (0.0011)
Financials and Demographics
Capital adequacy -0.0830*** -0.0827*** -0.0830*** -0.1063*** -0.1064*** -0.1063***
(0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0392) (0.0391) (0.0392)
Asset quality 0.061 0.0604 0.0609 -1.1905*** -1.1906*** -1.1906***
(0.0415) (0.0415) (0.0415) (0.1062) (0.1063) (0.1065)
Management quality -0.0249*** -0.0250*** -0.0249*** -0.0192** -0.0192** -0.0192**
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093)
Earnings -0.6926*** -0.6922*** -0.6922*** -0.4745*** -0.4747*** -0.4739***
(0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0352) (0.0555) (0.0557) (0.0555)
Liquidity 0.0224*** 0.0226*** 0.0225*** -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0042
(0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0054) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0144)
Sensitivity to market risk -0.0183*** -0.0182*** -0.0183*** -0.0153* -0.0152* -0.0154*
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0093) (0.0093) (0.0093)
Deposit-to-asset ratio 0.0321*** 0.0320*** 0.0321*** 0.0331** 0.0332** 0.0328**
(0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0167) (0.0168) (0.0167)
Leverage 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0026***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
ln(Total core deposits) -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0031*** -0.0026 -0.0027 -0.0026
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0019)
Size 0.0035*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0034 0.0035 0.0034
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0022) (0.0023) (0.0022)
Age -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0001* -0.0001* -0.0001*
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Fixed Effects
Year Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.2347 0.2348 0.2346 0.2781 0.2785 0.2779
Number of Banks 11,018 11,018 11,018 7,747 7,747 7,747
Number of Observations 107,977 107,977 107,977 22,073 22,073 22,073
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Models (1) to (3) of Table 4.6 report the base regression results for the full sample. The
results of the regression analysis are consistent with the univariate evidence presented in
the previous section. As shown in Models (1)-(3), the measures of lobbying are negatively
associated with the likelihood of getting a severe enforcement action. The economic
magnitudes of lobbying are meaningful. To facilitate the estimation of magnitudes,
Table 4.6 reports average marginal effects. Based on Models (1)-(3), I find that banks
active in lobbying are 0.8 percentage points less likely to receive a severe enforcement
action. Regarding revolving door, the effect is also more significant (statistically and
economically). I find that banks employing revolving door lobbyists are 1.1 percentage
points less likely to be subject to an action. Similarly, an increase of $1 million in the
amounts spent on lobbying is estimated to reduce the likelihood of an action by 3.3
percentage points.
Next, I restrict the sample to the period covered by the last U.S. banking crisis. During
this period, which is characterized by an intensive enforcement activity, the regulatory
agencies may face higher constraints, affecting their decision to issue an enforcement
action against particular banks. Models (4) to (6) of Table 4.6 show that the three mea-
sures of lobbying tend to make an action much less likely during the 2007-09 banking
crisis. From Models (4) to (6), it can be seen that the impact of lobbying is statistically
and economically stronger. The economic magnitude of lobbying and revolving door
dummies are more than twice as big as for the full sample. As for the lobbying inten-
sity, an increase of $1 million in the amounts spent on lobbying corresponds to a 9.4
percentage points reduction in the likelihood of an action. As a banking crisis is defined
differently by different scholars (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2011; Laeven and Valencia, 2013),
I also consider other banking crisis periods fitting with alternative (less restrictive) def-
initions. Reported in Appendix Table C.2, the results for the various samples fitting
with these alternative definitions are even stronger statistically and economically. This
suggests that regulatory agencies appear to be even more influenced by lobbying during
intensive crisis-related enforcement activity.
The evidence from financial and demographic control variables indicates that banks are
more likely to receive a severe enforcement action if they are more leveraged, have higher
deposit-to-asset ratio, and, in some specifications, have lower levels of core deposits and
are larger and younger. The likelihood of a severe enforcement action is higher if banks
present worst financial and management conditions as reflected in higher rating for
most of the CAMELS components. For example, based on Model (1), a one standard
deviation drop in the Tier 1 risk-based capital ratio (Capital adequacy) corresponds to a
1.2 percentage points increase in the probability of receiving a severe enforcement action.
Again according to Model (1), a one standard deviation drop in ROA (Earnings) is
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associated with a 2.1 percentage points increase in the likelihood of a severe enforcement
action.
Overall, these results strongly characterize the issuance of a severe enforcement action
as being partly driven by banks’ lobbying force. This suggests that lobbying banks
receive a more favorable treatment by regulatory agencies. I now turn to further address
endogeneity concerns about the lobbying variables.
4.4.2 Addressing Endogeneity
As banks are heterogeneous along many different dimensions, most of which are difficult
to observe and quantify, my results might be impaired if there is an omitted variables
problem that causes inference to break down. As an example, the confidential (unob-
served) component of the supervisory data (CAMELS ratings) may be responsible of
the results as it can affect both enforcement and lobbying decisions. Also, it can plau-
sibly be argued that banks lobby because they expect to get a severe action given their
financial or managerial problems, raising some doubts that the causality runs in the
direction outlined (i.e., from lobbying to enforcement outcome) rather than the other
way around. As these endogeneity concerns may weaken the conclusions drawn in the
previous section, I rule this out by instrumenting the lobbying variables.
I employ two instruments. As a first instrument, I consider the distance (in km) of
the bank’s headquarters to Washington, D.C., a proxy for a certain cost of lobbying.
Because the “business” of lobbying at the federal level is intricately intertwined with
life in Capitol Hill, I argue that the cost of lobbying is an increasing function of the
distance to Washington, D.C. I can arguably assume that the distance to Washington,
D.C. affects a bank’s lobbying decision, but has no independent effect on the outcome
under study. As a second instrument, I use the initial (in 1998) number of offices held by
the lobbying bank. Indeed, larger organizations are more likely to lobby (Bombardini,
2008). This second instrument is unlikely to be correlated with enforcement decisions
prevailing in the sample years as the initial number of offices is predetermined.
As my empirical models are characterized by binary outcome and treatment variables,24
I adopt two common IV strategies to estimating causal effects in such models (see,
e.g., Angrist and Pischke, 2009: 197—205). The first strategy computes maximum-
likelihood estimates (MLE) of a bivariate probit model, which assumes that the outcome
and treatment variables are each determined by latent linear index models with jointly
normal error terms. The second strategy I use disregards the binary structure of the
24That is, in the models in which the independent variables of interest are Lobbying dummy and
Revolving door dummy.
Chapter 4. Bank Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions 117
Table 4.7: Impact of Lobbying on the Probability of a Severe Enforcement Action: IV
Methods
This table presents estimates from regressions explaining the likelihood of a severe enforcement action.
The dependent variable is Severe action dummy. Columns (1) and (2) report results from seemingly
unrelated bivariate probit regressions, columns (3) and (4) report results from 2SLS regressions, and
columns (5) and (6) report results from IV probit regressions. In each model, the instruments are the
distance (in km) of the bank’s headquarters to Washington, D.C. and the initial (in 1998) number of
offices held by the lobbying bank. Panel A reports results from the second-stage regressions, while
Panel B reports results from the first-stage. All models are estimated for the full sample (i.e., the
1999-2012 interval) and use (unless otherwise specified) the same set of control variables as in Table
4.6. This table only reports the coefficients of variables of interest for brevity. All variables are defined
in Appendix C.1. Average marginal effects are reported (in columns (1), (2), and (5)) and robust
standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Second-Stage Results
Lobbying
Lobbying dummy -0.0130* -0.0312**
(0.0079) (0.0147)
Revolving door dummy -0.0142* -0.0430**
(0.0086) (0.0204)
ln(Lobbying expenditures) -0.1093*
(0.0660)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Method of Estimation Biprobit Biprobit 2SLS 2SLS IV Probit
R2 - - 0.0805 0.0805 -
Number of Banks 10,983 10,983 10,983 10,983 10,983
Number of Observations 107,795 107,795 107,795 107,795 107,795
Panel B: First-Stage Results
Instruments
Distance to DC -0.0004*** -0.0005*** -0.0001*** -0.0001*** -0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Initial market size 0.0075*** 0.0056*** 0.0021*** 0.0015*** 0.0229***
(0.0008) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0018)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test of excluded instruments - - 88.2 52.27 -
Hansen J-statistic (p-value) - - 0.2467 0.2375 -
Wald test of ρ=0 (p-value) 0.4275 0.7655 - - 0.1648
R2 - - 0.0805 0.145 -
Number of Banks 10,983 10,983 10,983 10,983 10,983
Number of Observations 107,795 107,795 107,795 107,795 107,795
outcome and treatment variables and presents two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimates
of a linear model. Table 4.7 contains the estimation results from these two strategies
relying on the instruments introduced above as the source of identification.
I first outline the bivariate probit model, in which the first stage of the latent index is
linear in covariates and excluded instruments. Suppose that a bank’s decision to lobby
can be written as:
Lit = 1[Xitβ1 + γ1Zit + vit > 0],
Chapter 4. Bank Lobbying on Regulatory Enforcement Actions 118
where Xit and Zit respectively contain the covariates and the instrumental variables,
and vit is a random error term. The second stage is similar to equation (4.1); the outcome
variable of interest, Yit (Severe action dummy), is determined by the latent index:
Yit = 1[Xitβ2 + δ2Lit + it > 0],
where it is a second random error term. To allow for the possibility that the unmeasured
random determinants of lobbying are correlated with unmeasured random determinants
of the issuance of a severe action, I assume that it and vit are distributed as bivariate
normal with mean zero, each has unit variance, and ρ = Corr(it, vit). The system is
identified by assuming (it, vit) is independent of Zit. Because both decisions I model
are dichotomous, there are four possible states of the world (Yit = 0 or 1 and Lit = 0 or
1). The likelihood function corresponding to these events is therefore a bivariate probit.
In columns (1) and (2), Panel A, I present the MLE bivariate probit estimates for
Lobbying dummy and Revolving door dummy, respectively, using the Distance to D.C.
and Initial market size as instruments and the same right-hand side variables I use for
equation (4.1). In both models the MLE estimates of the marginal effect of lobbying and
revolving door dummies are clearly in line with estimates from Table 4.6, though they
give slightly larger estimates: -0.013 versus -0.008 for Lobbying dummy and -0.011 versus
-0.014 for Revolving door dummy. The MLE estimates of the correlation coefficients ρ
are positive and statistically insignificant.
The bivariate probit model is not only way to go. As advocated by Angrist and Pischke
(2009), a viable, less complicated, alternative is 2SLS model one could estimate if all
potentially endogenous variables were continuous. If I ignore the fact that the dependent
variable is binary and estimate
Yit = α +Xitβ + δLit + it
with IV, the estimates of δ is again negative and statistically significant at conventional
levels. The 2SLS estimates, reported in columns (3) and (4), Panel A, are quite a bit
larger in magnitude than the MLE estimates. Importantly, I report evidence on the
validity of instruments in Panel B. If Distance to D.C. and Initial market size are valid,
then (1) they must be determinants of the decision to lobby (relevance condition), but
(2) they must not be determinants of the decision to issue a severe enforcement action,
that is, they must be uncorrelated with it (exclusion condition). From Panel B, one
can note that both instruments enter significantly with the expect sign in the first-stage
regression. The first-stage F -statistics, reported at the bottom of Panel B, are well
above the critical value for a 2SLS estimation with two instruments, meaning that my
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instruments are strong and thus satisfy the relevance condition. Although it is easy to
show that the instruments meet the first condition, the second condition is not testable
directly. However, I test for overidentifying restrictions and p-values of the Hansen
J-statistics are higher than 10% in both cases.
In the case of the continuous variable, Lobbying expenditures, I fit an IV probit model
using MLE. Column (5) shows that the coefficient on Lobbying expenditures has the
same sign and level of significance as its counterpart in Table 4.6. The Wald test at the
bottom of the table, testing whether the correlation coefficient ρ is equal to zero, reports
an insignificant statistic.
4.4.3 Robustness and Alternative Explanations
In this section I evaluate the robustness of the results presented so far to alternative
explanations. I start by considering different measures of banks’ financial and managerial
conditions and then I address issues related to unspecified or unobservable variables
correlated to the lobbying measures. Table 4.8 and 4.9 summarize these robustness
tests.
First, I would like to check the robustness of my results to different choice of measures
proxying the CAMELS components. I also consider an alternative measure for Leverage
and Total core deposits, next to the CAMELS components. These alternative measures
are discussed in Appendix C.1. Each CAMELS component is, however, not subject to
an alternative measure due to data availability. Column (1) of Table 4.8 (Panels A-
C) reports the estimation results with the new set of control variables. The qualitative
conclusions for all lobbying variables remain unchanged, suggesting that my main results
are consistent across different measures of financial and managerial conditions.
Second, I check whether my findings are not confined to a subset of particular banks.
Specifically, I gauge the sensitivity of my results to the exclusion of banks with the
best or worst financial condition. In columns (2) and (3), I exclude the top (bottom)
25% of the banks with best (worst) financial condition, as proxied by banks’ capital
adequacy. Excluding banks with best or worst financial health does not affect my results,
except in column (3), Panel C, where the variable Lobbying expenditures just fails to
be statistically significant at the 10% level. Third, in column (4), I exclude banks
headquartered in New York City and Washington, D.C. to evaluate whether my results
are not driven by a subset of banks with strong connections to Congress and regulatory
agencies, given their critical localization. The findings hold after eliminating banks
located in these centers of influence regardless the lobbying variables used.
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Fourth, I consider the issue of systemic importance. My results can be driven by a subset
of large banks, which would receive unconditionally preferential treatment irrespective
of their lobbying efforts given their systemic risk. To address this possibility, I exclude
the largest banks in my sample. Column (5) reports the results of estimating the logit
model of the issuance of a severe enforcement action after eliminating the top decile of
banks in terms of asset size. My results on each lobbying variable are hardly altered.
In column (6) I also allow for various functional forms of the relation between size and
systemic importance. In particular, I introduce in the model higher-order powers of
Size—i.e., Size squared and Size cubed. All qualitative and quantitative conclusions
hold.
Fifth, I perform an additional test to evaluate the robustness of my results to control-
ling for non-random assignment. To do so, I construct matched subsamples of lobbying
(treatment group) and non-lobbying banks (control group) to rule out that the results
are driven by the observable composition of these two groups. For each of the treatment
and control groups, I compute a propensity score via logit model, in which the dependent
variable is Lobbying dummy (resp. Revolving door dummy). My choice of independent
variables includes economically meaningful factors such as Deposit-to-asset ratio, Lever-
age, Size, Age, year dummies, and state dummies. It is worth emphasizing that this
test also allows to distilling the effect of lobbying from that of systemic importance, as
asset size alone may not be sufficient to capture systemic importance. Table 4.9 sum-
marizes the results from the various matching used—namely, nearest neighbor matching
and kernel-based matching (see Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, 1998, for greater
details). One can see that lobbying banks consistently receive less severe enforcement
actions. The size of the treatment effect is here greater than in Table 4.6. The estimates
for Lobbying dummy (Revolving door dummy) range from -0.011 to -0.016 (from -0.013
to -0.018), while statistical significance reaches the 1% level in almost all specifications.
Together these results suggest that there is an economically non-negligible treatment
difference in terms of issuance of enforcement actions between lobbying and non-lobbying
banks. I now turn to examine the reasons why banks engage in lobbying in order to
benefit from such favorable treatment.
4.4.4 Risk Taking in Lobbying Banks
So far, I have shown that bank lobbying reduces the likelihood of a severe enforcement
action. Lobbying activities influence the way banks are run, especially regarding how
much risk they take. In this section I pursue my second goal of gaining a deeper in-
sight into lobbying banks’ risk taking behavior. One possibility, involving moral hazard
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Table 4.9: Impact of Lobbying on Severe Enforcement Actions: Matching Methods
This table provides estimates of the mean difference between the likelihood of a severe enforcement
action for lobbying banks and non-lobbying banks; i.e. the average treatment effect on the treated
(ATT). Columns 1 and 3 report the ATT estimates, while columns 2 and 4 report the number of
matched treated. For the estimation of the propensity score, I estimate unreported logit regressions
where the dependent variable is Lobbying dummy (resp. Revolving door dummy) and I match on
the logarithm of the odds ratio of the propensity score. The independent variables are the Deposit-
to-asset ratio, Leverage, Size, Age, year dummies, and state dummies. The estimators, which are
described in detail in Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998), are defined as follows: Near
neighbor chooses for each lobbying bank, the n non-lobbying banks with closest propensity scores,
and uses the arithmetic average of the n non-lobbying banks. I use n=1, 10, 50, and 100 with
caliper = 0.01. I allow replacement, i.e. each matching observation may be used more than once.
Gaussian and Epanechnikov employ a weighted average of non-lobbying banks, with more weight
given to non-lobbying banks with propensity scores that are closer to the lobbying bank propensity
score. For Gaussian and Epanechnikov, I specify a propensity score bandwidth (h) that limits the
sample of non-lobbying banks. I specify that h = 0.01. The number of observations of the matched
sample may be lower than the number of banks to be matched because the logit model may not find
a suitable match, such as when the propensity score of a lobbying bank falls outside of the support
of non-lobbying bank propensity scores. All variables are defined in Appendix C.1. Standard errors
are in parentheses under the parameter estimates. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Estimator
ATT Number of ATT Number of
matches matches
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lobbying dummy Revolving door dummy
Near neighbor (n=1; caliper=0.01) -0.0158*** 1,267 -0.0136** 1,103
(0.0064) (0.0068)
Near neighbor (n=10; caliper=0.01) -0.0129*** 1,267 -0.0183*** 1,103
(0.0045) (0.0050)
Near neighbor (n=50; caliper=0.01) -0.0142*** 1,267 -0.0169*** 1,103
(0.0044) (0.0048)
Near neighbor (n=100; caliper=0.01) -0.0142*** 1,267 -0.0167*** 1,103
(0.0043) (0.0047)
Gaussian -0.0108*** 1,352 -0.0129*** 1,193
(0.0042) (0.0044)
Epanechnikov -0.0115*** 1,352 -0.0135*** 1,193
(0.0043) (0.0046)
elements, is that the lobbying process acts as a shield from supervisory scrutiny lead-
ing banks to take more risk. Another possibility is that the bank lobbying process is
to better inform regulators and to guide them in their corrective measures decisions.
Under this latter view, lobbying banks are more likely to be associated with lower risk.
Indeed, the lobbying process facilitates the transmission of prescriptions from regulators
in terms of bank risk. Table 4.10 presents the results.
The first outcome I consider is the measure of default risk, namely the Z-score. I take
the natural logarithm of this score given its skewed distribution (see Figure 4.3). I
then complement my analysis with bank risk measures based on profits and loan loss
ratios. Each column reports the results of panel regressions of bank risk, where the
dependent variables include the Z-score, ROA volatility, nonperforming loans ratio, and
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nonaccrual loans ratio, on the three measures of lobbying. Control variables are Deposit-
to-asset ratio, Total core deposits, Size, Age, year and state fixed effects. Standard
errors are clustered by bank. The evidence across the columns indicates a statistically
and economically significant increase in risk taking at lobbying banks.
Figure 4.3: Kernel Densities of Z-score and ROA volatility
This figure reports the kernel densities of the natural logarithm of both Z-score and ROA
volatility for the full sample. These variables are defined in Appendix C.1. Source: SNL
Financial.
In column (1), I show that bank lobbying is associated with higher default risk, an effect
that is significant for all lobbying variables (Panels A-C). Lobbying banks show a de-
crease in the Z-score of 0.233 relative to non-lobbying banks with similar characteristics,
which is 5% of its mean value (in logarithm form) in Table 4.4—recalling that a smaller
estimated Z-score implies more default risk. The effect on banks employing revolving
door lobbyists is statistically and economically similar. Regarding lobbying intensity,
a 10% increase in lobbying expenditures implies 18.5% drop in the Z-score. In column
(2), I also consistently find across Panels A-C that lobbying banks have higher ROA
volatility than non-lobbying banks.
To further investigate the analysis of risk, I turn to the risk associated with one key
channel of bank operations: credit risk. Column (3) shows that lobbying banks are
associated with higher nonperforming loans ratio. For example, Panel A shows that
lobbying banks are associated with nonperforming loans ratio that is 0.005 higher than
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Table 4.10: Impact of Lobbying on Risk Taking: Base Models
This table presents estimates from regressions explaining several indicators of bank risk
taking. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the Z-score in column (1), of
the ROA volatility in column (2), of the Nonperforming loans to total loans in column (3),
and of the Nonaccrual loans to total loans in column (4). Panel A reports results from
panel regressions, in which the independent variable of interest is Lobbying dummy. Panel
B reports results from panel regressions, in which the independent variable of interest
is Revolving door dummy. Panel C reports results from panel regressions, in which the
independent variable of interest is Lobbying expenditures. All the regressions control for
the Deposit-to-asset ratio, Total core deposits, Size, Age, year fixed effects, and state fixed
effects. All models are estimated for the full sample (i.e., the 1999-2012 interval). This
table only reports the coefficients of variables of interest for brevity. All variables are
defined in Appendix C.1. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. *,
**, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Variable
ln(Z-score) ln(ROA ln(Nonperfor- ln(Nonaccrual
volatility) ming loans loans to total
to total loans) loans)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Lobbying
Lobbying dummy -0.2334*** 0.2711*** 0.0049*** 0.0042***
(0.0692) (0.0679) (0.0019) (0.0016)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.1561 0.1973 0.0008 0.0003
Number of Banks 10,469 10,469 10,359 10,359
Number of Observations 105,687 105,687 104,933 104,933
Panel B: Revolving Door
Revolving door dummy -0.2004*** 0.2176*** 0.0045*** 0.0039**
(0.0695) (0.0680) (0.0018) (0.0016)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.1561 0.1970 0.0008 0.0003
Number of Banks 10,469 10,469 10,359 10,359
Number of Observations 105,687 105,687 104,933 104,933
Panel C: Lobbying Expenditures
ln(Lobbying expenditures) -0.0185*** 0.0227*** 0.0004** 0.0003**
(0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.1562 0.1973 0.0008 0.0003
Number of Banks 10,469 10,469 10,359 10,359
Number of Observations 105,687 105,687 104,933 104,933
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non-lobbying banks, which is 1.2% of the mean of the variable (taken in logarithm). The
results in column (4) mirror those found in column (3) for the nonaccrual loans ratio,
and are very similar.
For robustness purposes, I also repeat the analysis on bank risk for alternative model
specifications and subsamples as in Table 4.8. In particular, I extend the set of control
variables to the CAMELS rating proxies. The results are summarized in Appendix Table
C.3 and do not affect the conclusions drawn.25
In summary, lobbying banks, which are less likely to be subject to severe action, tend
to engage in additional risk taking—namely, default, volatility, and credit risk. These
results appear, therefore, consistent with the capture theory of regulation a` la Stigler
(1971) and Peltzman (1976), but rather inconsistent with an explanation echoing the
informational lobbying literature (Grossman and Helpman, 2001).
4.5 Conclusions
In the aftermath of the financial crisis, the political influence of the banking indus-
try and, in particular, their lobbying efforts have been blamed by many observers and
commentators for being responsible of failures and gaps in banking regulation and su-
pervision. Because of the difficulty of measuring political influence, anecdotes mainly
drive this general perception. This paper presents systematic bank-level evidence on the
link between bank lobbying and the issuance of enforcement actions, a crucial aspect of
banking micro-prudential supervision. Using a large sample of commercial and savings
banks, I find that banks engaged in lobbying activities have lower probabilities of receiv-
ing an enforcement action—being either a formal written agreement, cease and desist
order, prompt corrective action directive, or deposit insurance threat. All dimensions
of lobbying studied point in the direction of a significant negative impact of lobbying
on the issuance of a severe action. The effect identified is stronger during the banking
crisis, suggesting that regulators face higher constraints in periods of intense regulatory
activity and are more politically influenced. The evidence on the propensity of taking
risk at lobbying banks sheds light on the reasons why banks lobby to gain preferential
treatment. Broadly consistent with the Stigler-Peltzman view of regulation, my findings
suggest (1) that the supervisory process is not immune to the political influence of banks
and (2) that regulatory and supervisory distortions induced by lobbying outweigh the
25For brevity, Appendix Table C.3 only reports the results for Lobbying dummy as an independent
variable of interest. The results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar for Revolving door
dummy and Lobbying expenditures.
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welfare-enhancing role of the lobbying process in terms of information transmission. Un-
derstanding and quantifying further these distortions induced by bank lobbying remains
a fruitful area of future research.
From a policy perspective, my findings have implications for the redesign of banking
regulation in the United States and in other part of the world, especially within the
European Union. While my findings should not be interpreted as evidence for banning
lobbying, they decisively point in the direction of a need for tighter rules governing
lobbying activities. This implies that policymakers should advocate for greater trans-
parency but also address the pervasive dominance of the banking industry and their
lobbyists as a special interest group.

Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 Country Coverage
Table A.1: Country Coverage
This table lists the 35 countries of the cross section analysis and the 18 countries of the
panel data analysis (in bold).
Country Name
Argentina Cyprus Ireland Netherlands Sweden
Australia Denmark Israel New Zealand Switzerland
Austria Finland Italy Norway Turkey
Belgium France Japan Peru United Kingdom
Brazil Germany Korea, Republic of Portugal United States
Canada Greece Malaysia South Africa Uruguay
Chile India Mexico Spain Venezuela
A.2 Additional Results
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Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 Descriptive Statistics per Country
Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics per Country
This table presents the mean and standard deviation of our indices of government fragmentation and
the index of financial reforms (in levels and first differences) for each country. Table 3.1 summarizes
the variables definitions and sources.
Country HERFGOV NUMBER FR ∆FR
OF PARTIES
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Australia 0.813 0.170 1.567 0.504 0.645 0.357 0.030 0.054
Austria 0.685 0.215 1.733 0.450 0.558 0.260 0.027 0.051
Belgium 0.300 0.123 4.323 1.077 0.732 0.208 0.019 0.041
Canada 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.851 0.141 0.011 0.027
Chile 0.533 0.279 3.500 1.549 0.793 0.086 0.011 0.021
Czech Republic 0.676 0.205 2.467 1.302 0.740 0.178 0.039 0.068
Denmark 0.620 0.224 2.806 1.223 0.740 0.258 0.021 0.042
Estonia 0.590 0.291 2.231 0.927 0.818 0.236 0.046 0.067
Finland 0.348 0.065 4.267 0.907 0.642 0.197 0.017 0.038
France 0.655 0.171 3.387 1.383 0.705 0.304 0.024 0.065
Germany 0.612 0.114 2.552 0.506 0.819 0.083 0.006 0.024
Greece 0.999 0.004 1.097 0.301 0.487 0.283 0.024 0.045
Hungary 0.651 0.138 2.438 0.629 0.749 0.240 0.040 0.059
Ireland 0.780 0.175 1.903 0.539 0.805 0.203 0.016 0.038
Israel 0.466 0.176 5.000 1.826 0.527 0.267 0.022 0.054
Italy 0.749 0.257 2.690 1.775 0.596 0.257 0.022 0.041
Japan 0.880 0.197 1.793 1.320 0.639 0.197 0.019 0.039
Korea, Republic of 0.870 0.202 1.333 0.485 0.661 0.104 0.013 0.067
Mexico 0.918 0.080 1.556 0.527 0.889 0.086 0.021 0.035
Netherlands 0.462 0.100 2.677 0.909 0.873 0.113 0.011 0.026
New Zealand 0.909 0.163 1.467 0.681 0.727 0.288 0.025 0.075
Norway 0.694 0.212 2.290 0.693 0.659 0.220 0.019 0.045
Poland 0.595 0.217 2.647 1.539 0.684 0.199 0.040 0.050
Portugal 0.931 0.150 1.207 0.412 0.510 0.308 0.026 0.060
Spain 0.965 0.088 1.429 1.069 0.759 0.222 0.022 0.044
Sweden 0.686 0.249 2.290 0.973 0.741 0.265 0.022 0.042
Switzerland 0.271 0.020 3.935 0.250 0.880 0.047 0.005 0.015
Turkey 0.743 0.251 2.036 1.261 0.470 0.260 0.019 0.042
United Kingdom 0.998 0.014 1.032 0.180 0.859 0.180 0.017 0.036
United States 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.864 0.122 0.012 0.032
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B.2 Additional Robustness Tables
Table B.2: Financial Crises
This table reports results relating financial reforms to government fragmentation and various types of financial
crises. The dependent variable is ∆FR. In addition to the control variables as Table 3.4, the regressions
control for banking, currency, debt, inflation, and stock market crises. These additional variables are defined
for each year as the number of (banking, currency, domestic/external debt, inflation, and market) crises;
crises definitions follow Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). This table only reports the coefficients of variables of
interest for brevity. The panel spans the 1975-2005 interval and includes the OECD countries. Table 3.1
summarizes variables definitions and sources. All specifications are estimated with robust standard errors
(in parentheses) clustered by country. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Indices of Government Fragmentation
HERFGOV 0.021** 0.072*** 0.020** 0.074***
(0.009) (0.025) (0.010) (0.025)
LARGEST SEAT SHARE -0.064* -0.069**
(0.033) (0.032)
NUMBER OF PARTIES -0.003* -0.003*
(0.002) (0.002)
Financial Crises Variables
BANKING CRISIS -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
CURRENCY CRISIS 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.0057 0.005 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
DEBT CRISIS 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.004 0.010 0.008
(0.010) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
INFLATION CRISIS -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.028***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
STOCK MARKET CRASH -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Political Economy Controls No No Yes Yes No Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall R2 0.149 0.148 0.148 0.145 0.149 0.146
Within R2 0.219 0.221 0.220 0.222 0.218 0.217
Number of Countries 27 27 27 27 27 27
Number of Observations 676 676 676 676 676 676
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Table B.3: Ordered Logit Estimations
This table reports ordered logit regressions of financial reforms to gov-
ernment fragmentation. The dependent variable is ∆FR. The regressions
control for lagged financial reforms (in first differences and levels), eco-
nomic development, recession, inflation, gross fixed capital formation,
trade openness, EU membership, year and country fixed effects. The
panel spans the 1975-2005 interval and includes the OECD countries
reported in Table B.1. Table 3.1 summarizes variables definitions and
sources. All specifications are estimated with robust standard errors (in
parentheses) clustered by country. *, **, and *** indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Indices of Government Fragmentation
HERFGOV 1.003**
(0.470)
NUMBER OF PARTIES -0.187**
(0.092)
Control Variables
∆FR (lagged) 4.928* 4.938*
(2.720) (2.698)
FR (lagged) -6.279*** -6.220***
(0.772) (0.756)
ln(GDP PER CAPITA) (lagged) 0.488 0.352
(1.752) (1.710)
RECESSION 1.124*** 1.112***
(0.290) (0.293)
INFLATION -1.877*** -1.879***
(0.320) (0.300)
GFCF 10.509*** 9.777***
(3.526) (3.504)
TRADE OPENNESS 0.831 0.748
(1.342) (1.303)
EU 0.025 0.083
(0.467) (0.462)
Year FE Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes
Log L -1050.396 -1050.134
Pseudo R2 0.076 0.076
Number of Countries 30 30
Number of Observations 727 727

Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
C.1 Definition of Variables
C.1.1 Regulatory Enforcement Actions
Severe action dummy: dummy variable equal to one if Formal written agreements, Cease
and desist orders, Prompt corrective action directive, and/or Deposit insurance threats
are observed during the year, and zero otherwise.
Less severe action dummy: dummy variable equal to one if enforcement actions against
Personnel and individuals, Formal memoranda of understanding, Hearing notices, Sanc-
tions due to HMDA violation and/or other actions and fines are observed during the
year, and zero otherwise.
Formal written agreements: the number of formal agreements observed during the year.
Cease and desist orders: the number of cease and desist orders during the year.
Prompt corrective action directives: the number of prompt Corrective actions during
the year.
Deposit insurance threats: the number of deposits insurance threats during the year.
C.1.2 Risk Taking
Z-score: the sum of return on assets and the equity-to-asset ratio divided by the standard
deviation of the return on assets, calculated over a three-year rolling time window.
Formally, the Z-score is equal to (ROA+ EA)/σ(ROA), where ROA is the bank’s return
on assets (i.e., piA),
E
A denotes its equity-to-asset ratio, and σ(pi/A) is the standard
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deviation of ROA. I use a three-year rolling time window for the σ(ROA) to allow
for sufficient variation in the denominator of the Z-score. This approach avoids that
Z-scores are exclusively driven by variation in the levels of capital (E) and profitability
(pi). In unreported sensitivity analyses, I use different time windows and the results are
unchanged. The Z-score is an accounting-based measure of banks’ distance to default.
Default is defined as a state in which losses surmount equity (E < −pi). The probability
of default can therefore be expressed as Prob(−ROA < EA). If profits are normally
distributed, then the inverse of the probability of default equals (ROA+ EA)/σ(ROA). I
follow the literature by defining the inverse of the probability of default as the Z-score;
thus, a higher Z-score implies a lower probability of default. In other words, the Z-score
measures the number of standard deviations below the mean by which returns has to
fall to wipe out bank equity. Because the Z-score is highly skewed, I use the natural
logarithm of (1+Z-score), which is normally distributed (see Figure 4.3). For brevity, I
use the label “Z-score” in referring to the natural logarithm of Z-score in the paper.
ROA volatility: the standard deviation of return on assets (ROA).
Nonperforming loans to total loans: loans 90 days or more past due but still accruing
interest plus nonaccrual loans divided by total loans.
Nonaccrual loans to total loans: nonaccrual loans divided by total loans.
C.1.3 Lobbying
Lobbying dummy: dummy variable equal to one if the bank is active in lobbying during
the year, and zero otherwise. “Active” means that the bank has at least hired once a
lobbying firm or filed a lobbying report.
Revolving door dummy: dummy variable equal to one if the bank employs at least one
revolving door lobbyist during the year. A revolving door lobbyist is an individual who
serves or has served in public offices and moves to being employed as lobbyist; for more
information about the methodology employed, see the CRP website.
Lobbying expenditures: dollar amount spent on lobbying during the year.
C.1.4 Financials and Demographics
Capital adequacy: Tier 1 capital divided by risk-weighted assets. Tier 1 risk-based capi-
tal ratio is the amount of a bank’s capital relative to the risk profile of its assets. Broadly
speaking, this criterion evaluates the extent to which a bank can absorb potential losses.
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Tier 1 capital comprises the more liquid subset of bank’s capital, whose largest com-
ponents include common stock, paid-in-surplus, retained earnings, and noncumulative
perpetual preferred stock. The denominator of the ratio is computed as follows: all
assets are divided into risk classes (defined by regulators), where more risky assets are
assigned higher weights than less risky assets, thus contributing more to the denomina-
tor of the ratio. The idea behind is that banks, whose asset composition is riskier, need
a greater amount of capital to remain sufficiently capitalized.
Asset quality: the negative of loan and lease allowance scaled by total loans. This
ratio measures the adequacy of the allowance created by the bank to absorb losses on
nonperforming loans. For ease of interpretation, this ratio is included with a negative
sign so that greater values reflect higher asset quality. In the robustness section, I also
test an alternative measure: the negative of net losses divided by total loans and leases.
This alternative measure evaluates the overall condition of a bank’s portfolio. A higher
proportion of net losses indicates lower asset quality.
Management quality: the negative of the uniformly weighted moving average of the
number of enforcement actions against personnel and individuals using three lagged
years and the current year. In the robustness section, I also use the negative of the
number of enforcement actions against personnel and individuals during the year.
Earnings: return on assets (ROA), measured as the ratio of the annualized net income
in the trailing quarter to average total assets. In the robustness section, I also use the
ratio of net interest income to earning assets.
Liquidity: the ratio of cash to deposits.
Sensitivity to market risk: the ratio of the absolute difference (gap) between short-term
assets and short-term liabilities to earnings assets. This ratio measures the sensitivity to
interest rate risk. The primary focus of risk analysis by regulators is on interest rate risk.
The gap between both short-term assets and liabilities approximates the net amount of
assets or liabilities that need to be repriced within one year, affecting in turn earnings.
A higher gap reflects a higher interest rate risk.
Deposit-to-asset ratio: the ratio of total deposits to total book assets.
Leverage: the debt to equity ratio. For robustness, I also use an alternative measure:
the ratio of total equity to total book assets.
Total core deposits: the deposits made in a bank’s natural demographic market. This is
a measure of the size of a bank’s stable source of funds for their lending base.
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Size: the natural logarithm of total assets. For brevity, I use the label “size” in referring
to the natural logarithm of total assets in the paper.
Age: age (in years) of the bank.
C.2 Additional Robustness Tables
Table C.1: Impact of Lobbying on the Probability of a Severe Enforcement Action: Linear Proba-
bility Models
This table presents estimates from linear probability models explaining the likelihood of a severe enforcement
action. The dependent variable is Severe action dummy. Models (1)-(3) are estimated for the full sample
(i.e., the 1999-2012 interval). Models (4)-(6) are estimated for the crisis sample (i.e., the 2007-09 period). All
models use the same set of control variables as in Table 4.6, except the state fixed fixed which are replaced
by bank fixed effects. This table only reports the coefficients of variables of interest for brevity. All variables
are defined in Appendix C.1. Robust standard errors clustered by bank are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Full Sample Crisis Sample
Lobbying
Lobbying dummy -0.0110* -0.0508***
(0.0064) (0.0149)
Revolving door dummy -0.0138** -0.0471***
(0.0061) (0.0161)
ln(Lobbying expenditures) -0.0007 -0.0040***
(0.0006) (0.0014)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Within R2 0.0616 0.0616 0.0616 0.1140 0.1140 0.1139
Number of Banks 11,018 11,018 11,018 7,747 7,747 7,747
Number of Observations 107,977 107,977 107,977 22,073 22,073 22,073
Appendix C. Appendix C 141
T
a
b
l
e
C
.2
:
Im
p
ac
t
of
L
ob
b
y
in
g
o
n
th
e
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
o
f
a
S
ev
er
e
E
n
fo
rc
em
en
t
A
ct
io
n
:
D
iff
er
en
t
C
ri
si
s
S
a
m
p
le
s
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
es
ti
m
a
te
s
fr
o
m
lo
g
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
ex
p
la
in
in
g
th
e
li
k
el
ih
o
o
d
o
f
a
se
v
er
e
en
fo
rc
em
en
t
a
ct
io
n
in
cr
is
is
y
ea
rs
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
a
b
le
is
S
ev
er
e
a
ct
io
n
d
u
m
m
y.
M
o
d
el
s
(1
)-
(3
)
a
re
es
ti
m
a
te
d
fo
r
th
e
2
0
0
7
-1
0
p
er
io
d
,
M
o
d
el
s
(4
)-
(6
)
fo
r
th
e
2
0
0
7
-1
1
p
er
io
d
,
a
n
d
M
o
d
el
s
(7
)-
(9
)
fo
r
th
e
2
0
0
7
-1
2
p
er
io
d
.
A
ll
m
o
d
el
s
u
se
th
e
sa
m
e
se
t
o
f
co
n
tr
o
l
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
4
.6
.
T
h
is
ta
b
le
o
n
ly
re
p
o
rt
s
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
ts
o
f
va
ri
a
b
le
s
o
f
in
te
re
st
fo
r
b
re
v
it
y.
A
ll
va
ri
a
b
le
s
a
re
d
efi
n
ed
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
C
.1
.
A
v
er
a
g
e
m
a
rg
in
a
l
eff
ec
ts
a
re
re
p
o
rt
ed
a
n
d
ro
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
cl
u
st
er
ed
b
y
b
a
n
k
a
re
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
.
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
in
d
ic
a
te
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
le
v
el
s,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
2
0
0
7
-1
0
C
ri
si
s
S
a
m
p
le
2
0
0
7
-1
1
C
ri
si
s
S
a
m
p
le
2
0
0
7
-1
2
C
ri
si
s
S
a
m
p
le
L
o
b
b
y
in
g
L
o
b
b
y
in
g
d
u
m
m
y
-0
.0
3
0
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
0
1
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
6
1
)
(0
.0
0
6
2
)
R
ev
o
lv
in
g
d
o
o
r
d
u
m
m
y
-0
.0
3
1
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
7
9
*
*
*
(0
.0
0
5
4
)
(0
.0
0
5
1
)
(0
.0
0
5
3
)
ln
(L
o
b
b
y
in
g
ex
p
en
d
it
u
re
s)
-0
.0
0
3
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
2
1
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
0
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
e
a
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
te
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
P
se
u
d
o
R
2
0
.2
9
1
0
0
.2
9
1
0
0
.2
9
0
8
0
.2
7
4
3
0
.2
7
4
8
0
.2
7
4
3
0
.2
5
9
7
0
.2
6
0
1
0
.2
5
9
6
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
B
a
n
k
s
7
,7
6
7
7
,7
6
7
7
,7
6
7
7
,8
2
8
7
,8
2
8
7
,8
2
8
8
,4
0
6
8
,4
0
6
8
,4
0
6
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
2
8
,8
8
8
2
8
,8
8
8
2
8
,8
8
8
3
5
,5
0
1
3
5
,5
0
1
3
5
,5
0
1
4
2
,4
4
9
4
2
,4
4
9
4
2
,4
4
9
Appendix C. Appendix C 142
T
a
b
l
e
C
.3
:
Im
p
a
ct
o
f
L
o
b
b
y
in
g
o
n
R
isk
T
a
k
in
g
:
R
ob
u
stn
ess
T
h
is
ta
b
le
p
resen
ts
estim
a
tes
fro
m
p
a
n
el
reg
ressio
n
s
ex
p
la
in
in
g
sev
era
l
in
d
ica
to
rs
o
f
b
a
n
k
risk
ta
k
in
g
.
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ria
b
le
is
th
e
n
a
tu
ra
l
lo
g
a
rith
m
o
f
th
e
Z
-sco
re
in
P
a
n
el
A
,
o
f
th
e
R
O
A
v
o
la
tility
in
P
a
n
el
B
,
o
f
th
e
N
o
n
p
erfo
rm
in
g
lo
a
n
s
to
to
ta
l
lo
a
n
s
in
P
a
n
el
C
,
a
n
d
o
f
th
e
N
o
n
a
ccru
a
l
lo
a
n
s
to
to
ta
l
lo
a
n
s
in
P
a
n
el
D
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(1
)
co
n
sid
ers
a
d
iff
eren
t
o
f
co
n
tro
l
va
ria
b
les:
C
a
p
ita
l
a
d
eq
u
a
cy,
A
sset
q
u
a
lity,
M
a
n
a
g
em
en
t
q
u
a
lity,
L
iq
u
id
ity,
S
en
sitiv
ity
to
m
a
rk
et
risk
,
D
ep
o
sit-to
-a
sset
ra
tio
,
T
o
ta
l
co
re
d
ep
o
sits,
S
ize,
A
g
e,
y
ea
r
fi
x
ed
eff
ects,
a
n
d
sta
te
fi
x
ed
eff
ects.
C
o
lu
m
n
s
(2
)
a
n
d
(3
)
ex
clu
d
e
th
e
to
p
a
n
d
b
o
tto
m
q
u
a
rtiles
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
b
a
sed
o
n
C
a
p
ita
l
a
d
eq
u
a
cy.
C
o
lu
m
n
(4
)
ex
clu
d
es
a
ll
b
a
n
k
s
h
ea
d
q
u
a
rtered
in
N
ew
Y
o
rk
C
ity
a
n
d
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
,
D
.C
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(5
)
ex
clu
d
es
th
e
to
p
d
ecile
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
b
a
sed
o
n
S
ize.
C
o
lu
m
n
(6
)
in
clu
d
es
h
ig
h
er-o
rd
er
p
ow
ers
o
f
S
ize
(i.e.,
S
ize
sq
u
a
red
a
n
d
S
ize
cu
b
ed
).
A
ll
m
o
d
els
a
re
estim
a
ted
fo
r
th
e
fu
ll
sa
m
p
le
(i.e.,
th
e
1
9
9
9
-2
0
1
2
in
terva
l)
a
n
d
u
se
(u
n
less
o
th
erw
ise
sp
ecifi
ed
)
th
e
sa
m
e
set
o
f
co
n
tro
l
va
ria
b
les
a
s
in
T
a
b
le
4
.1
0
.
T
h
is
ta
b
le
o
n
ly
rep
o
rts
th
e
co
effi
cien
ts
o
f
va
ria
b
les
o
f
in
terest
fo
r
b
rev
ity.
A
ll
va
ria
b
les
a
re
d
efi
n
ed
in
A
p
p
en
d
ix
C
.1
.
R
o
b
u
st
sta
n
d
a
rd
erro
rs
clu
stered
b
y
b
a
n
k
a
re
in
p
a
ren
th
eses.
*
,
*
*
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
in
d
ica
te
sig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
,
5
%
,
a
n
d
1
%
lev
els,
resp
ectiv
ely.
D
e
sc
rip
tio
n
D
iff
eren
t
E
x
clu
d
e
E
x
clu
d
e
E
x
clu
d
e
N
ew
E
x
clu
d
e
H
ig
h
er-O
rd
er
S
et
o
f
T
o
p
2
5
%
B
o
tto
m
2
5
%
Y
o
rk
C
ity
a
n
d
T
o
p
1
0
%
P
ow
ers
o
f
C
o
n
tro
ls
C
a
p
ita
l
C
a
p
ita
l
W
a
sh
in
g
to
n
,
S
ize
S
ize
A
d
eq
u
a
cy
A
d
eq
u
a
cy
D
.C
.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
P
a
n
el
A
:
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ria
b
le:
ln
(Z
-sco
re)
L
o
b
b
y
in
g
d
u
m
m
y
-0
.2
9
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.4
8
6
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
7
6
-0
.2
6
7
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
2
1
*
*
-0
.1
3
0
1
*
*
(0
.0
7
1
9
)
(0
.0
6
8
2
)
(0
.0
7
5
9
)
(0
.0
6
8
5
)
(0
.0
7
8
2
)
(0
.0
6
7
4
)
C
o
n
tro
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
e
a
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
te
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0
.1
7
5
1
0
.1
6
0
2
0
.1
4
4
9
0
.1
5
7
3
0
.1
5
2
9
0
.1
5
6
4
N
b
o
f
b
a
n
k
s
1
0
,4
0
4
9
,2
8
0
9
,2
8
0
1
0
,3
8
2
9
,8
5
1
1
0
,4
6
9
N
b
o
f
o
b
s
1
0
5
,2
4
0
7
9
,5
8
1
7
9
,5
8
1
1
0
4
,8
7
5
9
5
,3
3
5
1
0
5
,6
8
7
P
a
n
el
B
:
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ria
b
le:
ln
(R
O
A
v
o
la
tility
)
L
o
b
b
y
in
g
d
u
m
m
y
0
.2
6
6
7
*
*
*
0
.4
4
4
7
*
*
*
0
.1
4
1
6
*
0
.3
0
1
0
*
*
*
0
.1
7
7
5
*
*
0
.1
4
1
6
*
*
(0
.0
7
0
8
)
(0
.0
6
5
9
)
(0
.0
7
6
7
)
(0
.0
6
7
9
)
(0
.0
7
5
4
)
(0
.0
6
5
2
)
C
o
n
tro
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
e
a
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
te
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0
.1
8
8
1
0
.1
6
8
1
0
.2
1
0
6
0
.1
9
7
3
0
.1
9
7
5
0
.1
9
5
8
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
B
a
n
k
s
1
0
,4
0
4
9
,2
8
0
9
,2
8
0
1
0
,3
8
2
9
,8
5
1
1
0
,4
6
9
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
O
b
serva
tio
n
s
1
0
5
,2
4
0
7
9
,5
8
1
7
9
,5
8
1
1
0
4
,8
7
5
9
5
,3
3
5
1
0
5
,6
8
7
(co
n
tin
u
ed
)
Appendix C. Appendix C 143
T
a
b
l
e
C
.3
—
C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
P
a
n
el
C
:
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
:
ln
(N
o
n
p
er
fo
rm
in
g
lo
a
n
s
to
to
ta
l
lo
a
n
s)
L
o
b
b
y
in
g
d
u
m
m
y
0
.0
0
4
9
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
1
*
0
.0
0
6
3
*
*
0
.0
0
4
1
*
*
0
.0
0
6
2
*
*
*
0
.0
0
4
5
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
0
2
5
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
9
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
e
a
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
te
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
1
2
0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
7
0
.0
0
1
0
0
.0
0
0
8
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
B
a
n
k
s
1
0
,3
5
7
9
,2
7
0
9
,2
7
0
1
0
,2
8
5
9
,7
4
1
1
0
,3
5
9
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
0
4
,9
2
1
7
9
,5
5
5
7
9
,5
5
5
1
0
4
,1
9
7
9
4
,6
3
9
1
0
4
,9
3
3
P
a
n
el
D
:
D
ep
en
d
en
t
V
a
ri
a
b
le
:
ln
(N
o
n
a
cc
ru
a
l
lo
a
n
s
to
to
ta
l
lo
a
n
s)
L
o
b
b
y
in
g
d
u
m
m
y
0
.0
0
4
1
*
*
0
.0
0
2
4
*
0
.0
0
5
1
*
*
0
.0
0
3
3
*
*
0
.0
0
4
2
*
*
0
.0
0
3
8
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
3
)
(0
.0
0
2
1
)
(0
.0
0
1
4
)
(0
.0
0
1
7
)
(0
.0
0
1
6
)
C
o
n
tr
o
ls
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
e
a
r
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
S
ta
te
F
E
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
R
2
0
.0
0
0
3
0
.0
0
0
4
0
.0
0
0
1
0
.0
0
0
2
0
.0
0
0
5
0
.0
0
0
3
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
B
a
n
k
s
1
0
,3
5
7
9
,2
7
0
9
,2
7
0
1
0
,2
8
5
9
,7
4
1
1
0
,3
5
9
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s
1
0
4
,9
2
1
7
9
,5
5
5
7
9
,5
5
5
1
0
4
,1
9
7
9
4
,6
3
9
1
0
4
,9
3
3

Bibliography
[1] Abiad, Abdul, Enrica Detragiache, and Thierry Tressel, 2010, A New Database of
Financial Reforms, IMF Staff Papers 57, 281—302.
[2] Abiad, Abdul, and Ashoka Mody, 2005, Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What
Shapes It? American Economic Review 95, 66—88.
[3] Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson, 2005, Unbundling Institutions, Journal of
Political Economy 113, 949—995.
[4] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, Amir Kermani, James Kwak, and Todd Mitton,
2013, The Value of Connections in Turbulent Times: Evidence from the United
States, NBER Working Paper No. 19701.
[5] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, 2001, The Colonial Origins
of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation, American Economic
Review 91, 1369—1401.
[6] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, 2002, Reversal of Fortune:
Geography and Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribu-
tion, Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 1231—1294.
[7] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James Robinson, 2005, Institutions as a
Fundamental Cause of Long-Run Growth, in Philippe Aghion, and Steven Durlauf,
eds.: Handbook of Economic Growth (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
[8] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared, 2008, Income
and Democracy, American Economic Review 98, 808—842.
[9] Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson, and Pierre Yared, 2009,
Reevaluating the Modernization Hypothesis, Journal of Monetary Economics 56,
1043—1058.
[10] Acemoglu, Daron, Suresh Naidu, Pascual Restrepo, and James Robinson, 2014,
Democracy Does Cause Growth, NBER Working Paper No. 20004.
145
Bibliography 146
[11] Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson, 2000, Why Did the West Extend the Fran-
chise? Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 115, 1167—1199.
[12] Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson, 2006, Economic Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[13] Acemoglu, Daron, and James Robinson, 2008, Persistence of Power, Elites and
Institutions, American Economic Review 98, 267—293.
[14] Acharya, Viral, and Tanju Yorulmazer, 2007, Too Many to Fail – An Analysis of
Time Inconsistency in Bank Closure Policies, Journal of Financial Intermediation
16, 1—31.
[15] Admati, Anat, and Martin Hellwig, 2013, The Bankers’ New Clothes: What’s
Wrong with Banking and What to Do About It (Princeton University Press, Prince-
ton).
[16] Agarwal, Sumit, David Lucca, Amit Seru, and Francesco Trebbi, 2014, Inconsis-
tent Regulators: Evidence from Banking, Quarterly Journal of Economics 129,
889—938.
[17] Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina, and Francesco Trebbi, 2004, Endogenous Polit-
ical Institutions, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 565—611.
[18] Aidt, Toke, Jayasri Dutta, and Elena Loukoianova, 2006, Democracy Comes to
Europe: Franchise Extension and Fiscal Outcomes 1830-1938, European Economic
Review 50, 249—283.
[19] Aidt, Toke, and Peter Jensen, 2014, Workers of the World, Unite! Franchise Ex-
tensions and the Threat of Revolution in Europe, 1820-1938, European Economic
Review, forthcoming.
[20] Akey, Pat, 2013, Valuing Changes in Political Networks: Evidence from Campaign
Contributions to Close Congressional Elections, Working Paper, London Business
School.
[21] Alesina, Alberto, Arnaud Devleeschauwer, William Easterly, Sergio Kurlat, and
Romain Wacziarg, 2003, Fractionalization, Journal of Economic Growth 8, 155—
194.
[22] Alesina, Alberto, Ardagna, Silvia, and Francesco Trebbi, 2006, Who Adjusts and
When? On the Political Economy of Reforms, IMF Staff Papers 53, 1—29.
Bibliography 147
[23] Alesina, Alberto, and Allan Drazen, 1991, Why are Stabilizations Delayed? Amer-
ican Economic Review 81, 1170—1188.
[24] Alesina, Alberto, Roberto Perotti, and Jose´ Tavares, 1998, The Political Economy
of Fiscal Adjustments, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, 197—266.
[25] Angrist, Joshua, and Jo¨rn-Steffen Pischke, 2009, Mostly Harmless Econometrics:
An Empiricists Companion (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
[26] Ansolabehere, Stephen, John de Figueiredo, and James Snyder, 2003, Why is There
so Little Money in Politics? Journal of Economic Perspectives 17, 105—130.
[27] Atkinson, Anthony, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez, 2011, Top Incomes in
the Long Run of History, Journal of Economic Literature 49, 3—71.
[28] Banks, Arthur, 2011, Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Databanks Inter-
national, Jerusalem: www.databanksinternational.com).
[29] Barca, Fabrizio, and Marco Becht, 2001, The Control of Corporate Europe (Oxford
University Press, Oxford).
[30] Baron, David, and Alexander Hirsch, 2012, Common Agency Lobbying over Coali-
tions and Policy, Economic Theory 49, 639—681.
[31] Barro, Robert, 1996, Democracy and Growth, Journal of Economic Growth 1,
1—27.
[32] Barro, Robert, 1999, Determinants of Democracy, Journal of Political Economy
107, 158—183.
[33] Barth, James, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine, 2004, Bank Supervision and Reg-
ulation: What Works Best? Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 205—248.
[34] Barth, James, Gerald Caprio, and Ross Levine, 2006, Rethinking Bank Regulation:
Till Angels Govern (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[35] Barth, James, Gerard Caprio, and Ross Levine, 2012, Guardians of Finance: Mak-
ing Regulators Work for Us. (MIT Press, Cambridge).
[36] Bebchuk, Lucian, and Zvika Neeman, 2010, Investor Protection and Interest Group
Politics, Review of Financial Studies 23, 1089—1119.
[37] Bebchuk, Lucian, and Mark Roe, 1999, A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance, Stanford Law Review 52, 127—170.
Bibliography 148
[38] Becht, Marco, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa Ro¨ell, 2003, Corporate Governance and
Control, in George Constantinides, Milton Harris, and Rene´ Stulz, eds.: Handbook
of the Economics of Finance (Elsevier Science, Amsterdam).
[39] Beck, Nathaniel, and Jonathan Katz, 1995, What to Do (and Not to Do) with
Time-Series Cross-Section Data, American Political Science Review 89, 634—647.
[40] Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh,
2001, New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political
Institutions, World Bank Economic Review 15, 165—176.
[41] Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Ross Levine, 2000, A New Database on
Financial Development and Structure, World Bank Economic Review 14, 597—605.
[42] Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Ross Levine, 2003, Law, Endowments,
and Finance, Journal of Financial Economics 70, 137—181.
[43] Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Ross Levine, 2006, Bank Supervision and
Corruption in Lending, Journal of Monetary Economics 56, 2131—2163.
[44] Beck, Thorsten, Asli Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 2005, Financial
and Legal Constraints to Growth: Does Firm Size Matter? Journal of Finance 60,
137—177.
[45] Beck, Thorsten, and Ross Levine, 2002, Industry Growth and Capital Allocation:
Does Having a Market- or Bank-Based System Matter? Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 64, 147—180.
[46] Beck, Thorsten, and Ross Levine, 2005, Legal Institutions and Financial Develop-
ment, in Claude Menard, and Mary Shirley, eds.: Handbook of New Institutional
Economics (Kluwer, Dordrecht).
[47] Beck, Thorsten, Ross Levine, and Norman Loayza, 2000, Finance and the Sources
of Growth, Journal of Financial Economics 58, 261—300.
[48] Behn, Markus, Rainer Haselmann, Thomas Kick, and Vikrant Vig, 2014, The Po-
litical Economy of Bank Bailouts, Working Paper, London Business School.
[49] Ben-Bassat, Avi, 2011, Conflicts, Interest Groups and Politics in Structural Re-
forms, The Journal of Law and Economics, 54, 937—952.
[50] Benmelech, Efraim, and Tobias Moskowitz, 2010, The Political Economy of Finan-
cial Regulation: Evidence from U.S. State Usury Laws in the 19th Century, Journal
of Finance 65, 1029—1073.
Bibliography 149
[51] Bennedsen, Morten, and Sven Feldmann, 2002, Lobbying Legislatures, Journal of
Political Economy, 110, 919—946.
[52] Berger, Allen, and Gregory Udell, 1994, Did Risk-Based Capital Allocate Bank
Credit and Cause a “Credit Crunch” in the United States? Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 26, 585—628.
[53] Berglo¨f, Erik, and Howard Rosenthal, 2000, The Political Economy of American
Bankruptcy: The Evidence from Roll Call Voting, 1800-1978, Working Paper,
Princeton University.
[54] Bertrand, Marianne, Matilde Bombardini, and Francesco Trebbi, 2014, Is It Whom
You Know or What You Know? An Empirical Assessment of the Lobbying Process,
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
[55] Besley, Timothy, and Stephen Coate, 2001, Lobbying and Welfare in a Representa-
tive Democracy, Review of Economic Studies 68, 67—82.
[56] Biais, Bruno, and Thomas Mariotti, 2009, Credit, Wages, and Bankruptcy Laws,
Journal of the European Economic Association 7, 939—973.
[57] Biais, Bruno, and Enrico Perotti, 2002, Machiavellian Privatization, American Eco-
nomic Review 92, 240—258.
[58] Black, Lamont, and Lieu Hazelwood, 2013, The Effect of TARP on Bank Risk-
Taking, Journal of Financial Stability 9, 790—803.
[59] Blair, Christine, and Rose Kushmeider, 2006, Challenges to the Dual Banking Sys-
tem: The Funding of Bank Supervision, FDIC Banking Review 18, 1—20.
[60] Blanes i Vidal, Jordi, Mirko Draca, and Christian Fons-Rosen, 2012, Revolving
Door Lobbyists, American Economic Review 102, 3731—3748.
[61] Bliss, Christopher, and Barry Nalebuff, 1984, Dragon-Slaying and Ballroom Danc-
ing: The Private Supply of a Public Good, Journal of Public Economics 25, 1—12.
[62] Bolton, Patrick, and Howard Rosenthal, 2002, Political Intervention in Debt Con-
tracts, Journal of Political Economy 110, 1103—1134.
[63] Bombardini, Matilde, 2008, Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation, Journal
of International Economics 75, 329—348.
[64] Bordo, Michael, Barry Eichengreen, Daniela Klingebiel, and Maria Soledad
Martinez-Peria, 2001, Is the Crisis Problem Growing More Severe? Economic Pol-
icy 16, 51—82.
Bibliography 150
[65] Bordo, Michael, and Peter Rousseau, 2006, Legal-Political Factors and the Histor-
ical Evolution of the Finance-Growth Link, European Review of Economic History
10, 421—444.
[66] Bortolotti, Bernardo, and Mara Faccio, 2009, Government Control of Privatized
Firms, Review of Financial Studies 22, 2907—2939.
[67] Bortolotti, Bernardo, and Paolo Pinotti, 2008, Delayed Privatization, Public Choice
136, 331—351.
[68] Braun, Mat`ıas, and Claudio Raddatz, 2008, The Politics of Financial Development:
Evidence from Trade Liberalization, Journal of Finance 63, 1469—1508.
[69] Braun, Mat´ıas, and Claudio Raddatz, 2010, Banking on Politics: When Former
High-Ranking Politicians Become Bank Directors, World Bank Economic Review
24, 234—279.
[70] Buck, Florian, and Nikolaus Hildebrand, 2014, Elites and Bank-Based Finance,
Working Paper, University of Munich.
[71] Campos, Nauro, and Fabrizio Coricelli, 2012, Financial Liberalization and Rever-
sals: Political and Economic Determinants, Economic Policy 27, 483—513.
[72] Calomiris, Charles, and Stephen Haber, 2014, Fragile By Design: The Political Ori-
gins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
[73] Caselli, Francesco, and Nicola Gennaioli, 2008, Economics and Politics of Alterna-
tive Institutional Reforms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 123, 1197—1250.
[74] Cebenoyan, Sinan, and Philip Strahan, 2004, Risk Management, Capital Structure
and Lending at Banks, Journal of Banking and Finance 28, 19—43.
[75] Cetorelli, Nicola, and Michele Gamberra, 2002, Banking Market Structure, Finan-
cial Development and Growth: International Evidence from Industry Data, Journal
of Finance 56, 617—648.
[76] Cetorelli, Nicola, and Philip Strahan, 2006, Finance as a Barrier to Entry: Bank
Competition and Industry Structure in Local U.S. Markets, Journal of Finance 61,
437—461.
[77] Claessens, Stijn, Erik Feijen, and Luc Laeven, 2008, Political Connections and
Preferential Access to Finance: The Role of Campaign Contributions, Journal of
Financial Economics 88, 554—580.
[78] Claessens, Stijn, and Enrico Perotti, 2007, Finance and Inequality: Channels and
Evidence, Journal of Comparative Economics 35, 748—773.
Bibliography 151
[79] Colomer, Josep, 2001, Political Institutions, Democracy and Social Choice (Oxford
University Press, Oxford).
[80] Cooper, Michael, Huseyin Gulen, and Alexei Ovtchinnikov, 2010, Corporate Polit-
ical Contributions and Stock Returns, Journal of Finance 65, 687—724.
[81] Correia, Maria, 2014, Political Connections and SEC Enforcement, Journal of Ac-
counting and Economics 57, 241—262.
[82] Cumming, Douglas, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Joseph McCahery, and Armin
Schwienbacher, 2013, Tranching in the Syndicated Loan Market around the World,
Working Paper, Universite´ Lille Nord de France – SKEMA Business School.
[83] Curry, Timothy, John O’Keefe, Jane Coburn, and Lynne Montgomery, 1999, Finan-
cially Distressed Banks: How Effective are Enforcement Actions in the Supervision
Process? FDIC Banking Review 12, 1—18.
[84] Dam, Lammertjan, and Michael Koetter, 2012, Bank Bailouts and Moral Hazard:
Evidence from Germany, Review of Financial Studies 25, 2343—2380.
[85] Danisewicz, Piotr, Danny McGowan, Enrico Onali, and Klaus Schaeck, 2014, The
Real Effects of Regulatory Enforcement Actions: Evidence from U.S. Counties,
Working Paper, Bangor University.
[86] Davydenko, Sergei, and Julian Franks, 2008, Do Bankruptcy Codes Matter? A
Study of Defaults in France, Germany, and the U.K., Journal of Finance 63,
565—608.
[87] de Figueiredo, John, and James Snyder, 2014, Advancing the Empirical Research
on Lobbying, Annual Review of Political Science 17, 163—185.
[88] Degryse, Hans, Thomas Lambert, and Armin Schwienbacher, 2013, The Political
Economy of Financial Systems: Evidence from Suffrage Reforms in the Last Two
Centuries, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 9621.
[89] Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Asli, Edward Kane, and Luc Laeven, 2008, Determinants of
Deposit-Insurance Adoption and Design, Journal of Financial Intermediation 17,
407—438.
[90] Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt, Asli, and Vojislav Maksimovic, 1998, Law, Finance, and Firm
Growth, Journal of Finance 53, 2107—2137.
[91] Dinc, Serdar, 2005, Politicians and Banks: Political Influences on Government-
Owned Banks in Emerging Countries, Journal of Financial Economics 77,
453—479.
Bibliography 152
[92] Dinc, Serdar, and Nandini Gupta, 2011, The Decision to Privatize: Finance and
Politics, Journal of Finance 66, 241—269.
[93] Djankov, Simeon, Caralee McLiesh, and Andrei Shleifer, 2007, Private Credit in
129 Countries, Journal of Financial Economics 84, 299—329.
[94] Duchin, Ran, and Denis Sosyura, 2012, The Politics of Government Investment,
Journal of Financial Economics 106, 24—48.
[95] Duchin, Ran, and Denis Sosyura, 2014, Safer Ratios, Riskier Portfolios: Banks’
Response to Government Aid, Journal of Financial Economics 113, 1—28.
[96] Eckel, Catherine, and Philip Grossman, 2008, Men, Women and Risk Aversion:
Experimental Evidence, in Charles Plott, and Vernon Smith, eds.: Handbook of
Experimental Economics Results (North-Holland, Amsterdam).
[97] Engerman, Stanley, and Kenneth Sokoloff, 1997, Factor Endowments, Institutions
and Differential Paths of Growth among New World Economies, in Stephen Haber,
ed.: How Latin America Fell Behind (Stanford University Press, Stanford).
[98] Engerman, Stanley, and Kenneth Sokoloff, 2005, The Evolution of Suffrage Institu-
tions in the New World, Journal of Economic History 65, 891—921.
[99] Enriques, Luca, and Paolo Volpin, 2007, Corporate Governance Reforms in Conti-
nental Europe, Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, 117—140.
[100] ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board), 2014, Is Europe Overbanked? Reports
of the Advisory Scientific Committee No. 4/June 2014.
[101] Faccio, Mara, Ronald Masulis, and John McConnell, 2006, Political Connections
and Corporate Bailouts, Journal of Finance 61, 2597—2635.
[102] Fauvera, Larry, and Michael Fuerst, 2006, Does Good Corporate Governance In-
clude Employee Representation? Evidence from German Corporate Boards, Journal
of Financial Economics 82, 673—710.
[103] Fisman, Raymond, 2001, Estimating the Value of Political Connections, American
Economic Review 91, 1095—1102.
[104] Fisman, Raymond, and Inessa Love, 2004, Financial Development and Intersec-
toral Allocation: A New Approach, Journal of Finance 59, 2785—2807.
[105] Flora, Peter, 1983, State, Economy and Society 1815-1975 (Campus Verlag, Frank-
furt).
Bibliography 153
[106] Fogel, Kathy, Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung, 2008, Big Business Stability
and Economic Growth: Is What’s Good for General Motors Good for America?
Journal of Financial Economics 89, 83—108.
[107] Franks, Julian, Colin Mayer, and Stefano Rossi, 2009, Ownership: Evolution and
Regulation, Review of Financial Studies 22, 4009—4056.
[108] Fulghieri, Paolo, and Matti Suominen, 2012, Corporate Governance, Finance, and
the Real Sector, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47, 1187—1214.
[109] Gao, Meng, and Jiekun Huang, 2014, Capitalizing on Capitol Hill: Informed Trad-
ing by Hedge Fund Managers, Working Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign.
[110] Glaeser, Edward, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer,
2004, Do Institutions Cause Growth? Journal of Economic Growth 9, 271—303.
[111] Glaeser, Edward, and Andrei Shleifer, 2002, Legal Origins, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 117, 1193—1230.
[112] Goldsmith, Raymond, 1969, Financial Structure and Development (Yale Univer-
sity Press, New Haven, CT).
[113] Goldsmith, Raymond, 1985, Comparative National Balance Sheets: A Study of
Twenty Countries, 1688-1978 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
[114] Goldman, Eitan, Jo¨rg Rocholl, and Jongil So, 2009, Do Politically Connected
Boards Affect Firm Value? Review of Financial Studies 22, 2331—2360.
[115] Gordon, Sanford, and Catherine Hafer, 2005, Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political
Expenditures as Signals to the Bureaucracy, American Political Science Review 99,
245—261.
[116] Gourevitch, Peter, and James Shinn, 2005, Political Power and Corporate Control.
The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance (Princeton University Press,
Princeton).
[117] Gropp, Reint, Christian Grundl, and Andre Guettler, 2014, The Impact of Public
Guarantees on Bank Risk Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, Review of
Finance 18, 457—448.
[118] Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman, 1994, Protection for Sales, American
Economic Review 84, 833—850.
[119] Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman, 1996, Electoral Competition and Special
Interest Politics, Review of Economic Studies 63, 265—286.
Bibliography 154
[120] Grossman, Gene, and Elhanan Helpman, 2001, Special Interest Politics (MIT
Press, Cambridge).
[121] Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, 2004a, The Role of Social Capital
in Financial Development, American Economic Review 94, 526—556.
[122] Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, 2004b, Does Local Financial
Development Matter? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 929—969.
[123] Guiso, Luigi, Paola Sapienza, and Luigi Zingales, 2009, Cultural Biases in Eco-
nomic Exchange? Quarterly Journal of Economics 124, 1095—1131.
[124] Haber, Stephen, 2011, Politics and Banking Systems: Evidence from New World
Economies, in Stanley Engerman, and Kenneth Sokoloff, eds.: Economic Develop-
ment in the Americas since 1500: Endowments and Institutions (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge).
[125] Haber, Stephen, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast, 2007, Political Institutions
and Financial Development (Stanford University Press, Stanford).
[126] Hall, Peter, and David Soskice, 2001, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional
Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
[127] Hamann, Javier, and Alessandro Prati, 2002, Why Do Many Disinflations Fail?
The Importance of Luck, Timing, and Political Institutions, IMF Working Paper
No. 02/228.
[128] Harstad, Bard, and Jakob Svensson, 2011, Bribes, Lobbying, and Development,
American Political Science Review 105, 46—63.
[129] Heckman, James, Hidehiko Ichimura, and Petra Todd, 1997, Matching as an
Econometric Evaluation Estimator: Evidence from Evaluating a Job Training Pro-
gramme, Review of Economic Studies 64, 605—654.
[130] Heckman, James, Hidehiko Ichimura, and Petra Todd, 1998, Matching as an
Econometric Evaluation Estimator, Review of Economic Studies 65, 261—294.
[131] Hellwig, Martin, 2000, On the Economics and Politics of Corporate Finance and
Corporate Control, in Xavier Vives, ed.: Corporate Governance: Theoretical and
Empirical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[132] Hewitt, Paul, 2011, The Exercise of Shareholder Rights: Country Comparison of
Turnout and Dissent, OECD Corporate Governance Working Papers No. 3.
Bibliography 155
[133] Ho¨gfeldt, Peter, 2005, The History and Politics of Corporate Ownership in Sweden,
in Randall Morck, ed.: A History of Corporate Governance around the World:
Family Business Groups to Professional Managers (University of Chicago Press,
Chicago).
[134] Hsiao, Cheng, 2003, Analysis of Panel Data (Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge).
[135] Huang, Yongfu, 2009, The Political Economy of Financial Reform: Are Abiad and
Mody Right? Journal of Applied Econometrics 24, 1207—1213.
[136] Husted, Thomas, and Lawrence Kenny, 1997, The Effect of the Expansion of the
Voting Franchise on the Size of Government, Journal of Political Economy 105,
54—82.
[137] Igan, Deniz, and Prachi Mishra, 2012, Three’s Company: Wall Street, Capitol
Hill, and K Street, Working Paper, International Monetary Fund.
[138] Igan, Deniz, Prachi Mishra, and Thierry Tressel, 2012, A Fistful of Dollars: Lob-
bying and the Financial Crisis, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 26, 195—230.
[139] Ioannidou, Vasso, 2005, Does Monetary Policy Affect the Central Bank’s Role in
Bank Supervision? Journal of Financial Intermediation 14, 58—85.
[140] Jayaratne, Jith, and Philip Strahan, 1996, The Finance-Growth Nexus: Evidence
from Bank Branch Deregulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics 111, 639—670.
[141] Johnson, Simon, and Todd Mitton, 2003, Cronyism and Capital Controls: Evi-
dence from Malaysia, Journal of Financial Economics 67, 351—382.
[142] Johnson, Simon, and James Kwak, 2011, 13 Bankers: The Wall Street Takeover
and the Next Financial Meltdown (Pantheon Books, New York).
[143] Judson, Ruth, and Ann Owen, 1999, Estimating Dynamic Panel Data Models: A
Guide for Macroeconomists, Economics Letters 65, 9—15.
[144] Justam, Moshe, and Mark Gradstein, 1999, The Industrial Revolution, Political
Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain, Ex-
plorations in Economic History 36, 109—127.
[145] Kaminsky, Graciela, and Sergio Schmukler, 2008, Short-Run Pain, Long-Run Gain:
Financial Liberalization and Stock Market Cycles, Review of Finance 12, 253—292.
[146] Kane, Edward, 2012, Missing Elements in US Financial Reform: A Ku¨bler-Ross
Interpretation of the Inadequacy of the Dodd-Frank Act, Journal of Banking and
Finance 36, 654—661.
Bibliography 156
[147] Kaustia, Markku, Samuli Knu¨pfer, and Sami Torstila, 2014, Stock Ownership
and Political Behavior: Evidence from Demutualizations, Management Science,
forthcoming.
[148] Kerr, William, William Lincoln, and Prachi Mishra, 2014, The Dynamics of Firm
Lobbying, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, forthcoming.
[149] Khwaja, Asim, and Atif Mian, 2005, Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected
Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics
120, 1371—1411.
[150] King, Robert, and Ross Levine, 1993, Finance, Entrepreneurship and Growth,
Journal of Monetary Economics 32, 513—542.
[151] King, Gary, and Langche Zeng, 2001, Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data,
Political Analysis 9, 137—163.
[152] Krishnan, Karthik, Debarshi Nandy, and Manju Puri, 2014, Does Financing Spur
Small Business Productivity? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, Review of
Financial Studies, forthcoming.
[153] Kroszner, Randall, and Philip Strahan, 1996, Regulatory Incentives and the Thrift
Crisis: Dividends, Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, and Financial Distress, Journal of
Finance 51, 1285—1319.
[154] Kroszner, Randall, and Philip Strahan, 1999, What Drives Deregulation? Eco-
nomics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, Quarterly
Journal of Economics 114, 1437—1467.
[155] Krueger, Anne, 1974, The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking Society, American
Economic Review 64, 291—303.
[156] Laeven, Luc, and Ross Levine, 2009, Bank Governance, Regulation, and Risk
Taking, Journal of Financial Economics 93, 259—275.
[157] Laeven, Luc, and Fabia´n Valencia, 2013, Systemic Banking Crises Database, IMF
Economic Review 61, 225—270.
[158] Lamoreaux, Naomi, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 2005, Legal Regime and Con-
tractual Flexibility: A Comparison of Business’s Organizational Choices in France
and the United States during the Era of Industrialization, American Law and Eco-
nomics Review 7, 28—61.
[159] Lancaster, Tony, 2000, The Incidental Parameter Problem Since 1948, Journal of
Econometrics 95, 391—413.
Bibliography 157
[160] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer 1999, Corporate
Ownership around the World, Journal of Finance 54, 471—517.
[161] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2006, What
Works in Securities Laws, Journal of Finance 61, 1—32.
[162] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, 2008, The Eco-
nomic Consequences of Legal Origins, Journal of Economic Literature 46, 285—332.
[163] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
1997, Legal Determinants of External Finance, Journal of Finance 52, 1131—1150.
[164] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
1998, Law and Finance, Journal of Political Economy 106, 231—268.
[165] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
1999, The Quality of Government, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization
15, 222—279.
[166] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
2000a, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies around the World, Journal of Fi-
nance 55, 1—33.
[167] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
2000b, Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 58, 3—27.
[168] La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny,
2002, Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, Journal of Finance 57,
1147—1170.
[169] Levine, Ross, 1997, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and
Agenda, Journal of Economic Literature 35, 688—726.
[170] Levine, Ross, 1998, The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic
Growth, Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 30, 596—620.
[171] Levine, Ross, and Sara Zervos, 1998, Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic
Growth, American Economic Review 88, 537—558.
[172] Liang, Hao, and Luc Renneboog, 2014, Finance and Society: On the Foundations
of Corporate Social Responsibility, Working Paper, Tilburg University.
[173] Licht, Amir, Chanan Goldschmidt, and Shalom Schwartz, 2005, Culture, Law, and
Corporate Governance, International Review of Law and Economics 24, 229—255.
Bibliography 158
[174] Lijphart, Arend, 1994, Electoral Systems and Party Systems (Oxford University
Press, Oxford).
[175] Lipset, Seymour, 1959, Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Develop-
ment and Political Legitimacy, American Political Science Review 53, 69—105.
[176] Lizzeri, Alessandro, and Nicola Persico, 2004, Why Did the Elites Extend the Suf-
frage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain’s
“Age of Reform”, Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, 707—765.
[177] Llavador, Humberto, and Robert Oxoby, 2005, Partisan Competition, Growth,
and the Franchise, Quarterly Journal of Economics 120, 1155—1192.
[178] Lucca, David, Amit Seru, and Francesco Trebbi, 2014, The Revolving Door and
Worker Flows in Banking Regulation, Journal of Monetary Economics 65, 17—32.
[179] Mackie, Thomas, and Richard Rose, 1982, The International Almanac of Electoral
History (Macmillan, London).
[180] Maddala, G. S., and Shaowen Wu, 1999, A Comparative Study of Unit Root
Tests with Panel Data and a New Simple Test, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics 61, 631—652.
[181] Maddison, Angus, 2003, The World Economy: Historical Statistics (OECD,
Paris).
[182] Malmendier, Ulrike, 2009, Law and Finance “at the Origin”, Journal of Economic
Literature 47, 1076—1108.
[183] McCubbins, Mathew, Roger Noll, and Barry Weingast, 1999, Political Control of
Bureaucracy, in Peter Newman, ed.: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law (Palgrave-MacMillan, London).
[184] McKinnon, Ronald, 1973, Money and Capital in Economic Development (Brook-
ings Institution Press, Washington, D.C.).
[185] Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, 2010, The Political Economy of the
US Mortgage Default Crisis, American Economic Review 100, 1967—1998.
[186] Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, 2013, The Political Economy of the
Subprime Mortgage Credit Expansion, Quarterly Journal of Political Science 8,
373—408.
[187] Mian, Atif, Amir Sufi, and Francesco Trebbi, 2014, Resolving Debt Overhang:
Political Constraints in the Aftermath of Financial Crises, American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics 6, 1—28.
Bibliography 159
[188] Modigliani, Franco, and Enrico Perotti, 2000, Security Markets versus Bank Fi-
nance: Legal Enforcement and Investor Protection, International Review of Finance
1, 81—96.
[189] Morgan-Collins, Mona, 2013, Universal Suffrage and the Rise of Socialist Parties:
Evidence from Eleven European Countries, American Political Science Association
2013 Annual Meeting Paper.
[190] Musacchio, Aldo, 2008, Can Civil Law Countries Get Good Institutions? Lessons
from the History of Creditor Rights and Bond Markets in Brazil, Journal of Eco-
nomic History 68, 80—108.
[191] Musacchio, Aldo, 2010, Law and Finance c. 1900, NBER Working Paper Series
No. 16216.
[192] Neyman, Jerzy, and Elizabeth Scott, 1948, Consistent Estimates Based on Par-
tially Consistent Observations, Econometrica 16, 1—32.
[193] North, Douglass, 1990, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Perfor-
mance (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[194] North, Douglass, and Robert Thomas, 1973, The Rise of the Western World: A
New Economic History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[195] North, Douglass, and Barry Weingast, 1989, Constitutions and Commitment: Evo-
lution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England,
Journal of Economic History 49, 803—832.
[196] Olson, Mancur, 1965, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and Theory
Groups (Harvard University Press: Cambridge).
[197] Pagano, Marco, and Paolo Volpin, 2001, The Political Economy of Finance, Oxford
Review of Economic Policy 17, 502—519.
[198] Pagano, Marco, and Paolo Volpin, 2005, The Political Economy of Corporate
Governance, American Economic Review 95, 1005—1030.
[199] Pagano, Marco, and Paolo Volpin, 2006, Shareholder Protection, Stock Mar-
ket Development, and Politics, Journal of the European Economic Association 4,
315—341.
[200] Papaioannou, Elias, and Gregorios Siourounis, 2008, Democratisation and Growth,
Economic Journal 118, 1520—1551.
[201] Peek, Joe, Eric Rosengren, and Geoffrey Tootell, 1999, Is Bank Supervision Central
to Central Banking? Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 629—653.
Bibliography 160
[202] Peltzman, Sam, 1976, Towards a More General Theory of Regulation, Journal of
Law and Economics 19, 211—240.
[203] Perotti, Enrico, 2014, The Political Economy of Finance, Capitalism and Society
9, Article 1.
[204] Perotti, Enrico, and Armin Schwienbacher, 2009, The Political Origin of Pension
Funding, Journal of Financial Intermediation 18, 384—404.
[205] Perotti, Enrico, and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 2006, The Political Economy of
Corporate Control and Labor Rents, Journal of Political Economy 114, 145—174.
[206] Perotti, Enrico, and Paolo Volpin, 2007, Politics, Investor Protection and Compe-
tition, ECGI Finance Working Paper No. 162/2007.
[207] Perotti, Roberto, and Yianos Kontopoulos, 2002, Fragmented Fiscal Policy, Jour-
nal of Public Economics 86, 191—222.
[208] Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, 2003, The Economic Effects of Constitu-
tions (MIT Press, Cambridge).
[209] Persson, Torsten, and Guido Tabellini, 2004, Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Pol-
icy Outcomes, American Economic Review 94, 25—45.
[210] Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, Fernando Limongi,
2000, Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-Being
in the World, 1950-1990 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
[211] Quintyn, Marc, and Genevie`ve Verdier, 2010, Mother Can I Trust the Govern-
ment? Sustained Financial Deepening – A Political Institutions View, IMF Working
Paper No. 10/210.
[212] Rajan, Raghuram, and Rodney Ramcharan, 2011, Land and Credit: A Study of
the Political Economy of Banking in the United States in the Early 20th Century,
Journal of Finance 66, 1895—1931.
[213] Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 1998, Financial Development and Growth,
American Economic Review 88, 559—586.
[214] Rajan, Raghuram, and Luigi Zingales, 2003, The Great Reversals: The Politics of
Financial Development in the Twentieth Century, Journal of Financial Economics
69, 5—50.
[215] Ramirez, Francisco, Yasemin Soysal, and Suzanne Shanahan, 1997, The Chang-
ing Logic of Political Citizenship: Cross-National Acquisition of Women’s Suffrage
Rights, 1890 to 1990, American Sociological Review 62, 735—745.
Bibliography 161
[216] Reese, William, and Michael Weisbach, 2002, Protection of Minority Shareholder
Interests, Cross-Listings in the United States, and Subsequent Equity Offerings,
Journal of Financial Economics 66, 65—104.
[217] Reinhart, Carmen, and Kenneth Rogoff, 2011, From Financial Crash to Debt
Crisis, American Economic Review, 101, 1676—1706.
[218] Richter, Brian, Krislert Samphantharak, and Jeffrey Timmons, 2009, Lobbying
and Taxes, American Journal of Political Science 53, 893—909.
[219] Roe, Mark, 1994, Strong Managers Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American
Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, Princeton).
[220] Roe, Mark, 2003, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Con-
text, Corporate Impact (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
[221] Roe, Mark, 2006, Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, Harvard
Law Review 120, 460—526.
[222] Roe, Mark, and Jordan Siegel, 2009, Finance and Politics: A review Essay Based
on Kenneth Dam’s Analysis of Legal Traditions in The Law-Growth Nexus, Journal
of Economic Literature 47, 781—800.
[223] Rossi, Stefano, and Paolo Volpin, 2004, Cross-Country Determinants of Mergers
and Acquisitions, Journal of Financial Economics 74, 277—304.
[224] Roubini, Nouriel, and Jeffrey Sachs, 1989, Political and Economic Determinants
of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies, European Economic Review 33,
903—938.
[225] Rousseau, Peter, and Paul Wachtel, 1998, Financial Intermediation and Eco-
nomic Performance: Historical Evidence from Five Industrial Countries, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 30, 657—678.
[226] Rousseau, Peter, and Paul Wachtel, 2000, Equity Markets and Growth: Cross-
Country Evidence on Timing and Outcomes, 1980-1995, Journal of Banking and
Finance 24, 1933—1957.
[227] Roy, Arthur, 1952, Safety First and the Holding of Assets, Econometrica 20,
431—449.
[228] Sapienza, Paola, 2004, The Effects of Government Ownership on Bank Lending,
Journal of Financial Economics 72, 357—384.
Bibliography 162
[229] Sapienza, Paola, Luigi Zingales, and Dario Maestripieri, 2009, Gender Differences
in Financial Risk Aversion and Career Choices are Affected by Testosterone, Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, 15268—15273.
[230] Sˇevcˇ´ık, Pavel, 2012, Financial Contracts and the Political Economy of Investor
Protection, American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 4, 163—197.
[231] Shaw, Edward, 1973, Financial Deepening in Economic Development (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, Oxford).
[232] Shive, Sophie, and Margaret Forster, 2014, The Revolving Door for Financial
Regulators, Working Paper, University of Notre Dame.
[233] Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1993, Corruption, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 103, 599—617.
[234] Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1994, Politicians and Firms, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics 109, 995—1025.
[235] Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert Vishny, 1997, A Survey of Corporate Governance,
Journal of Finance 52, 737—783.
[236] Siegel, Jordan, Amir Licht, and Shalom Schwartz, 2011, Egalitarianism and Inter-
national Investment, Journal of Financial Economics 102, 621—642.
[237] Stigler, George, 1971, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Eco-
nomics and Management Science 2, 3—21.
[238] Stock, James, and Motohiro Yogo, 2005, Testing for Weak Instruments in Linear
IV Regression, in Donald Andrews, and James Stock, eds.: Identification and Infer-
ence for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge).
[239] Stulz, Rene´, and Rohan Williamson, 2003, Culture, Openness, and Finance, Jour-
nal of Financial Economics 70, 313—349.
[240] Sylla, Richard, 2006, Schumpeter Redux: A Review of Raghuram G. Rajan and
Luigi Zingales’s Saving Capitalism from the Capitalists, Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 44, 391—404.
[241] Tirole, Jean, 2001, Corporate Governance, Econometrica 69, 1—35.
[242] Tocqueville (de), Alexis, [1835] 1965, Democracy in America (Reprinted in Oxford
University Press, Oxford).
Bibliography 163
[243] Tsebelis, George, 2002, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton
University Press, Princeton).
[244] Turner, John, and Wenwen Zhan, 2012, Property Rights and Competing from the
Affections of Demos: The Impact of the 1867 Reform Act on Stock Prices, Public
Choice 150, 609—631.
[245] Van Nieuwerburgh, Stijn, Frans Buelens, and Ludo Cuyvers, 2006, Stock Market
Development and Economic Growth in Belgium, Explorations in Economic History
43, 13—38.
[246] Veiga, Francisco Jose´, 2000, Delays of Inflation Stabilizations, Economics and
Politics 12, 275—295.
[247] Woo, Jaejoon, 2003, Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of Public
Deficits, Journal of Public Economics 87, 387—426.
[248] Wurgler, Jeffrey, 2000, Financial Markets and the Allocation of Capital, Journal
of Financial Economics 58, 187—214.
[249] Yu, Frank, and Xiaoyun Yu, 2012, Corporate Lobbying and Fraud Detection,
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 46, 1865—1891.

